Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 21:42:58 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190603211528-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <877ea26tk8.fsf@morokweng.localdomain>

On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 10:13:59PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> 
> 
> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:42:00PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >> I rephrased it in terms of address translation. What do you think of
> >> this version? The flag name is slightly different too:
> >>
> >>
> >> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION This feature has the same
> >>     meaning as VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set and when not set,
> >>     with the exception that address translation is guaranteed to be
> >>     unnecessary when accessing memory addresses supplied to the device
> >>     by the driver. Which is to say, the device will always use physical
> >>     addresses matching addresses used by the driver (typically meaning
> >>     physical addresses used by the CPU) and not translated further. This
> >>     flag should be set by the guest if offered, but to allow for
> >>     backward-compatibility device implementations allow for it to be
> >>     left unset by the guest. It is an error to set both this flag and
> >>     VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
> >
> >
> > OK so VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is designed to allow unpriveledged
> > drivers. This is why devices fail when it's not negotiated.
> 
> Just to clarify, what do you mean by unprivileged drivers? Is it drivers
> implemented in guest userspace such as with VFIO? Or unprivileged in
> some other sense such as needing to use bounce buffers for some reason?

I had drivers in guest userspace in mind.

> > This confuses me.
> > If driver is unpriveledged then what happens with this flag?
> > It can supply any address it wants. Will that corrupt kernel
> > memory?
> 
> Not needing address translation doesn't necessarily mean that there's no
> IOMMU. On powerpc we don't use VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM but there's
> always an IOMMU present. And we also support VFIO drivers. The VFIO API
> for pseries (sPAPR section in Documentation/vfio.txt) has extra ioctls
> to program the IOMMU.
> 
> For our use case, we don't need address translation because we set up an
> identity mapping in the IOMMU so that the device can use guest physical
> addresses.

And can it access any guest physical address?

> If the guest kernel is concerned that an unprivileged driver could
> jeopardize its integrity it should not negotiate this feature flag.

Unfortunately flag negotiation is done through config space
and so can be overwritten by the driver.

> Perhaps there should be a note about this in the flag definition? This
> concern is platform-dependant though. I don't believe it's an issue in
> pseries.

Again ACCESS_PLATFORM has a pretty open definition. It does actually
say it's all up to the platform.

Specifically how will VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION be
implemented portably? virtio has no portable way to know
whether DMA API bypasses translation.

> --
> Thiago Jung Bauermann
> IBM Linux Technology Center