From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262818AbTELWJt (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 May 2003 18:09:49 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262855AbTELWJt (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 May 2003 18:09:49 -0400 Received: from pc2-cwma1-4-cust86.swan.cable.ntl.com ([213.105.254.86]:1690 "EHLO lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262818AbTELWJp (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 May 2003 18:09:45 -0400 Subject: Re: The disappearing sys_call_table export. From: Alan Cox To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu Cc: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>, Linux Kernel Mailing List In-Reply-To: <200305122212.h4CMCDJ5031682@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> References: <200305121754_MC3-1-388D-BC60@compuserve.com> <200305122212.h4CMCDJ5031682@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Organization: Message-Id: <1052774389.31825.21.camel@dhcp22.swansea.linux.org.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.2.2 (1.2.2-5) Date: 12 May 2003 22:19:51 +0100 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Llu, 2003-05-12 at 23:12, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote: > > "That can be done manually" does not get you the check mark in > > the list of features. Management wants idiot-resistant security. > > In particular, the code that handles the zeroing out of resource objects > before re-use needs to be "inside" the trusted-base perimeter. This has > been well-understood for years - even my August 83 copy of the Orange Book > says (for class C2): 1. Base Linux is not C2 certified 2. C2 is obsolete 3. NSA SELinux can do the needed stuff from scanning the code 4. Even then data erasure is not guaranteed because of the drive logic So you are back to crypting swap in the first place