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From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: oss-security@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: Linux kernel: powerpc: KVM guest to host memory corruption
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 10:46:14 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87eebk1t49.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87im0x1lqi.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>

Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> writes:
> The Linux kernel for powerpc since v3.10 has a bug which allows a malicious KVM guest to
> corrupt host memory.
>
> In the handling of the H_RTAS hypercall, args.rets is made to point into the args.args
> buffer which is located on the stack:
>
> 	args.rets = &args.args[be32_to_cpu(args.nargs)];
>
> However args.nargs has not been range checked. That allows the guest to point args.rets
> anywhere up to +16GB from args.args.
>
> The guest does not have control of what is written to args.rets, it is always (u32)-3,
> because subsequent code does check nargs. Additionally the guest will be killed as a
> result of the nargs being out of range, so a given guest only has a single shot at
> corrupting memory.
>
> Only machines using Linux as the hypervisor, aka. KVM or bare metal, are affected by the
> bug.
>
> The bug was introduced in:
>
>     8e591cb72047 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add infrastructure to implement kernel-side RTAS calls")
>
> Which was first released in v3.10.
>
> The upstream fix is:
>
>   f62f3c20647e ("KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix H_RTAS rets buffer overflow")
>
>   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=f62f3c20647ebd5fb6ecb8f0b477b9281c44c10a
>
> Which will be included in the v5.14 release.

This has been assigned CVE-2021-37576.

cheers

      reply	other threads:[~2021-07-27  0:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-26  9:13 Linux kernel: powerpc: KVM guest to host memory corruption Michael Ellerman
2021-07-27  0:46 ` Michael Ellerman [this message]

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