[PATCH 0/8] cfg80211/mac80211 patches from our internal tree 2019-08-30

[PATCH 0/8] cfg80211/mac80211 patches from our internal tree 2019-08-30

[Luca Coelho]

From: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>

Hi,

Some patches with mac80211 and cfg80211 changes from our internal
tree.

Please review, though you have already reviewed most if not all of
them ;)

Cheers,
Luca.


Ilan Peer (1):
  mac80211: Allow user space to register for station Rx authentication

Johannes Berg (4):
  cfg80211: always shut down on HW rfkill
  mac80211: list features in WEP/TKIP disable in better order
  mac80211: remove unnecessary key condition
  mac80211: IBSS: send deauth when expiring inactive STAs

Lior Cohen (1):
  mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable

Luca Coelho (1):
  mac80211: don't check if key is NULL in ieee80211_key_link()

Mordechay Goodstein (1):
  mac80211: vht: add support VHT EXT NSS BW in parsing VHT

 net/mac80211/ibss.c        |  8 +++++++
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h |  3 ++-
 net/mac80211/key.c         | 48 +++++++++++++-------------------------
 net/mac80211/key.h         |  4 ++--
 net/mac80211/main.c        | 13 +++++++++++
 net/mac80211/mlme.c        | 13 ++++++-----
 net/mac80211/util.c        | 11 ++++-----
 net/mac80211/vht.c         | 10 +++++++-
 net/wireless/core.c        | 13 ++++++-----
 net/wireless/core.h        |  2 +-
 net/wireless/wext-compat.c |  5 ++--
 11 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)

-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 1/8] cfg80211: always shut down on HW rfkill

[Luca Coelho]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

When the RFKILL subsystem isn't available, then rfkill_blocked()
always returns false. In the case of hardware rfkill this will
be wrong though, as if the hardware reported being killed then
it cannot operate any longer.

Since we only ever call the rfkill_sync work in this case, just
rename it to rfkill_block and always pass "true" for the blocked
parameter, rather than passing rfkill_blocked().

We rely on the underlying driver to still reject any new attempt
to bring up the device by itself.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/wireless/core.c        | 13 +++++++------
 net/wireless/core.h        |  2 +-
 net/wireless/wext-compat.c |  5 +++--
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c
index a599469b8157..350513744575 100644
--- a/net/wireless/core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/core.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * Copyright 2006-2010		Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
  * Copyright 2013-2014  Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
  * Copyright 2015-2017	Intel Deutschland GmbH
- * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
@@ -300,12 +300,13 @@ static int cfg80211_rfkill_set_block(void *data, bool blocked)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void cfg80211_rfkill_sync_work(struct work_struct *work)
+static void cfg80211_rfkill_block_work(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev;
 
-	rdev = container_of(work, struct cfg80211_registered_device, rfkill_sync);
-	cfg80211_rfkill_set_block(rdev, rfkill_blocked(rdev->rfkill));
+	rdev = container_of(work, struct cfg80211_registered_device,
+			    rfkill_block);
+	cfg80211_rfkill_set_block(rdev, true);
 }
 
 static void cfg80211_event_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -516,7 +517,7 @@ struct wiphy *wiphy_new_nm(const struct cfg80211_ops *ops, int sizeof_priv,
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	INIT_WORK(&rdev->rfkill_sync, cfg80211_rfkill_sync_work);
+	INIT_WORK(&rdev->rfkill_block, cfg80211_rfkill_block_work);
 	INIT_WORK(&rdev->conn_work, cfg80211_conn_work);
 	INIT_WORK(&rdev->event_work, cfg80211_event_work);
 
@@ -1061,7 +1062,7 @@ void wiphy_rfkill_set_hw_state(struct wiphy *wiphy, bool blocked)
 	struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = wiphy_to_rdev(wiphy);
 
 	if (rfkill_set_hw_state(rdev->rfkill, blocked))
-		schedule_work(&rdev->rfkill_sync);
+		schedule_work(&rdev->rfkill_block);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(wiphy_rfkill_set_hw_state);
 
diff --git a/net/wireless/core.h b/net/wireless/core.h
index 77556c58d9ac..ed487e324571 100644
--- a/net/wireless/core.h
+++ b/net/wireless/core.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct cfg80211_registered_device {
 	/* rfkill support */
 	struct rfkill_ops rfkill_ops;
 	struct rfkill *rfkill;
-	struct work_struct rfkill_sync;
+	struct work_struct rfkill_block;
 
 	/* ISO / IEC 3166 alpha2 for which this device is receiving
 	 * country IEs on, this can help disregard country IEs from APs
diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-compat.c b/net/wireless/wext-compat.c
index 46e4d69db845..7b6529d81c61 100644
--- a/net/wireless/wext-compat.c
+++ b/net/wireless/wext-compat.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  * we directly assign the wireless handlers of wireless interfaces.
  *
  * Copyright 2008-2009	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -864,8 +865,8 @@ static int cfg80211_wext_siwtxpower(struct net_device *dev,
 			}
 		}
 	} else {
-		rfkill_set_sw_state(rdev->rfkill, true);
-		schedule_work(&rdev->rfkill_sync);
+		if (rfkill_set_sw_state(rdev->rfkill, true))
+			schedule_work(&rdev->rfkill_block);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 1/8] cfg80211: always shut down on HW rfkill

[Luca Coelho]

This fixes was missed in parsing the vht capabilities max bw
support.

Signed-off-by: Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@intel.com>
Fixes: e80d642552a3 ("mac80211: copy VHT EXT NSS BW Support/Capable data to station")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/vht.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/vht.c b/net/mac80211/vht.c
index b20ff28d9f30..ccdcb9ad9ac7 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/vht.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/vht.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Portions of this file
  * Copyright(c) 2015 - 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
- * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2019 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
@@ -349,6 +349,14 @@ enum ieee80211_sta_rx_bandwidth ieee80211_sta_cap_rx_bw(struct sta_info *sta)
 	    cap_width == IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SUPP_CHAN_WIDTH_160_80PLUS80MHZ)
 		return IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_160;
 
+	/*
+	 * If this is non-zero, then it does support 160 MHz after all,
+	 * in one form or the other. We don't distinguish here (or even
+	 * above) between 160 and 80+80 yet.
+	 */
+	if (vht_cap->cap & IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_EXT_NSS_BW_MASK)
+		return IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_160;
+
 	return IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_80;
 }
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 3/8] mac80211: list features in WEP/TKIP disable in better order

[Luca Coelho]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

"HE/HT/VHT" is a bit confusing since really the order of
development (and possible support) is different - change
this to "HT/VHT/HE".

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/mlme.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index 6471f552a942..31f0bae28dcc 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -5296,7 +5296,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 			ifmgd->flags |= IEEE80211_STA_DISABLE_VHT;
 			ifmgd->flags |= IEEE80211_STA_DISABLE_HE;
 			netdev_info(sdata->dev,
-				    "disabling HE/HT/VHT due to WEP/TKIP use\n");
+				    "disabling HT/VHT/HE due to WEP/TKIP use\n");
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 4/8] mac80211: Allow user space to register for station Rx authentication

[Luca Coelho]

From: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>

To support Pre Association Security Negotiation (PASN) while already
associated to one AP, allow user space to register to Rx authentication
frames, so that the user space logic would be able to receive/handle
authentication frames from a different AP as part of PASN.

Note that it is expected that user space would intelligently register
for Rx authentication frames, i.e., only when PASN is used and configure
a match filter only for PASN authentication algorithm, as otherwise
the MLME functionality of mac80211 would be broken.

Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/main.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c
index 29b9d57df1a3..6eddc5592fc4 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/main.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/main.c
@@ -416,7 +416,20 @@ ieee80211_default_mgmt_stypes[NUM_NL80211_IFTYPES] = {
 	},
 	[NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION] = {
 		.tx = 0xffff,
+		/*
+		 * To support Pre Association Security Negotiation (PASN) while
+		 * already associated to one AP, allow user space to register to
+		 * Rx authentication frames, so that the user space logic would
+		 * be able to receive/handle authentication frames from a
+		 * different AP as part of PASN.
+		 * It is expected that user space would intelligently register
+		 * for Rx authentication frames, i.e., only when PASN is used
+		 * and configure a match filter only for PASN authentication
+		 * algorithm, as otherwise the MLME functionality of mac80211
+		 * would be broken.
+		 */
 		.rx = BIT(IEEE80211_STYPE_ACTION >> 4) |
+			BIT(IEEE80211_STYPE_AUTH >> 4) |
 			BIT(IEEE80211_STYPE_PROBE_REQ >> 4),
 	},
 	[NL80211_IFTYPE_AP] = {
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 5/8] mac80211: remove unnecessary key condition

[Luca Coelho]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

When we reach this point, the key cannot be NULL. Remove the condition
that suggests otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/key.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 7dfee848abac..1be3686562ee 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * Copyright 2007-2008	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
  * Copyright 2013-2014  Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
  * Copyright 2015-2017	Intel Deutschland GmbH
+ * Copyright 2018-2019  Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #include <linux/if_ether.h>
@@ -781,9 +782,8 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
 		/* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using
 		 * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys.
 		 */
-		if (key &&
-		    ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) ||
-		     (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)))
+		if ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) ||
+		    (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher))
 			goto out;
 	} else if (sta) {
 		old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]);
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 6/8] mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable

[Luca Coelho]

From: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com>

In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to
non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending
counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value.

The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational
for the delayed tailroom needed:

	/*
	* The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
	* make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
	* and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
	* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
	* the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
	* by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
	* key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
	* zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
	*
	* The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
	* to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
	* longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
	* within an ESS this usually won't happen.
	*/

The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug:
1. Disconnect from encrypted AP
2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key
3. Schedule work
4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP
5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1
6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning

While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into
its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called
ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
and remove the counters warning as we just reset both.

Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/key.c  | 40 ++++++++++++----------------------------
 net/mac80211/key.h  |  4 ++--
 net/mac80211/util.c |  6 +-----
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 1be3686562ee..93ea03b86b80 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -843,46 +843,30 @@ void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom)
 	ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
 }
 
-void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_key *key;
 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
 
 	ASSERT_RTNL();
 
-	if (WARN_ON(!ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)))
-		return;
-
-	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
-		     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
-
-	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
-		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
-			WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
-				     vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
-	}
-
-	list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
-		increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
-		ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
-	}
-
-	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
-}
-
-void ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
-{
-	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
-
 	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
 
 	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
+	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
 
 	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
-		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
+		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) {
 			vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
+			vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) {
+		list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
+			increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+			ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
+		}
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index b8b9cd743bf4..d6d6e89cf7dd 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
  * Copyright 2005, Devicescape Software, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #ifndef IEEE80211_KEY_H
@@ -156,8 +157,7 @@ void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 			 bool force_synchronize);
 void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 			     struct sta_info *sta);
-void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata);
-void ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata);
+void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata);
 
 #define key_mtx_dereference(local, ref) \
 	rcu_dereference_protected(ref, lockdep_is_held(&((local)->key_mtx)))
diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c
index 286c7ee35e63..92bfedfd3fd2 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/util.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/util.c
@@ -2420,11 +2420,7 @@ int ieee80211_reconfig(struct ieee80211_local *local)
 
 	/* add back keys */
 	list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
-		ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom(sdata);
-
-	list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
-		if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata))
-			ieee80211_enable_keys(sdata);
+		ieee80211_reenable_keys(sdata);
 
 	/* Reconfigure sched scan if it was interrupted by FW restart */
 	mutex_lock(&local->mtx);
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 7/8] mac80211: don't check if key is NULL in ieee80211_key_link()

[Luca Coelho]

From: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>

We already assume that key is not NULL and dereference it in a few
other places before we check whether it is NULL, so the check is
unnecessary.  Remove it.

Fixes: 96fc6efb9ad9 ("mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/key.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 93ea03b86b80..0f889b919b06 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
 
 	/* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */
 	if (!pairwise) {
-		if (key && old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)
+		if (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH 8/8] mac80211: IBSS: send deauth when expiring inactive STAs

[Luca Coelho]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

When we expire an inactive station, try to send it a deauth. This
helps if it's actually still around, and just has issues with
beacon distribution (or we do), and it will not also remove us.
Then, if we have shared state, this may not be reset properly,
causing problems; for example, we saw a case where aggregation
sessions weren't removed properly (due to the TX start being
offloaded to firmware and it relying on deauth for stop), causing
a lot of traffic to get lost due to the SN reset after remove/add
of the peer.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/ibss.c        |  8 ++++++++
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h |  3 ++-
 net/mac80211/mlme.c        | 11 ++++++-----
 net/mac80211/util.c        |  5 +++--
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/ibss.c b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
index f00dca056295..0a6ff01c68a9 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ibss.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
@@ -1252,6 +1252,7 @@ void ieee80211_ibss_rx_no_sta(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 
 static void ieee80211_ibss_sta_expire(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 {
+	struct ieee80211_if_ibss *ifibss = &sdata->u.ibss;
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
 	struct sta_info *sta, *tmp;
 	unsigned long exp_time = IEEE80211_IBSS_INACTIVITY_LIMIT;
@@ -1268,10 +1269,17 @@ static void ieee80211_ibss_sta_expire(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 		if (time_is_before_jiffies(last_active + exp_time) ||
 		    (time_is_before_jiffies(last_active + exp_rsn) &&
 		     sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED)) {
+			u8 frame_buf[IEEE80211_DEAUTH_FRAME_LEN];
+
 			sta_dbg(sta->sdata, "expiring inactive %sSTA %pM\n",
 				sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED ?
 				"not authorized " : "", sta->sta.addr);
 
+			ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, sta->sta.addr,
+						       ifibss->bssid,
+						       IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH,
+						       WLAN_REASON_DEAUTH_LEAVING,
+						       true, frame_buf);
 			WARN_ON(__sta_info_destroy(sta));
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 791ce58d0f09..05406e9c05b3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -2099,7 +2099,8 @@ void ieee80211_send_auth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 			 const u8 *da, const u8 *key, u8 key_len, u8 key_idx,
 			 u32 tx_flags);
 void ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
-				    const u8 *bssid, u16 stype, u16 reason,
+				    const u8 *da, const u8 *bssid,
+				    u16 stype, u16 reason,
 				    bool send_frame, u8 *frame_buf);
 
 enum {
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index 31f0bae28dcc..26a2f49208b6 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -2278,8 +2278,9 @@ static void ieee80211_set_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 		    !ifmgd->have_beacon)
 			drv_mgd_prepare_tx(sdata->local, sdata, 0);
 
-		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, ifmgd->bssid, stype,
-					       reason, tx, frame_buf);
+		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, ifmgd->bssid,
+					       ifmgd->bssid, stype, reason,
+					       tx, frame_buf);
 	}
 
 	/* flush out frame - make sure the deauth was actually sent */
@@ -4509,7 +4510,7 @@ void ieee80211_mgd_quiesce(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 		 * cfg80211 won't know and won't actually abort those attempts,
 		 * thus we need to do that ourselves.
 		 */
-		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, bssid,
+		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, bssid, bssid,
 					       IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH,
 					       WLAN_REASON_DEAUTH_LEAVING,
 					       false, frame_buf);
@@ -5550,7 +5551,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 			   ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(req->reason_code));
 
 		drv_mgd_prepare_tx(sdata->local, sdata, 0);
-		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, req->bssid,
+		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, req->bssid, req->bssid,
 					       IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH,
 					       req->reason_code, tx,
 					       frame_buf);
@@ -5570,7 +5571,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 			   ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(req->reason_code));
 
 		drv_mgd_prepare_tx(sdata->local, sdata, 0);
-		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, req->bssid,
+		ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, req->bssid, req->bssid,
 					       IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH,
 					       req->reason_code, tx,
 					       frame_buf);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c
index 92bfedfd3fd2..051a02ddcb85 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/util.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/util.c
@@ -1583,7 +1583,8 @@ void ieee80211_send_auth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 }
 
 void ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
-				    const u8 *bssid, u16 stype, u16 reason,
+				    const u8 *da, const u8 *bssid,
+				    u16 stype, u16 reason,
 				    bool send_frame, u8 *frame_buf)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
@@ -1594,7 +1595,7 @@ void ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 	mgmt->frame_control = cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FTYPE_MGMT | stype);
 	mgmt->duration = 0; /* initialize only */
 	mgmt->seq_ctrl = 0; /* initialize only */
-	memcpy(mgmt->da, bssid, ETH_ALEN);
+	memcpy(mgmt->da, da, ETH_ALEN);
 	memcpy(mgmt->sa, sdata->vif.addr, ETH_ALEN);
 	memcpy(mgmt->bssid, bssid, ETH_ALEN);
 	/* u.deauth.reason_code == u.disassoc.reason_code */
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

[PATCH v2] mac80211: vht: add support VHT EXT NSS BW in parsing VHT

[Luca Coelho]

From: Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@intel.com>

This fixes was missed in parsing the vht capabilities max bw
support.

Signed-off-by: Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@intel.com>
Fixes: e80d642552a3 ("mac80211: copy VHT EXT NSS BW Support/Capable data to station")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
---

Fixed the subject in v2 (no idea what happened there).


net/mac80211/vht.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/vht.c b/net/mac80211/vht.c
index b20ff28d9f30..ccdcb9ad9ac7 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/vht.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/vht.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Portions of this file
  * Copyright(c) 2015 - 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
- * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2019 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
@@ -349,6 +349,14 @@ enum ieee80211_sta_rx_bandwidth ieee80211_sta_cap_rx_bw(struct sta_info *sta)
 	    cap_width == IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SUPP_CHAN_WIDTH_160_80PLUS80MHZ)
 		return IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_160;
 
+	/*
+	 * If this is non-zero, then it does support 160 MHz after all,
+	 * in one form or the other. We don't distinguish here (or even
+	 * above) between 160 and 80+80 yet.
+	 */
+	if (vht_cap->cap & IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_EXT_NSS_BW_MASK)
+		return IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_160;
+
 	return IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_80;
 }
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1

Re: [PATCH 4/8] mac80211: Allow user space to register for station Rx authentication

[Johannes Berg]

On Fri, 2019-08-30 at 14:24 +0300, Luca Coelho wrote:
> From: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
> 
> To support Pre Association Security Negotiation (PASN) while already
> associated to one AP, allow user space to register to Rx authentication
> frames, so that the user space logic would be able to receive/handle
> authentication frames from a different AP as part of PASN.
> 
> Note that it is expected that user space would intelligently register
> for Rx authentication frames, i.e., only when PASN is used and configure
> a match filter only for PASN authentication algorithm, as otherwise
> the MLME functionality of mac80211 would be broken.

This literally broke hundreds of wpa_s tests, so I guess it's not
"intelligently register[ing]" for them...

johannes