From: Auger Eric <eric.auger@redhat.com>
To: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>,
alex.williamson@redhat.com, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
joro@8bytes.org
Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com,
ashok.raj@intel.com, jun.j.tian@intel.com, yi.y.sun@intel.com,
jean-philippe@linaro.org, peterx@redhat.com, hao.wu@intel.com,
stefanha@gmail.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:30:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0db97d4a-7c74-9fac-0763-0ed56dcc5eaa@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1595917664-33276-10-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com>
Hi Yi,
On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote:
> When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a
> system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain.
> For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space.
> e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation.
>
> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
> CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++
> drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++--
> 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev,
> int granu = 0;
> u64 pasid = 0;
> u64 addr = 0;
> + void *pdata;
>
> granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity);
> if (granu == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev,
> (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags & IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID))
> pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid;
>
> + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> + if (!pdata) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata);
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> switch (BIT(cache_type)) {
> case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB:
> /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev,
> dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
>
> mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex);
> - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL);
> + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL);
A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the
device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe?
> if (IS_ERR(svm)) {
> ret = PTR_ERR(svm);
> goto out;
> @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
> {
> struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev);
> + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain;
> struct intel_svm_dev *sdev;
> struct intel_svm *svm;
> int ret = -EINVAL;
> @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> if (WARN_ON(!iommu))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> +
> mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex);
> - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL);
> + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
same here.
> if (!svm) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
>
Thanks
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-15 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-28 6:27 [PATCH v6 00/15] vfio: expose virtual Shared Virtual Addressing to VMs Liu Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 01/15] vfio/type1: Refactor vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl() Liu Yi L
2020-07-28 15:53 ` Alex Williamson
2020-07-29 2:20 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 02/15] iommu: Report domain nesting info Liu Yi L
2020-08-13 12:52 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-14 7:15 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-16 12:40 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-18 4:21 ` Jacob Pan
2020-08-18 6:59 ` Auger Eric
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 03/15] iommu/smmu: Report empty " Liu Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 04/15] vfio/type1: Report iommu nesting info to userspace Liu Yi L
2020-08-13 13:19 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-14 7:36 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-20 19:52 ` Alex Williamson
2020-08-21 0:52 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 05/15] vfio: Add PASID allocation/free support Liu Yi L
2020-08-13 15:07 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-14 7:40 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 06/15] iommu/vt-d: Support setting ioasid set to domain Liu Yi L
2020-08-13 15:06 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-14 8:04 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-16 12:42 ` Auger Eric
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 07/15] vfio/type1: Add VFIO_IOMMU_PASID_REQUEST (alloc/free) Liu Yi L
2020-08-15 16:30 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-17 5:23 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-20 20:51 ` Alex Williamson
2020-08-21 0:37 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-21 1:49 ` Alex Williamson
2020-08-21 2:18 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 08/15] iommu: Pass domain to sva_unbind_gpasid() Liu Yi L
2020-08-20 21:06 ` Alex Williamson
2020-08-21 0:18 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-21 13:09 ` Auger Eric
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space Liu Yi L
2020-08-15 16:30 ` Auger Eric [this message]
2020-08-17 5:38 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 10/15] vfio/type1: Support binding guest page tables to PASID Liu Yi L
2020-08-16 11:29 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-17 6:30 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 11/15] vfio/type1: Allow invalidating first-level/stage IOMMU cache Liu Yi L
2020-08-16 11:35 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-17 6:30 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 12/15] vfio/type1: Add vSVA support for IOMMU-backed mdevs Liu Yi L
2020-08-20 21:48 ` Alex Williamson
2020-08-21 0:53 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 13/15] vfio/pci: Expose PCIe PASID capability to guest Liu Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 14/15] vfio: Document dual stage control Liu Yi L
2020-08-16 11:51 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-17 7:00 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-17 7:40 ` Eric Auger
2020-08-17 7:43 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 15/15] iommu/vt-d: Support reporting nesting capability info Liu Yi L
2020-08-16 12:01 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-17 7:05 ` Liu, Yi L
2020-08-17 7:42 ` Auger Eric
2020-08-17 7:45 ` Liu, Yi L
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