From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
To: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/10] vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 17:32:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201207163255.564116-2-mszeredi@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201207163255.564116-1-mszeredi@redhat.com>
cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the
xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns.
This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is
what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
---
fs/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++------
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 3 +--
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index cd7a563e8bcd..fd57153b1f61 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -276,8 +276,16 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
+ const void *orig_value = value;
int error;
+ if (size && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+ error = cap_convert_nscap(dentry, &value, size);
+ if (error < 0)
+ return error;
+ size = error;
+ }
+
retry_deleg:
inode_lock(inode);
error = __vfs_setxattr_locked(dentry, name, value, size, flags,
@@ -289,6 +297,9 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
if (!error)
goto retry_deleg;
}
+ if (value != orig_value)
+ kfree(value);
+
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_setxattr);
@@ -537,12 +548,6 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
(strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(kvalue, size);
- else if (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
- error = cap_convert_nscap(d, &kvalue, size);
- if (error < 0)
- goto out;
- size = error;
- }
}
error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 1e7fe311cabe..b2f698915c0f 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -270,6 +270,6 @@ static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
-extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
+extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void **ivalue, size_t size);
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 59bf3c1674c8..bacc1111d871 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
*
* If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
*/
-int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
+int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void **ivalue, size_t size)
{
struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
uid_t nsrootid;
@@ -516,7 +516,6 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
- kvfree(*ivalue);
*ivalue = nscap;
return newsize;
}
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-07 16:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-07 16:32 [PATCH v2 00/10] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2020-12-09 1:53 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr() James Morris
2021-01-01 17:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-11 13:49 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 0:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-12 9:43 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 10:04 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 18:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-12 18:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] vfs: verify source area in vfs_dedupe_file_range_one() Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] ovl: check privs before decoding file handle Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 13:49 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-09 10:13 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09 16:20 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09 18:16 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] ovl: make ioctl() safe Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 11:11 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-10 15:18 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14 5:44 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-14 13:23 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14 14:47 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-09 1:57 ` James Morris
2020-12-10 15:19 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] ovl: simplify file splice Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] ovl: user xattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 13:10 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-11 14:55 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14 5:13 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 11:29 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-11 14:44 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14 5:49 ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] ovl: unprivieged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 10:27 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Tetsuo Handa
2020-12-10 8:56 ` John Johansen
2020-12-10 9:39 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-15 11:03 ` John Johansen
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