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Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/18] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via
 speculative execution
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
        torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
        alan@linux.intel.com
References: <151520099201.32271.4677179499894422956.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
 <151520107515.32271.4902355030043648595.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
From: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Message-ID: <07835e19-baef-81a0-b921-5bae491f03f6@cogentembedded.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 13:05:40 +0300
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On 1/6/2018 4:11 AM, Dan Williams wrote:

> Expectedly, static analysis reports that 'fd' is a user controlled value
> that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array.  In
> order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
> speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads
> based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files.
> 
> Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
> 
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
>   include/linux/fdtable.h |    5 +++--
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
> index 1c65817673db..4a147c5c2533 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
> @@ -81,9 +81,10 @@ struct dentry;
>   static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd)
>   {
>   	struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
> +	struct file __rcu **fdp;
>   
> -	if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
> -		return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
> +	if ((fdp = nospec_array_ptr(fdt->fd, fd, fdt->max_fds)))

    And here...

> +		return rcu_dereference_raw(*fdp);
>   	return NULL;
>   }
>   

MMR, Sergei