From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B159C433EF for ; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 17:19:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243587AbiBYRUa (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Feb 2022 12:20:30 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45746 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S243568AbiBYRU2 (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Feb 2022 12:20:28 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6707B1C2D9B for ; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 09:19:55 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1645809594; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=0bdBwNSnrD7yysUHd564/dKTLnPvhau29Bt+Q9jstDU=; b=cYV20tyKciv68POq/kdH+lAYSkS13oSDXC5iz3RvJt11ceSY+tgHCAFmgqRy2ISQp5mvCR Vi8nQuuGCZMdmxbS4Nr9AMDI6Jd9cCG2qOqoshp63uwlO2CLBogfZAlnJLGPSXKW60XNmp so9/61ODnGhMMg9tB2ZJrHNwbQPJVwE= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-538-I5C8UVqENE6b8OLJbAh-2A-1; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 12:19:49 -0500 X-MC-Unique: I5C8UVqENE6b8OLJbAh-2A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 02B27800425; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 17:19:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from starship (unknown [10.40.195.190]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9983F1073025; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 17:19:33 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <0e9a22e90256ed289d90956f720f36d870c92d2a.camel@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 7/9] KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization From: Maxim Levitsky To: Zeng Guang , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , kvm@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen , Tony Luck , Kan Liang , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Kim Phillips , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , Kai Huang Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Robert Hu , Gao Chao Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 19:19:32 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20220225082223.18288-8-guang.zeng@intel.com> References: <20220225082223.18288-1-guang.zeng@intel.com> <20220225082223.18288-8-guang.zeng@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" User-Agent: Evolution 3.36.5 (3.36.5-2.fc32) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 2022-02-25 at 16:22 +0800, Zeng Guang wrote: > From: Gao Chao > > With IPI virtualization enabled, the processor emulates writes to > APIC registers that would send IPIs. The processor sets the bit > corresponding to the vector in target vCPU's PIR and may send a > notification (IPI) specified by NDST and NV fields in target vCPU's > Posted-Interrupt Descriptor (PID). It is similar to what IOMMU > engine does when dealing with posted interrupt from devices. > > A PID-pointer table is used by the processor to locate the PID of a > vCPU with the vCPU's APIC ID. > > Like VT-d PI, if a vCPU goes to blocked state, VMM needs to switch its > notification vector to wakeup vector. This can ensure that when an IPI > for blocked vCPUs arrives, VMM can get control and wake up blocked > vCPUs. And if a VCPU is preempted, its posted interrupt notification > is suppressed. > > Note that IPI virtualization can only virualize physical-addressing, > flat mode, unicast IPIs. Sending other IPIs would still cause a > trap-like APIC-write VM-exit and need to be handled by VMM. > > Signed-off-by: Gao Chao > Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h | 2 + > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 6 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 12 ++++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 ++ > 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h > index 8c929596a299..b79b6438acaa 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h > @@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(USR_WAIT_PAUSE) > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(BUS_LOCK_DETECTION) > > +/* > + * Definitions of Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls. > + */ > +#define TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(IPI_VIRT) > + > #define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(INTR_EXITING) > #define PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(NMI_EXITING) > #define PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(VIRTUAL_NMIS) > @@ -159,6 +164,7 @@ static inline int vmx_misc_mseg_revid(u64 vmx_misc) > enum vmcs_field { > VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID = 0x00000000, > POSTED_INTR_NV = 0x00000002, > + LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX = 0x00000008, > GUEST_ES_SELECTOR = 0x00000800, > GUEST_CS_SELECTOR = 0x00000802, > GUEST_SS_SELECTOR = 0x00000804, > @@ -224,6 +230,8 @@ enum vmcs_field { > TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH = 0x00002033, > TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL = 0x00002034, > TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH = 0x00002035, > + PID_POINTER_TABLE = 0x00002042, > + PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH = 0x00002043, > GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS = 0x00002400, > GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x00002401, > VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800, > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h > index ff20776dc83b..7ce616af2db2 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h > @@ -86,4 +86,6 @@ > #define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLV_EXITING ( 2*32+ 28) /* "" VM-Exit on ENCLV (leaf dependent) */ > #define VMX_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION ( 2*32+ 30) /* "" VM-Exit when bus lock caused */ > > +/* Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 3 */ > +#define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT (3*32 + 4) /* "" Enable IPI virtualization */ > #endif /* _ASM_X86_VMXFEATURES_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h > index 31f3d88b3e4d..5f656c9e33be 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h > @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept; > extern bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest; > extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits; > extern bool __read_mostly enable_pml; > +extern bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv; > extern int __read_mostly pt_mode; > > #define PT_MODE_SYSTEM 0 > @@ -283,6 +284,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_apicv(void) > cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr(); > } > > +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ipiv(void) > +{ > + return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl & TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT; > +} > + > static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority(void) > { > return cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() && > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c > index aa1fe9085d77..90124a30c074 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c > @@ -177,11 +177,21 @@ static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > local_irq_restore(flags); > } > > +static bool vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) && enable_ipiv; > +} > + > +static bool vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + return vmx_can_use_ipiv_pi(kvm) || vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(kvm); It took me a while to figure that out. vmx_can_use_vtd_pi returns true when the VM can be targeted by posted interrupts from the IOMMU, which leads to 1. update of the NV vector and SN bit on vcpu_load/vcpu_put to let IOMMU knows where the vCPU really runs. 2. in vmx_pi_update_irte to configure the posted interrupts. Now IPIv will also use the same NV vector and SN bit for IPI virtualization, thus they have to be kept up to date on vcpu load/put. I would appreciate a comment about this in vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts because posted interrupts can mean too many things, like a host->guest posted interrupt which is sent by just interrupt. Maybe also rename the function to something like vmx_need_up_to_date_nv_sn(). Sounds silly to me so maybe something else. > +} > + > void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > { > struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu); > > - if (!vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm)) > + if (!vmx_can_use_posted_interrupts(vcpu->kvm)) I see here it is used. > return; > > if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)) > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > index 7beba7a9f247..0cb141c277ef 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO); > > module_param(enable_apicv, bool, S_IRUGO); > > +bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true; > +module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444); > + > /* > * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use > * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not > @@ -227,6 +230,11 @@ static const struct { > }; > > #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 > + > +/* PID(Posted-Interrupt Descriptor)-pointer table entry is 64-bit long */ > +#define MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER get_order(KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS * sizeof(u64)) > +#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1 > + > static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages; > > static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf) > @@ -2543,7 +2551,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, > } > > if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS) { > - u64 opt3 = 0; > + u64 opt3 = TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT; > u64 min3 = 0; > > if (adjust_vmx_controls_64(min3, opt3, > @@ -3898,6 +3906,8 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW); > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W); > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W); > + if (enable_ipiv) > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR),MSR_TYPE_RW); > } > } > > @@ -4219,14 +4229,21 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx)); > if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) { > - if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) > + if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) { > secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, > SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | > SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY); > - else > + if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls() && enable_ipiv) > + tertiary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, > + TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT); > + } else { > secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, > SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | > SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY); > + if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls()) > + tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, > + TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT); > + } Why check for cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls()? wouldn't it be always true (enable_ipiv has to be turned to false if CPU doesn't support IPIv, and if it does it will support tertiary exec controls). I don't mind this as a precaution + consistency with other code. > } > > vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu); > @@ -4260,7 +4277,16 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > > static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > { > - return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; > + u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl; > + > + /* > + * IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI > + * virtualization if APICv is inhibited. > + */ > + if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu)) > + exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT; I am not 100% sure, but kvm_vcpu_apicv_active might not be the best thing to check here, as it reflects per-cpu dynamic APICv inhibit. It probably works, but it might be better to use enable_apicv here and rely on normal APICv inhibit, and there inibit IPIv as well as you do in vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl/ > + > + return exec_control; > } > > /* > @@ -4412,6 +4438,9 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > > static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > { > + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu; > + struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm); > + > if (nested) > nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap(); > > @@ -4431,7 +4460,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls()) > tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx)); > > - if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu)) { > + if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) { here too (pre-existing), I also not 100% sure that kvm_vcpu_apicv_active should be used. I haven't studied APICv code that much to be 100% sure. > vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0); > vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0); > vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0); > @@ -4441,6 +4470,13 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > > vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR); > vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc))); > + > + if (enable_ipiv) { > + WRITE_ONCE(kvm_vmx->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id], > + __pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID); > + vmcs_write64(PID_POINTER_TABLE, __pa(kvm_vmx->pid_table)); > + vmcs_write16(LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX, kvm_vmx->pid_last_index); > + } > } > > if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm)) { > @@ -4492,7 +4528,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1); > } > > - vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL); > + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL); I might have separated the refactoring of using vcpu instead of &vmx->vcpu in a separate patch, but I don't mind that that much. > > if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) { > memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc)); > @@ -4508,7 +4544,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > > if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow()) { > vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0); > - if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu)) > + if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(vcpu)) > vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, > __pa(vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs)); > vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0); > @@ -7165,6 +7201,18 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) > break; > } > } > + > + if (enable_ipiv) { > + struct page *pages; > + > + pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER); > + if (!pages) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->pid_table = (void *)page_address(pages); > + to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->pid_last_index = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS - 1; > + } > + > return 0; > } > > @@ -7756,6 +7804,14 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit) > return supported & BIT(bit); > } > > +static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm); > + > + if (kvm_vmx->pid_table) > + free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, MAX_PID_TABLE_ORDER); Maybe add a warning checking that ipiv was actually enabled. Maybe this is overkill. > +} > + > static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { > .name = "kvm_intel", > > @@ -7768,6 +7824,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { > > .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), > .vm_init = vmx_vm_init, > + .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, > > .vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu, > .vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu, > @@ -8022,6 +8079,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) > if (!enable_apicv) > vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL; > > + if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv()) > + enable_ipiv = false; > + > if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling()) { > kvm_has_tsc_control = true; > kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h > index d4a647d3ed4a..e7b0c00c9d43 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h > @@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ struct kvm_vmx { > unsigned int tss_addr; > bool ept_identity_pagetable_done; > gpa_t ept_identity_map_addr; > + /* PID table for IPI virtualization */ > + u64 *pid_table; > + u16 pid_last_index; > }; > > bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); I might have missed something, but overall looks good. Best regards, Maxim Levitsky