From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C563DC2BB48 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:20:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E4412395A for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:20:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727015AbgLQOU4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Dec 2020 09:20:56 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34784 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726601AbgLQOUz (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Dec 2020 09:20:55 -0500 Received: from mail-ej1-x641.google.com (mail-ej1-x641.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::641]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA8AAC061794 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:20:29 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ej1-x641.google.com with SMTP id d17so38121928ejy.9 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:20:29 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=szeredi.hu; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition; bh=s2io9byrVSQg39u9kY1sFTMQIOzVrXTXCf/O9WPWFOA=; b=RD62ChU+OJDF7UVtIVsJlfZGn25fGNj6obtVAVtbOfS2rSy0yE6P+pQA9jFQ/hMihx AQFvzcRCMpzHb5H2uFgcBZkSOfB02SaM9rPWUt+ugNEML91QwzkZ440MrnUrlX1dtd6d mACbQBbnpf5r+rUU5+ytGiLypwDX6Mliyj+TU= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version :content-disposition; bh=s2io9byrVSQg39u9kY1sFTMQIOzVrXTXCf/O9WPWFOA=; b=bhd64dI6+4rglJCUcCIOJPTu7WvWjLgQs+T1m6vTVFJ8En7Yj4EIqsUAf5rCBlysFy sKANckNAnkuJA+wsEhSjoz5sOiBefpw6QmfBFuKJYdw8LPeoYdYPadIeEG3feq4FGKZe BbfwvYFJwrXhRIlZxLSlJ/Wlq27WSyHwqGbAO8DH+wzKqflLNGh7G88u5+pX4kGFndAY GLaBuSOECtQLLp2fyYYXvO65s5dsXHJWTEP4oxx4+Xpgd81QAQ+NUQjDvKr/8GKBdnMh UzdJ6Ks5ufUjECelutj5irPeaGFJWy+Umx7b+vVHN5r15IdnjCfffksSkL4dCTKitSjq Y3fg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530MBiKkeLJWILQ4S1A5/Kkf3BxJgmk6v7Eov7m4vC7PT35GY4DS R12jpykB727Xu8vNYUR2wvOcXw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwYacqRq/f7MIh1/3pz0PfUQwyDeoMerwcxyS4emF6UV4Lid3Xf+1Hk5tGsH6lIIlmX0qnYXw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:9345:: with SMTP id p5mr24446195ejw.40.1608214828591; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:20:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com (catv-86-101-169-67.catv.broadband.hu. [86.101.169.67]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n4sm24486697edt.46.2020.12.17.06.20.27 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:20:27 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 15:20:25 +0100 From: Miklos Szeredi To: Linus Torvalds Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" Subject: [GIT PULL] overlayfs update for 5.11 Message-ID: <20201217142025.GB1236412@miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Hi Linus, Please pull from: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs.git tags/ovl-update-5.11 - Allow unprivileged mounting in a user namespace. For quite some time the security model of overlayfs has been that operations on underlying layers shall be performed with the privileges of the mounting task. This way an unprvileged user cannot gain privileges by the act of mounting an overlayfs instance. A full audit of all function calls made by the overlayfs code has been performed to see whether they conform to this model, and this branch contains some fixes in this regard. - Support running on copied filesystem images by optionally disabling UUID verification. - Bug fixes as well as documentation updates. I was hoping to get feedback from Eric Biederman on the unprivileged mounting feature, but even without that I feel quite good about enabling it at this point. It's a trivial patch at the head of this branch, so skipping it now or reverting later would also be options. Thanks, Miklos --- Chengguang Xu (1): ovl: fix incorrect extent info in metacopy case Kevin Locke (2): ovl: warn about orphan metacopy ovl: document lower modification caveats Miklos Szeredi (12): ovl: doc clarification ovl: expand warning in ovl_d_real() vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr() vfs: verify source area in vfs_dedupe_file_range_one() ovl: check privs before decoding file handle ovl: make ioctl() safe ovl: simplify file splice ovl: user xattr ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr ovl: unprivieged mounts Pavel Tikhomirov (2): ovl: propagate ovl_fs to ovl_decode_real_fh and ovl_encode_real_fh ovl: introduce new "uuid=off" option for inodes index feature --- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst | 36 ++++++-- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 28 ++++--- fs/overlayfs/export.c | 10 ++- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 144 +++++--------------------------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 14 +++- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 28 ++++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 22 +++-- fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 2 + fs/overlayfs/super.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++--- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 18 +++- fs/remap_range.c | 10 ++- fs/xattr.c | 17 ++-- include/linux/capability.h | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 3 +- 14 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 196 deletions(-)