From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
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sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
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PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
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<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2016 16:48:38 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKxw3RxWNKLX4XVCwJ6x_zA=_RwiU9jLDm2+VRO79G7+w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+UdkQA+k39GNLe5CwBPVD5ZbRGTCQLqS8VF=kWx+PtsQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
>> On Fri, 8 Jul 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>>> Is check_valid_pointer() making sure the pointer is within the usable
>>> size? It seemed like it was checking that it was within the slub
>>> object (checks against s->size, wants it above base after moving
>>> pointer to include redzone, etc).
>>
>> check_valid_pointer verifies that a pointer is pointing to the start of an
>> object. It is used to verify the internal points that SLUB used and
>> should not be modified to do anything different.
>
> Yup, no worries -- I won't touch it. :) I just wanted to verify my
> understanding.
>
> And after playing a bit more, I see that the only thing to the left is
> padding and redzone. SLUB layout, from what I saw:
>
> offset: what's there
> -------
> start: padding, redzone
> red_left_pad: object itself
> inuse: rest of metadata
> size: start of next slub object
>
> (and object_size == inuse - red_left_pad)
>
> i.e. a pointer must be between red_left_pad and inuse, which is the
> same as pointer - ref_left_pad being less than object_size.
>
> So, as found already, the position in the usercopy check needs to be
> bumped down by red_left_pad, which is what Michael's fix does, so I'll
> include it in the next version.
Actually, after some offline chats, I think this is better, since it
makes sure the ptr doesn't end up somewhere weird before we start the
calculations. This leaves the pointer as-is, but explicitly handles
the redzone on the offset instead, with no wrapping, etc:
/* Find offset within object. */
offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
+ /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
+ if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
+ if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
+ return s->name;
+ offset -= s->red_left_pad;
+ }
+
/* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
return NULL;
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-08 20:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-07 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
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