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From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
To: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linuxram@us.ibm.com, cclaudio@linux.ibm.com,
	kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, jglisse@redhat.com,
	aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, paulus@au1.ibm.com,
	sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	hch@lst.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/8] mm: ksm: Export ksm_madvise()
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 16:45:35 +1100
Message-ID: <20191107054535.GA2882@oak.ozlabs.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191106064542.GB21634@in.ibm.com>

On Wed, Nov 06, 2019 at 12:15:42PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2019 at 03:33:29PM +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 09:47:53AM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > > KVM PPC module needs ksm_madvise() for supporting secure guests.
> > > Guest pages that become secure are represented as device private
> > > pages in the host. Such pages shouldn't participate in KSM merging.
> > 
> > If we don't do the ksm_madvise call, then as far as I can tell, it
> > should all still work correctly, but we might have KSM pulling pages
> > in unnecessarily, causing a reduction in performance.  Is that right?
> 
> I thought so too. When KSM tries to merge a secure page, it should
> cause a fault resulting in page-out the secure page. However I see
> the below crash when KSM is enabled and KSM scan tries to kmap and
> memcmp the device private page.
> 
> BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc007fffe00010000
> Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000ab5a0
> Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: ksmd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2-00026-g2249c0ae4a53-dirty #376
> NIP:  c0000000000ab5a0 LR: c0000000003d7c3c CTR: 0000000000000004
> REGS: c0000001c85d79b0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (5.4.0-rc2-00026-g2249c0ae4a53-dirty)
> MSR:  900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002242  XER: 20040000
> CFAR: c0000000000ab3d0 DAR: c007fffe00010000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 
> GPR00: 0000000000000004 c0000001c85d7c40 c0000000018ce000 c0000001c3880000 
> GPR04: c007fffe00010000 0000000000010000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 
> GPR08: c000000001992298 0000603820002138 ffffffffffffffff ffffffff00003a69 
> GPR12: 0000000024002242 c000000002550000 c0000001c8700000 c00000000179b728 
> GPR16: c00c01ffff800040 c00000000179b5b8 c00c00000070e200 ffffffffffffffff 
> GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 fffffffffffff000 c00000000179b648 
> GPR24: c0000000024464a0 c00000000249f568 c000000001118918 0000000000000000 
> GPR28: c0000001c804c590 c00000000249f518 0000000000000000 c0000001c8700000 
> NIP [c0000000000ab5a0] memcmp+0x320/0x6a0
> LR [c0000000003d7c3c] memcmp_pages+0x8c/0xe0
> Call Trace:
> [c0000001c85d7c40] [c0000001c804c590] 0xc0000001c804c590 (unreliable)
> [c0000001c85d7c70] [c0000000004591d0] ksm_scan_thread+0x960/0x21b0
> [c0000001c85d7db0] [c0000000001bf328] kthread+0x198/0x1a0
> [c0000001c85d7e20] [c00000000000bfbc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x80
> Instruction dump:
> ebc1fff0 eba1ffe8 eb81ffe0 eb61ffd8 4e800020 38600001 4d810020 3860ffff 
> 4e800020 38000004 7c0903a6 7d201c28 <7d402428> 7c295040 38630008 38840008 

Hmmm, that seems like a bug in the ZONE_DEVICE stuff generally.  All
that ksm is doing as far as I can see is follow_page() and
kmap_atomic().  I wonder how many other places in the kernel might
also be prone to crashing if they try to touch device pages?

> In anycase, we wouldn't want secure guests pages to be pulled out due
> to KSM, hence disabled merging.

Sure, I don't disagree with that, but I worry that we are papering
over a bug here.

Paul.

  reply index

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-04  4:17 [PATCH v10 0/8] KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] mm: ksm: Export ksm_madvise() Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06  4:33   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06  6:45     ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-07  5:45       ` Paul Mackerras [this message]
2019-11-15 14:10         ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] KVM: PPC: Support for running secure guests Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06  4:34   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] KVM: PPC: Shared pages support for " Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06  4:52   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06  8:22     ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06  8:29       ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] KVM: PPC: Radix changes for secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06  5:58   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06  8:36     ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] KVM: PPC: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM Bharata B Rao
2019-11-11  4:25   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] KVM: PPC: Support reset of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-11-11  5:28   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-11  6:55     ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-12  5:34   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-13 15:29     ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-14  5:07       ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-04  4:17 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] KVM: PPC: Implement H_SVM_INIT_ABORT hcall Bharata B Rao
2019-11-11  4:19   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-12  1:01     ` Ram Pai
2019-11-12  5:38       ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-12  7:52         ` Ram Pai
2019-11-12 11:32           ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-12 14:45             ` Ram Pai
2019-11-13  0:14               ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-13  6:32                 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-13 21:18                   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-13 21:50                     ` Ram Pai
2019-11-14  5:08                       ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-14  7:02                         ` Ram Pai
2019-11-04  4:18 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] KVM: PPC: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06  4:30 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06  6:20   ` Bharata B Rao

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