From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261259AbVA0Wqi (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Jan 2005 17:46:38 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261260AbVA0Wqi (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Jan 2005 17:46:38 -0500 Received: from zeus.kernel.org ([204.152.189.113]:901 "EHLO zeus.kernel.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261259AbVA0WqQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Jan 2005 17:46:16 -0500 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="CP 1252" From: Jesse Pollard To: Zan Lynx Subject: Re: thoughts on kernel security issues Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 16:18:25 -0600 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.2] Cc: Bill Davidsen , linux-os , John Richard Moser , dtor_core@ameritech.net, Linus Torvalds , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Arjan van de Ven , Ingo Molnar , Christoph Hellwig , Dave Jones , Andrew Morton , marcelo.tosatti@cyclades.com, Greg KH , chrisw@osdl.org, Alan Cox , Kernel Mailing List References: <05012710374600.20895@tabby> <1106846314.15927.6.camel@localhost> In-Reply-To: <1106846314.15927.6.camel@localhost> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <05012716182500.22102@tabby> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thursday 27 January 2005 11:18, Zan Lynx wrote: > On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 10:37 -0600, Jesse Pollard wrote: > > > > > > > Unfortunately, there will ALWAYS be a path, either direct, or > > > > indirect between the secure net and the internet. > > > > > > Other than letting people use secure computers after they have seen the > > > Internet, a good setup has no indirect paths. > > > > Ha. Hahaha... > > > > Reality bites. > > In the reality I'm familiar with, the defense contractor's secure > projects building had one entrance, guarded by security guards who were > not cheap $10/hr guys, with strict instructions. No computers or > computer media were allowed to leave the building except with written > authorization of a corporate officer. The building was shielded against > Tempest attacks and verified by the NSA. Any computer hardware or media > brought into the building for the project was physically destroyed at > the end. > And you are assuming that everybody follows the rules. when a PHB, whether military or not (and not contractor) comes in and says "... I don't care what it takes... get that data over there NOW..." guess what - it gets done. Even if it is "less secure" in the process. Oh - and about that "physically destroyed" - that used to be true. Until it was pointed out to them that destruction of 300TB of data media would cost them about 2 Million. Suddenly, erasing became popular. And sufficient. Then it was reused in a non-secure facility, operated by the same CO. > Secure nets _are_ possible. Yes they are. But they are NOT reliable. Don't ever assume a "secure" network really is. All it means is: "as secure as we can manage"