From: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
To: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: linuxram@us.ibm.com, cclaudio@linux.ibm.com,
kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, jglisse@redhat.com,
aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, paulus@au1.ibm.com,
sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
hch@lst.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/8] mm: ksm: Export ksm_madvise()
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 19:40:06 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191115141006.GA21409@in.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191107054535.GA2882@oak.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Nov 07, 2019 at 04:45:35PM +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2019 at 12:15:42PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 06, 2019 at 03:33:29PM +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> > > On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 09:47:53AM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > > > KVM PPC module needs ksm_madvise() for supporting secure guests.
> > > > Guest pages that become secure are represented as device private
> > > > pages in the host. Such pages shouldn't participate in KSM merging.
> > >
> > > If we don't do the ksm_madvise call, then as far as I can tell, it
> > > should all still work correctly, but we might have KSM pulling pages
> > > in unnecessarily, causing a reduction in performance. Is that right?
> >
> > I thought so too. When KSM tries to merge a secure page, it should
> > cause a fault resulting in page-out the secure page. However I see
> > the below crash when KSM is enabled and KSM scan tries to kmap and
> > memcmp the device private page.
> >
> > BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc007fffe00010000
> > Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000ab5a0
> > Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> > LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
> > Modules linked in:
> > CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: ksmd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2-00026-g2249c0ae4a53-dirty #376
> > NIP: c0000000000ab5a0 LR: c0000000003d7c3c CTR: 0000000000000004
> > REGS: c0000001c85d79b0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2-00026-g2249c0ae4a53-dirty)
> > MSR: 900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002242 XER: 20040000
> > CFAR: c0000000000ab3d0 DAR: c007fffe00010000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
> > GPR00: 0000000000000004 c0000001c85d7c40 c0000000018ce000 c0000001c3880000
> > GPR04: c007fffe00010000 0000000000010000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff
> > GPR08: c000000001992298 0000603820002138 ffffffffffffffff ffffffff00003a69
> > GPR12: 0000000024002242 c000000002550000 c0000001c8700000 c00000000179b728
> > GPR16: c00c01ffff800040 c00000000179b5b8 c00c00000070e200 ffffffffffffffff
> > GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 fffffffffffff000 c00000000179b648
> > GPR24: c0000000024464a0 c00000000249f568 c000000001118918 0000000000000000
> > GPR28: c0000001c804c590 c00000000249f518 0000000000000000 c0000001c8700000
> > NIP [c0000000000ab5a0] memcmp+0x320/0x6a0
> > LR [c0000000003d7c3c] memcmp_pages+0x8c/0xe0
> > Call Trace:
> > [c0000001c85d7c40] [c0000001c804c590] 0xc0000001c804c590 (unreliable)
> > [c0000001c85d7c70] [c0000000004591d0] ksm_scan_thread+0x960/0x21b0
> > [c0000001c85d7db0] [c0000000001bf328] kthread+0x198/0x1a0
> > [c0000001c85d7e20] [c00000000000bfbc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x80
> > Instruction dump:
> > ebc1fff0 eba1ffe8 eb81ffe0 eb61ffd8 4e800020 38600001 4d810020 3860ffff
> > 4e800020 38000004 7c0903a6 7d201c28 <7d402428> 7c295040 38630008 38840008
>
> Hmmm, that seems like a bug in the ZONE_DEVICE stuff generally. All
> that ksm is doing as far as I can see is follow_page() and
> kmap_atomic(). I wonder how many other places in the kernel might
> also be prone to crashing if they try to touch device pages?
In the above shown crash, we don't go via follow_page() and hence
I believe we don't hit the fault path. I see that we come here
after getting the page from get_ksm_page() which returns a device
private page which the subsequent memcmp_pages() does kmap_atomic and
tries to access the address resulting in the above crash.
>
> > In anycase, we wouldn't want secure guests pages to be pulled out due
> > to KSM, hence disabled merging.
>
> Sure, I don't disagree with that, but I worry that we are papering
> over a bug here.
Looks like yes. May be someone with better understanding of KSM code
can comment here?
Regards,
Bharata.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-15 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-04 4:17 [PATCH v10 0/8] KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] mm: ksm: Export ksm_madvise() Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06 4:33 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06 6:45 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-07 5:45 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-15 14:10 ` Bharata B Rao [this message]
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] KVM: PPC: Support for running secure guests Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06 4:34 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] KVM: PPC: Shared pages support for " Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06 4:52 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06 8:22 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06 8:29 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] KVM: PPC: Radix changes for secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06 5:58 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06 8:36 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] KVM: PPC: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM Bharata B Rao
2019-11-11 4:25 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] KVM: PPC: Support reset of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-11-11 5:28 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-11 6:55 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-12 5:34 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-13 15:29 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-11-14 5:07 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-04 4:17 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] KVM: PPC: Implement H_SVM_INIT_ABORT hcall Bharata B Rao
2019-11-11 4:19 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-12 1:01 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-12 5:38 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-12 7:52 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-12 11:32 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-12 14:45 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-13 0:14 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-13 6:32 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-13 21:18 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-13 21:50 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-14 5:08 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-11-14 7:02 ` Ram Pai
2019-11-04 4:18 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] KVM: PPC: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option Bharata B Rao
2019-11-06 4:30 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest Paul Mackerras
2019-11-06 6:20 ` Bharata B Rao
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