Re: [PATCH v1 3/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: migrate remaining normal-GFNs to secure-GFNs in H_SVM_INIT_DONE

[Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>]

On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 04:10:25PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 03:36:39PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 12:05:35PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 05:25:18PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > > > On Sat, May 30, 2020 at 07:27:50PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:
> > > > > H_SVM_INIT_DONE incorrectly assumes that the Ultravisor has explicitly
> > > > > called H_SVM_PAGE_IN for all secure pages.
> > > > 
> > > > I don't think that is quite true. HV doesn't assume anything about
> > > > secure pages by itself.
> > > 
> > > Yes. Currently, it does not assume anything about secure pages.  But I am
> > > proposing that it should consider all pages (except the shared pages) as
> > > secure pages, when H_SVM_INIT_DONE is called.
> > 
> > Ok, then may be also add the proposed changes to H_SVM_INIT_DONE
> > documentation.
> 
> ok.
> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > In other words, HV should treat all pages; except shared pages, as
> > > secure pages once H_SVM_INIT_DONE is called. And this includes pages
> > > added subsequently through memory hotplug.
> > 
> > So after H_SVM_INIT_DONE, if HV touches a secure page for any
> > reason and gets encrypted contents via page-out, HV drops the
> > device pfn at that time. So what state we would be in that case? We
> > have completed H_SVM_INIT_DONE, but still have a normal (but encrypted)
> > page in HV?
> 
> Good point.
> 
> The corresponding GFN will continue to be a secure GFN. Just that its
> backing PFN is not a device-PFN, but a memory-PFN. Also that backing
> memory-PFN contains encrypted content.
> 
> I will clarify this in the patch; about secure-GFN state.

I feel all this is complicating the states in HV and is avoidable
if UV just issued page-in calls during memslot registration uvcall.

Regards,
Bharata.