From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
overlayfs <linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/5] allow unprivileged overlay mounts
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2019 16:14:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJfpegt_haMDwd6jo3mQzX2vchk_LLMH+V+h4yDs7geLmo4NhA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87r231rlfj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 3:43 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>
> Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> writes:
>
> > Hi Eric,
> >
> > Can you please have a look at this patchset?
> >
> > The most interesting one is the last oneliner adding FS_USERNS_MOUNT;
> > whether I'm correct in stating that this isn't going to introduce any
> > holes, or not...
>
> I will take some time and dig through this.
>
> From a robustness standpoint I worry about the stackable filesystem
> side. As that is uniquely an attack vector with overlayfs.
>
> There is definitely demand for this.
Hi Eric,
Have you had time to look into this yet?
Thanks,
Miklos
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-25 15:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-25 11:29 [RFC PATCH 0/5] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] ovl: document permission model Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] ovl: ignore failure to copy up unknown xattrs Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] ovl: user xattr Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-26 13:50 ` Amir Goldstein
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] ovl: unprivieged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:35 ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-29 17:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-02-24 2:45 ` Ian Kent
2019-10-25 13:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-11-25 15:14 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
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