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* [PATCH] Process Attribute API for Security Modules against 2.5.68
@ 2003-04-23 17:46 Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2003-04-23 17:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Linus Torvalds, Alexander Viro, lkml, lsm

This patch against 2.5.68 implements a process attribute API for
security modules, as described in my April 8th RFC posting.  Credit for
the idea of implementing this API via /proc/pid/attr nodes goes to Al
Viro.  Please apply, or let me know if any changes are needed.  Thanks.

 fs/proc/base.c           |  250 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/security.h |   23 ++++
 security/dummy.c         |   12 ++
 3 files changed, 285 insertions(+)

Index: linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c
diff -u linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c:1.1.1.3 linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c:1.6
--- linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c:1.1.1.3	Mon Apr 21 10:15:46 2003
+++ linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c	Mon Apr 21 11:03:32 2003
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@
 	PROC_PID_MAPS,
 	PROC_PID_MOUNTS,
 	PROC_PID_WCHAN,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_CURRENT,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_EXEC,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
 	PROC_PID_FD_DIR = 0x8000,	/* 0x8000-0xffff */
 };
 
@@ -82,11 +86,18 @@
   E(PROC_PID_ROOT,	"root",		S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_EXE,	"exe",		S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_MOUNTS,	"mounts",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR,	"attr",		S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO),
 #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
   E(PROC_PID_WCHAN,	"wchan",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
 #endif
   {0,0,NULL,0}
 };
+static struct pid_entry attr_stuff[] = {
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_CURRENT,	"current",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_EXEC,		"exec",		S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_FSCREATE,	"fscreate",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  {0,0,NULL,0}
+};
 #undef E
 
 static inline struct task_struct *proc_task(struct inode *inode)
@@ -961,6 +972,240 @@
 	.permission	= proc_permission,
 };
 
+static int proc_attr_readdir(struct file * filp,
+	void * dirent, filldir_t filldir)
+{
+	int i;
+	int pid, ino;
+	struct inode *inode = filp->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct pid_entry *p;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	lock_kernel();
+
+	pid = proc_task(inode)->pid;
+	if (!pid) {
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	i = filp->f_pos;
+	switch (i) {
+		case 0:
+			if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, i, inode->i_ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
+				goto out;
+			i++;
+			filp->f_pos++;
+			/* fall through */
+		case 1:
+			ino = fake_ino(pid, PROC_PID_INO);
+			if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, 1, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
+				goto out;
+			i++;
+			filp->f_pos++;
+			/* fall through */
+		default:
+			i -= 2;
+			if (i>=sizeof(attr_stuff)/sizeof(attr_stuff[0])) {
+				ret = 1;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			p = attr_stuff + i;
+			while (p->name) {
+				if (filldir(dirent, p->name, p->len, filp->f_pos,
+					    fake_ino(pid, p->type), p->mode >> 12) < 0)
+					goto out;
+				filp->f_pos++;
+				p++;
+			}
+	}
+
+	ret = 1;
+out:
+	unlock_kernel();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define ATTRGET(name) \
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_get##name(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, size_t count) \
+{ \
+	return security_getprocattr(task, #name , buffer, count); \
+}
+ATTRGET(current)
+ATTRGET(exec)
+ATTRGET(fscreate)
+#undef ATTRGET
+
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char * buf,
+				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+				  int (*attr_read)(struct task_struct *task, char *page, size_t count))
+{
+	struct inode * inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	unsigned long page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	ssize_t end;
+	struct task_struct *task = proc_task(inode);
+
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		count = PAGE_SIZE;
+	if (!(page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	length = attr_read(task, (char*)page, count);
+	if (length < 0) {
+		free_page(page);
+		return length;
+	}
+	/* Static 4kB (or whatever) block capacity */
+	if (*ppos >= length) {
+		free_page(page);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (count + *ppos > length)
+		count = length - *ppos;
+	end = count + *ppos;
+	copy_to_user(buf, (char *) page + *ppos, count);
+	*ppos = end;
+	free_page(page);
+	return count;
+}
+
+#define ATTRREAD(name) \
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read##name(struct file * file, \
+					char * buf, \
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos) \
+{ \
+	return proc_pid_attr_read(file, buf, count, ppos, proc_pid_attr_get##name); \
+}
+ATTRREAD(current);
+ATTRREAD(exec);
+ATTRREAD(fscreate);
+#undef ATTRREAD
+
+#define ATTRSET(name) \
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_set##name(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, size_t count) \
+{ \
+	return security_setprocattr(task, #name , buffer, count); \
+}
+ATTRSET(current)
+ATTRSET(exec)
+ATTRSET(fscreate)
+#undef ATTRSET
+
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char * buf,
+				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+				   int (*attr_write)(struct task_struct *task, char *page, size_t count))
+{ 
+	struct inode * inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	char *page; 
+	ssize_t length; 
+	struct task_struct *task = proc_task(inode); 
+
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE) 
+		count = PAGE_SIZE; 
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_USER); 
+	if (!page) 
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT; 
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) 
+		goto out;
+
+	length = attr_write(task, page, count);
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+} 
+
+#define ATTRWRITE(name) \
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write##name(struct file * file, \
+					 const char * buf, \
+					 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) \
+{ \
+	return proc_pid_attr_write(file, buf, count, ppos, proc_pid_attr_set##name); \
+}
+ATTRWRITE(current);
+ATTRWRITE(exec);
+ATTRWRITE(fscreate);
+#undef ATTRWRITE
+
+#define ATTROPS(name) \
+static struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_##name##_operations = { \
+	.read		= proc_pid_attr_read##name, \
+	.write		= proc_pid_attr_write##name, \
+};
+ATTROPS(current);
+ATTROPS(exec);
+ATTROPS(fscreate);
+#undef ATTROPS
+
+static struct dentry *proc_attr_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int error;
+	struct task_struct *task = proc_task(dir);
+	struct pid_entry *p;
+	struct proc_inode *ei;
+
+	error = -ENOENT;
+	inode = NULL;
+
+	for (p = attr_stuff; p->name; p++) {
+		if (p->len != dentry->d_name.len)
+			continue;
+		if (!memcmp(dentry->d_name.name, p->name, p->len))
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!p->name)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = -EINVAL;
+	inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, p->type);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+
+	ei = PROC_I(inode);
+	inode->i_mode = p->mode;
+	/*
+	 * Yes, it does not scale. And it should not. Don't add
+	 * new entries into /proc/<pid>/attr without very good reasons.
+	 */
+	switch(p->type) {
+		case PROC_PID_ATTR_CURRENT:
+			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_current_operations;
+			break;
+		case PROC_PID_ATTR_EXEC:
+			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_exec_operations;
+			break;
+		case PROC_PID_ATTR_FSCREATE:
+			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_fscreate_operations;
+			break;
+		default:
+			printk("procfs: impossible type (%d)",p->type);
+			iput(inode);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+	if (!proc_task(dentry->d_inode)->pid)
+		d_drop(dentry);
+	return NULL;
+
+out:
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations proc_attr_operations = {
+	.read		= generic_read_dir,
+	.readdir	= proc_attr_readdir,
+};
+
+static struct inode_operations proc_attr_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup		= proc_attr_lookup,
+};
+
 /* SMP-safe */
 static struct dentry *proc_base_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
@@ -1040,6 +1285,11 @@
 			break;
 		case PROC_PID_MOUNTS:
 			inode->i_fop = &proc_mounts_operations;
+			break;
+		case PROC_PID_ATTR:
+			inode->i_nlink = 2;
+			inode->i_op = &proc_attr_inode_operations;
+			inode->i_fop = &proc_attr_operations;
 			break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
 		case PROC_PID_WCHAN:
Index: linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h
diff -u linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h:1.1.1.2 linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h:1.16
--- linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h:1.1.1.2	Wed Mar 19 09:54:58 2003
+++ linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h	Fri Apr 18 11:17:19 2003
@@ -1123,6 +1128,9 @@
 
 	void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
+ 	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+ 	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket * sock,
 				    struct socket * other, struct sock * newsk);
@@ -1755,6 +1769,16 @@
 	security_ops->d_instantiate (dentry, inode);
 }
 
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+}
+
+static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+}
+
 static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sk_buff * skb)
 {
 	return security_ops->netlink_send(skb);
@@ -2339,6 +2367,16 @@
 
 static inline void security_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 { }
+
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
 
 /*
  * The netlink capability defaults need to be used inline by default
Index: linux-2.5/security/dummy.c
diff -u linux-2.5/security/dummy.c:1.1.1.2 linux-2.5/security/dummy.c:1.14
--- linux-2.5/security/dummy.c:1.1.1.2	Wed Mar 19 09:59:17 2003
+++ linux-2.5/security/dummy.c	Fri Apr 18 11:17:20 2003
@@ -736,6 +741,16 @@
 	return;
 }
 
+static int dummy_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int dummy_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 
 struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
 
@@ -860,6 +876,8 @@
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, register_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unregister_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
+ 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
+ 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);


-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* [PATCH] Process Attribute API for Security Modules against 2.5.68
@ 2003-05-01 17:45 Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2003-05-01 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Linus Torvalds, Alexander Viro, lkml, lsm, Jan Harkes

This patch against 2.5.68 implements a process attribute API for
security modules via a set of nodes in a /proc/pid/attr directory.
Credit for the idea of implementing this API via /proc/pid/attr nodes
goes to Al Viro.  Jan Harkes provided a nice cleanup of the
implementation to reduce the code bloat.  An additional node has been
added to support the SELinux API call for obtaining the security context
prior to the last exec, i.e. the calling context, so that a program that
runs in a different context can obtain the context of its caller and
apply security checks based on it or use it for labeling purposes. 
Please apply, or let me know if any changes are needed.  Thanks.


 fs/proc/base.c           |  187 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/security.h |   23 +++++
 security/dummy.c         |   12 +++
 3 files changed, 222 insertions(+)

Index: linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c
diff -u linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c:1.1.1.3 linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c:1.8
--- linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c:1.1.1.3	Mon Apr 21 10:15:46 2003
+++ linux-2.5/fs/proc/base.c	Wed Apr 30 14:26:51 2003
@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@
 	PROC_PID_MAPS,
 	PROC_PID_MOUNTS,
 	PROC_PID_WCHAN,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_CURRENT,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_PREV,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_EXEC,
+	PROC_PID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
 	PROC_PID_FD_DIR = 0x8000,	/* 0x8000-0xffff */
 };
 
@@ -82,11 +87,19 @@
   E(PROC_PID_ROOT,	"root",		S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_EXE,	"exe",		S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_MOUNTS,	"mounts",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR,	"attr",		S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO),
 #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
   E(PROC_PID_WCHAN,	"wchan",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
 #endif
   {0,0,NULL,0}
 };
+static struct pid_entry attr_stuff[] = {
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_CURRENT,	"current",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_PREV,	"prev",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_EXEC,	"exec",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_ATTR_FSCREATE,	"fscreate",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
+  {0,0,NULL,0}
+};
 #undef E
 
 static inline struct task_struct *proc_task(struct inode *inode)
@@ -961,6 +974,175 @@
 	.permission	= proc_permission,
 };
 
+static int proc_attr_readdir(struct file * filp,
+	void * dirent, filldir_t filldir)
+{
+	int i;
+	int pid, ino;
+	struct inode *inode = filp->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct pid_entry *p;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	lock_kernel();
+
+	pid = proc_task(inode)->pid;
+	if (!pid) {
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	i = filp->f_pos;
+	switch (i) {
+		case 0:
+			if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, i, inode->i_ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
+				goto out;
+			i++;
+			filp->f_pos++;
+			/* fall through */
+		case 1:
+			ino = fake_ino(pid, PROC_PID_INO);
+			if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, 1, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
+				goto out;
+			i++;
+			filp->f_pos++;
+			/* fall through */
+		default:
+			i -= 2;
+			if (i>=sizeof(attr_stuff)/sizeof(attr_stuff[0])) {
+				ret = 1;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			p = attr_stuff + i;
+			while (p->name) {
+				if (filldir(dirent, p->name, p->len, filp->f_pos,
+					    fake_ino(pid, p->type), p->mode >> 12) < 0)
+					goto out;
+				filp->f_pos++;
+				p++;
+			}
+	}
+
+	ret = 1;
+out:
+	unlock_kernel();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char * buf,
+				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct inode * inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	unsigned long page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	ssize_t end;
+	struct task_struct *task = proc_task(inode);
+
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+		count = PAGE_SIZE;
+	if (!(page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	length = security_getprocattr(task, 
+				      (char*)file->f_dentry->d_name.name, 
+				      (void*)page, count);
+	if (length < 0) {
+		free_page(page);
+		return length;
+	}
+	/* Static 4kB (or whatever) block capacity */
+	if (*ppos >= length) {
+		free_page(page);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (count + *ppos > length)
+		count = length - *ppos;
+	end = count + *ppos;
+	copy_to_user(buf, (char *) page + *ppos, count);
+	*ppos = end;
+	free_page(page);
+	return count;
+}
+
+static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char * buf,
+				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{ 
+	struct inode * inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	char *page; 
+	ssize_t length; 
+	struct task_struct *task = proc_task(inode); 
+
+	if (count > PAGE_SIZE) 
+		count = PAGE_SIZE; 
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_USER); 
+	if (!page) 
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT; 
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) 
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_setprocattr(task, 
+				      (char*)file->f_dentry->d_name.name, 
+				      (void*)page, count);
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+} 
+
+static struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {
+	.read		= proc_pid_attr_read,
+	.write		= proc_pid_attr_write,
+};
+
+static struct dentry *proc_attr_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int error;
+	struct task_struct *task = proc_task(dir);
+	struct pid_entry *p;
+	struct proc_inode *ei;
+
+	error = -ENOENT;
+	inode = NULL;
+
+	for (p = attr_stuff; p->name; p++) {
+		if (p->len != dentry->d_name.len)
+			continue;
+		if (!memcmp(dentry->d_name.name, p->name, p->len))
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!p->name)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = -EINVAL;
+	inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, p->type);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+
+	ei = PROC_I(inode);
+	inode->i_mode = p->mode;
+	inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_operations;
+	dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+	if (!proc_task(dentry->d_inode)->pid)
+		d_drop(dentry);
+	return NULL;
+
+out:
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations proc_attr_operations = {
+	.read		= generic_read_dir,
+	.readdir	= proc_attr_readdir,
+};
+
+static struct inode_operations proc_attr_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup		= proc_attr_lookup,
+};
+
 /* SMP-safe */
 static struct dentry *proc_base_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
@@ -1040,6 +1222,11 @@
 			break;
 		case PROC_PID_MOUNTS:
 			inode->i_fop = &proc_mounts_operations;
+			break;
+		case PROC_PID_ATTR:
+			inode->i_nlink = 2;
+			inode->i_op = &proc_attr_inode_operations;
+			inode->i_fop = &proc_attr_operations;
 			break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
 		case PROC_PID_WCHAN:
Index: linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h
diff -u linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h:1.1.1.2 linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h:1.16
--- linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h:1.1.1.2	Wed Mar 19 09:54:58 2003
+++ linux-2.5/include/linux/security.h	Fri Apr 18 11:17:19 2003
@@ -1123,6 +1128,9 @@
 
 	void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
+ 	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+ 	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket * sock,
 				    struct socket * other, struct sock * newsk);
@@ -1755,6 +1769,16 @@
 	security_ops->d_instantiate (dentry, inode);
 }
 
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+}
+
+static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+}
+
 static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sk_buff * skb)
 {
 	return security_ops->netlink_send(skb);
@@ -2339,6 +2367,16 @@
 
 static inline void security_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 { }
+
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
 
 /*
  * The netlink capability defaults need to be used inline by default
Index: linux-2.5/security/dummy.c
diff -u linux-2.5/security/dummy.c:1.1.1.2 linux-2.5/security/dummy.c:1.14
--- linux-2.5/security/dummy.c:1.1.1.2	Wed Mar 19 09:59:17 2003
+++ linux-2.5/security/dummy.c	Fri Apr 18 11:17:20 2003
@@ -736,6 +741,16 @@
 	return;
 }
 
+static int dummy_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int dummy_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 
 struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
 
@@ -860,6 +876,8 @@
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, register_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unregister_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
+ 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
+ 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);


-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency


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2003-04-23 17:46 [PATCH] Process Attribute API for Security Modules against 2.5.68 Stephen Smalley
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