From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74EF4C433FF for ; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 01:49:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5405621872 for ; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 01:49:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2389654AbfHHBto (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Aug 2019 21:49:44 -0400 Received: from zeniv.linux.org.uk ([195.92.253.2]:50112 "EHLO ZenIV.linux.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389618AbfHHBtn (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Aug 2019 21:49:43 -0400 Received: from viro by ZenIV.linux.org.uk with local (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hvXYT-00010L-MQ; Thu, 08 Aug 2019 01:49:26 +0000 Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 02:49:25 +0100 From: Al Viro To: Matthew Wilcox Cc: syzbot , allison@lohutok.net, andreyknvl@google.com, cai@lca.pw, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, tglx@linutronix.de, Jiri Kosina Subject: Re: BUG: bad usercopy in hidraw_ioctl Message-ID: <20190808014925.GL1131@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <000000000000ce6527058f8bf0d0@google.com> <20190807195821.GD5482@bombadil.infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190807195821.GD5482@bombadil.infradead.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.0 (2019-05-25) Sender: linux-usb-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 12:58:21PM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 12:28:06PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from wrapped address > > (offset 0, size 0)! > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:98! > > This report is confusing because the arguments to usercopy_abort() are wrong. > > /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */ > if (ptr + n < ptr) > usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n); > > ptr + n is not 'size', it's what wrapped. I don't know what 'offset' > should be set to, but 'size' should be 'n'. Presumably we don't want to > report 'ptr' because it'll leak a kernel address ... reporting 'n' will > leak a range for a kernel address, but I think that's OK? Admittedly an > attacker can pass in various values for 'n', but it'll be quite noisy > and leave a trace in the kernel logs for forensics to find afterwards. > > > Call Trace: > > check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:151 [inline] > > __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:260 [inline] > > __check_object_size.cold+0xb2/0xba mm/usercopy.c:250 > > check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:119 [inline] > > check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:150 [inline] > > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:151 [inline] > > hidraw_ioctl+0x38c/0xae0 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:392 > > The root problem would appear to be: > > else if (copy_to_user(user_arg + offsetof( > struct hidraw_report_descriptor, > value[0]), > dev->hid->rdesc, > min(dev->hid->rsize, len))) > > That 'min' should surely be a 'max'? Surely not. ->rsize is the amount of data available to copy out; len is the size of buffer supplied by userland to copy into. BTW, why is it playing those games with offsetof, anyway? What's wrong with struct hidraw_report_descriptor __user *p = user_arg; ... get_user(&p->size) ... copy_to_user(p->value, ...)