From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S271215AbTGaSEq (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jul 2003 14:04:46 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S270478AbTGaSEp (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jul 2003 14:04:45 -0400 Received: from werbeagentur-aufwind.com ([217.160.128.76]:14219 "EHLO mail.werbeagentur-aufwind.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S274855AbTGaSDq (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jul 2003 14:03:46 -0400 Subject: [RFC] device mapper crypt target From: Christophe Saout To: Linux Kernel Mailing List Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=-yqgi1avuk8oj6KOJzEum" Message-Id: <1059674619.14800.56.camel@chtephan.cs.pocnet.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.4.3 Date: 31 Jul 2003 20:03:39 +0200 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --=-yqgi1avuk8oj6KOJzEum Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The last days I've written a target for the device-mapper in the 2.5 kernel that uses the in-kernel cryptoapi to do transparent encryption on a block device. It works for me and doesn't show any strange corruptions. Joe (the device-mapper guy) also looked over it and made some modifications. The target doesn't have any special user space tool yet, so you have to use the dmsetup tool (in the libdevmapper-1.0 package you'll find on the Sistina ftp server) to set up an encrypted device. It also means that it doesn't store a passhrase encrypted key, you'll have to directly specify the key for the symmetric encryption/decrypt operation. With the dmsetup tool you can create a device like this: dmsetup create The device will be created in /dev/mapper/ and can be removed with "dmsetup remove ". The table file can contain several lines, but if you just want a device that doesn't use several other devices as backend (like LVM can do), specifying only one line is fine. The syntax for the crypt target is: is one of the ciphers in the cryptoapi like aes or des. You can optionally specify the block chaining mode like "aes-cbc" or "aes-ecb" (inspired by cryptoloop, but no copied code). The CBC mode is the default, but it doesn't really do cipher block chaining, it only additonally perturbs the encryption by munging the sector number so that the same sector gets always encrypted differently, like zero-filled ones. is the actual key. It's hex encrypted, two digits per byte. is used with CBC and you can specify a sector offset for the perturbation. For example if you want to map only a part of your encrypted device and start at some offset, you can specify it here, so that you're still able to read your data. is the device path of the device you want to encrypt (can also be a loop device if you want to test things on a file). is the sector offset in the device where you want the mapping to start. So a complete line for the table file might look like: 0 204800 crypt aes 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef 0 /dev/hda7 0 (the second parameter is the size of the device you want to create in sectors, this would give a 100 MB device). If something fails look into your log file (and don't forget to remove the device that was created with dmsetup remove ). My tests suggest that it's fairly stable. I've created different filesystems on it (ext2, ext3, reiserfs) and did a lot of copy operations from/to/on it. A lot of small files, large files. Unmounting/remounting, etc... I didn't find any corruptions. It even works when putting swap space on it and it didn't deadlock my machine under extreme memory pressure. I also added a lot of temporary debug statements and poisoning code to make sure that allocations and frees are correctly balanced. The attached patch adds a dm-daemon.c/.h, this is a forward-ported version from 2.4 and the actual dm-crypt.c. It can be compiled in statically or as a module (kernel configuration: Multiple Devices -> Device mapper -> crypt target). The patch should apply cleanly on top of 2.6.0-test1. I've appended it as an attachement because my mailer adds additional newlines. :( -- Christophe Saout Please avoid sending me Word or PowerPoint attachments. See http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html --=-yqgi1avuk8oj6KOJzEum Content-Description: Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=dm-crypt.diff Content-Type: text/x-patch; charset=iso-8859-15 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm.c linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm.c --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm.c 2003-07-31 19:34:25.272437600 +0200 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm.c 2003-07-31 19:32:37.116879744 +0200 @@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ xx(dm_linear) xx(dm_stripe) xx(dm_interface) +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DM_CRYPT + xx(dm_crypt) +#endif #undef xx }; diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c 2003-07-31 19:32:37.118879440 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,784 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2003 Christophe Saout + * + * This file is released under the GPL. + */ + +#include "dm.h" +#include "dm-daemon.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * per bio private data + */ +struct crypt_io { + struct dm_target *target; + struct bio *bio; + struct bio *first_clone; + atomic_t pending; + int error; +}; + +/* + * context holding the current state of a multi-part conversion + */ +struct convert_context { + struct bio *bio_in; + struct bio *bio_out; + unsigned int offset_in; + unsigned int offset_out; + int idx_in; + int idx_out; + sector_t sector; + int write; +}; + +/* + * Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device + * and encrypts / decrypts at the same time. + */ +struct crypt_c { + struct dm_dev *dev; + sector_t start; + + /* + * pool for per bio private data and + * for encryption buffer pages + */ + mempool_t *io_pool; + mempool_t *page_pool; + + /* + * crypto related data + */ + struct crypto_tfm *tfm; + sector_t iv_offset; + int iv_size; + int key_size; + u8 key[0]; +}; + +#define MIN_IOS 256 +#define MIN_POOL_PAGES 16 +#define MIN_BIO_PAGES 8 + +static kmem_cache_t *_io_cache; + +/* + * Mempool alloc and free functions for the page and io pool + */ +static void *mempool_alloc_page(int gfp_mask, void *data) +{ + return alloc_page(gfp_mask); +} + +static void mempool_free_page(void *page, void *data) +{ + __free_page(page); +} + +static inline struct page *crypt_alloc_page(struct crypt_c *cc, int gfp_mask) +{ + return mempool_alloc(cc->page_pool, gfp_mask); +} + +static inline void crypt_free_page(struct crypt_c *cc, struct page *page) +{ + mempool_free(page, cc->page_pool); +} + +static inline struct crypt_io *crypt_alloc_io(struct crypt_c *cc) +{ + return mempool_alloc(cc->io_pool, GFP_NOIO); +} + +static inline void crypt_free_io(struct crypt_c *cc, struct crypt_io *io) +{ + return mempool_free(io, cc->io_pool); +} + +/* + * Encrypt / decrypt a single sector, source and destination buffers + * are stored in scatterlists. In CBC mode initialise the "previous + * block" with the sector number (it's not a real chaining because + * it would not allow to seek on the device...) + */ +static inline int +crypt_convert_scatterlist(struct crypt_c *cc, struct scatterlist *out, + struct scatterlist *in, unsigned int length, + int write, sector_t sector) +{ + u8 iv[cc->iv_size]; + int r; + + if (cc->iv_size) { + *(u32 *)iv = cpu_to_le32(sector & 0xffffffff); + if (cc->iv_size > sizeof(u32) / sizeof(u8)) + memset(iv + (sizeof(u32) / sizeof(u8)), 0, + cc->iv_size - (sizeof(u32) / sizeof(u8))); + + if (write) + r = crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv(cc->tfm, out, in, length, iv); + else + r = crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv(cc->tfm, out, in, length, iv); + } else { + if (write) + r = crypto_cipher_encrypt(cc->tfm, out, in, length); + else + r = crypto_cipher_decrypt(cc->tfm, out, in, length); + } + + return r; +} + +static void +crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_c *cc, struct convert_context *ctx, + struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in, + sector_t sector, int write) +{ + ctx->bio_in = bio_in; + ctx->bio_out = bio_out; + ctx->offset_in = 0; + ctx->offset_out = 0; + ctx->idx_in = bio_in ? bio_in->bi_idx : 0; + ctx->idx_out = bio_out ? bio_out->bi_idx : 0; + ctx->sector = sector + cc->iv_offset; + ctx->write = write; +} + +/* + * Encrypt / decrypt data from one bio to another one (may be the same) + */ +static int crypt_convert(struct crypt_c *cc, + struct convert_context *ctx) +{ + int r = 0; + + while(ctx->idx_in < ctx->bio_in->bi_vcnt && + ctx->idx_out < ctx->bio_out->bi_vcnt) { + struct bio_vec *bv_in = bio_iovec_idx(ctx->bio_in, ctx->idx_in); + struct bio_vec *bv_out = bio_iovec_idx(ctx->bio_out, ctx->idx_out); + struct scatterlist sg_in = { + .page = bv_in->bv_page, + .offset = bv_in->bv_offset + ctx->offset_in, + .length = 1 << SECTOR_SHIFT + }; + struct scatterlist sg_out = { + .page = bv_out->bv_page, + .offset = bv_out->bv_offset + ctx->offset_out, + .length = 1 << SECTOR_SHIFT + }; + + ctx->offset_in += sg_in.length; + if (ctx->offset_in >= bv_in->bv_len) { + ctx->offset_in = 0; + ctx->idx_in++; + } + + ctx->offset_out += sg_out.length; + if (ctx->offset_out >= bv_out->bv_len) { + ctx->offset_out = 0; + ctx->idx_out++; + } + + r = crypt_convert_scatterlist(cc, &sg_out, &sg_in, sg_in.length, + ctx->write, ctx->sector); + if (r < 0) + break; + + ctx->sector++; + } + + return r; +} + +/* + * Generate a new unfragmented bio with the given size + * This should never violate the device limitations + * May return a smaller bio when running out of pages + */ +static struct bio * +crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_c *cc, unsigned int size, + struct bio *base_bio, int *bio_vec_idx) +{ + struct bio *bio; + int nr_iovecs = dm_div_up(size, PAGE_SIZE); + int gfp_mask = GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGHMEM; + int i; + + if (base_bio) + bio = bio_clone(base_bio, GFP_NOIO); + else + bio = bio_alloc(GFP_NOIO, nr_iovecs); + if (!bio) + return NULL; + + /* if the last bio was not complete, continue where that one ends */ + bio->bi_idx = *bio_vec_idx; + bio->bi_vcnt = *bio_vec_idx; + bio->bi_size = 0; + + /* bio->bi_idx pages have already been allocated */ + size -= bio->bi_idx * PAGE_SIZE; + + for(i = bio->bi_idx; i < nr_iovecs; i++) { + struct bio_vec *bv = bio_iovec_idx(bio, i); + + bv->bv_page = crypt_alloc_page(cc, gfp_mask); + if (!bv->bv_page) + break; + + /* + * if additional pages cannot be allocated without waiting + * return a partially allocated bio, the caller will then try + * to allocate additional bios while submitting this partial bio + */ + if ((i - bio->bi_idx) == (MIN_BIO_PAGES - 1)) + gfp_mask = (gfp_mask | __GFP_NOWARN) & ~__GFP_WAIT; + + bv->bv_offset = 0; + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) + bv->bv_len = PAGE_SIZE; + else + bv->bv_len = size; + + bio->bi_size += bv->bv_len; + bio->bi_vcnt++; + size -= bv->bv_len; + } + + if (!bio->bi_size) { + bio_put(bio); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * remember the last bio_vec allocated to be able to correctly + * continue after splitting caused by memory pressure + */ + *bio_vec_idx = bio->bi_vcnt; + + return bio; +} + +static void crypt_free_buffer_pages(struct crypt_c *cc, struct bio *bio, + unsigned int bytes) +{ + int i = bio->bi_idx; + + while(bytes) { + struct bio_vec *bv = bio_iovec_idx(bio, i++); + crypt_free_page(cc, bv->bv_page); + bytes -= bv->bv_len; + } +} + +/* + * One of the bios was finished. Check for completion of + * the whole request and correctly cleanup the buffer. + */ +static void dec_pending(struct crypt_io *io, int error) +{ + struct crypt_c *cc = (struct crypt_c*) io->target->private; + + if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&io->pending)) + return; + + if (io->first_clone) + bio_put(io->first_clone); + + if (error < 0) + io->error = error; + + if (io->bio) + bio_endio(io->bio, io->bio->bi_size, io->error); + + crypt_free_io(cc, io); +} + +/* + * kcryptd: + * + * Needed because we can't decrypt when called in an + * interrupt context, so returning bios from read requests get + * queued here. + */ +static spinlock_t _kcryptd_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +static struct bio *_bio_head; +static struct bio *_bio_tail; + +static struct dm_daemon _kcryptd; + +/* + * Fetch a list of the complete bios. + */ +static struct bio *kcryptd_get_bios(void) +{ + struct bio *bio; + + spin_lock_irq(&_kcryptd_lock); + bio = _bio_head; + if (bio) + _bio_head = _bio_tail = NULL; + spin_unlock_irq(&_kcryptd_lock); + + return bio; +} + +/* + * Append bio to work queue + */ +static void kcryptd_queue_bio(struct bio *bio) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&_kcryptd_lock, flags); + if (_bio_tail) + _bio_tail->bi_next = bio; + else + _bio_head = bio; + _bio_tail = bio; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&_kcryptd_lock, flags); +} + +static void kcryptd(void) +{ + int r; + struct bio *bio; + struct bio *next_bio; + struct crypt_io *io; + struct crypt_c *cc; + struct convert_context ctx; + + bio = kcryptd_get_bios(); + + while (bio) { + io = (struct crypt_io *) bio->bi_private; + cc = (struct crypt_c *) io->target->private; + + crypt_convert_init(cc, &ctx, io->bio, io->bio, + io->bio->bi_sector - io->target->begin, 0); + r = crypt_convert(cc, &ctx); + + next_bio = bio->bi_next; + + bio->bi_next = NULL; + bio_put(bio); + dec_pending(io, r); + + bio = next_bio; + } +} + +/* + * Decode key from its hex representation + */ +static int crypt_decode_key(u8 *key, char *hex, int size) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < size; i++) { + int digits; + if (*hex >= 'a' && *hex <= 'f') + digits = *hex - ('a' - 10); + else if (*hex >= 'A' && *hex <= 'F') + digits = *hex - ('A' - 10); + else if (*hex >= '0' && *hex <= '9') + digits = *hex - '0'; + else + return -EINVAL; + + digits <<= 4; + hex++; + + if (*hex >= 'a' && *hex <= 'f') + digits += *hex - ('a' - 10); + else if (*hex >= 'A' && *hex <= 'F') + digits += *hex - ('A' - 10); + else if (*hex >= '0' && *hex <= '9') + digits += *hex - '0'; + else + return -EINVAL; + + hex++; + key[i] = (u8)digits; + } + + if (*hex != '\0') + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Encode key into its hex representation + */ +static void crypt_encode_key(char *hex, u8 *key, int size) +{ + static char hex_digits[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < size; i++) { + *hex++ = hex_digits[*key >> 4]; + *hex++ = hex_digits[*key & 0x0f]; + key++; + } + + *hex++ = '\0'; +} + +/* + * Construct an encryption mapping: + * + */ +static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct crypt_c *cc; + struct crypto_tfm *tfm; + char *tmp; + char *cipher; + char *mode; + int crypto_flags; + int iv_size; + int key_size; + + if (argc != 5) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Not enough arguments"; + return -EINVAL; + } + + tmp = argv[0]; + cipher = strsep(&tmp, "-"); + mode = strsep(&tmp, "-"); + + if (tmp) + DMWARN("dm-crypt: Unexpected additional cipher options"); + + if (!mode || strcmp(mode, "cbc") == 0) + crypto_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC; + else if (strcmp(mode, "ecb") == 0) + crypto_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB; + else { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Invalid chaining mode"; + return -EINVAL; + } + + tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, crypto_flags); + if (!tfm) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Error allocating crypto tfm"; + return -EINVAL; + } + + key_size = strlen(argv[1]) >> 1; + if (tfm->crt_u.cipher.cit_decrypt_iv && tfm->crt_u.cipher.cit_encrypt_iv) + iv_size = max(crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm), sizeof(u32) / sizeof(u8)); + else + iv_size = 0; + + cc = kmalloc(sizeof(*cc) + key_size * sizeof(u8), GFP_KERNEL); + if (cc == NULL) { + ti->error = + "dm-crypt: Cannot allocate transparent encryption context"; + crypto_free_tfm(tfm); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + cc->io_pool = mempool_create(MIN_IOS, mempool_alloc_slab, + mempool_free_slab, _io_cache); + if (!cc->io_pool) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Cannot allocate crypt io mempool"; + goto bad1; + } + + cc->page_pool = mempool_create(MIN_POOL_PAGES, mempool_alloc_page, + mempool_free_page, NULL); + if (!cc->page_pool) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Cannot allocate page mempool"; + goto bad2; + } + + cc->tfm = tfm; + cc->iv_size = iv_size; + cc->key_size = key_size; + if ((key_size == 0 && strcmp(argv[1], "-") != 0) + || crypt_decode_key(cc->key, argv[1], key_size) < 0) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Error decoding key"; + goto bad3; + } + + if (tfm->crt_u.cipher.cit_setkey(tfm, cc->key, key_size) < 0) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Error setting key"; + goto bad3; + } + + if (sscanf(argv[2], SECTOR_FORMAT, &cc->iv_offset) != 1) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Invalid iv_offset sector"; + goto bad3; + } + + if (sscanf(argv[4], SECTOR_FORMAT, &cc->start) != 1) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Invalid device sector"; + goto bad3; + } + + if (dm_get_device(ti, argv[3], cc->start, ti->len, + dm_table_get_mode(ti->table), &cc->dev)) { + ti->error = "dm-crypt: Device lookup failed"; + goto bad3; + } + + ti->private = cc; + return 0; + +bad3: + mempool_destroy(cc->page_pool); +bad2: + mempool_destroy(cc->io_pool); +bad1: + crypto_free_tfm(tfm); + kfree(cc); + return -EINVAL; +} + +static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti) +{ + struct crypt_c *cc = (struct crypt_c *) ti->private; + + mempool_destroy(cc->page_pool); + mempool_destroy(cc->io_pool); + + crypto_free_tfm(cc->tfm); + dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev); + kfree(cc); +} + +static int crypt_endio(struct bio *bio, unsigned int done, int error) +{ + struct crypt_io *io = (struct crypt_io*) bio->bi_private; + struct crypt_c *cc = (struct crypt_c*) io->target->private; + + if (bio_rw(bio) == WRITE) { + /* + * free the processed pages, even if + * it's only a partially completed write + */ + crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, bio, done); + } + + if (bio->bi_size) + return 1; + + /* + * successful reads get decrypted by the worker thread + * because we never want to decrypt in an irq context + */ + if ((bio_rw(bio) == READ || bio_rw(bio) == READA) + && bio_flagged(bio, BIO_UPTODATE)) { + kcryptd_queue_bio(bio); + dm_daemon_wake(&_kcryptd); + return 0; + } + + bio_put(bio); + dec_pending(io, error); + + return error; +} + +static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio) +{ + struct crypt_c *cc = (struct crypt_c*) ti->private; + struct crypt_io *io = crypt_alloc_io(cc); + struct bio *clone = NULL; + struct convert_context ctx; + unsigned int remaining = bio->bi_size; + sector_t sector = bio->bi_sector - ti->begin; + int bio_vec_idx = 0; + int r = 0; + + io->target = ti; + io->bio = bio; + io->first_clone = NULL; + io->error = 0; + atomic_set(&io->pending, 1); /* hold a reference */ + + if (bio_rw(bio) == WRITE) + crypt_convert_init(cc, &ctx, NULL, bio, sector, 1); + + /* + * The allocated buffers can be smaller then the whole bio, + * so repeat the whole process until all the data can be handled. + */ + while (remaining) { + if (bio_rw(bio) == WRITE) { + clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(cc, bio->bi_size, + io->first_clone, + &bio_vec_idx); + if (clone) { + ctx.bio_out = clone; + r = crypt_convert(cc, &ctx); + if (r < 0) { + crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone, + clone->bi_size); + bio_put(clone); + goto cleanup; + } + } + } else + clone = bio_clone(bio, GFP_NOIO); + + if (!clone) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!io->first_clone) { + /* + * hold a reference to the first clone, because it holds + * the bio_vec array and that needs to be released only + * after all other clones are released + */ + bio_get(clone); + io->first_clone = clone; + } + atomic_inc(&io->pending); + + clone->bi_private = io; + clone->bi_end_io = crypt_endio; + clone->bi_bdev = cc->dev->bdev; + clone->bi_sector = cc->start + sector; + clone->bi_rw = bio->bi_rw; + + remaining -= clone->bi_size; + sector += bio_sectors(clone); + + generic_make_request(clone); + } + + /* drop reference, clones could have returned before we reach this */ + dec_pending(io, 0); + return 0; + +cleanup: + if (io->first_clone) { + dec_pending(io, r); + return 0; + } + + /* if no bio has been dispatched yet, we can directly return the error */ + crypt_free_io(cc, io); + return r; +} + +static int crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, + char *result, unsigned int maxlen) +{ + struct crypt_c *cc = (struct crypt_c *) ti->private; + char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; + const char *cipher; + const char *mode = NULL; + int offset; + + switch (type) { + case STATUSTYPE_INFO: + result[0] = '\0'; + break; + + case STATUSTYPE_TABLE: + cipher = crypto_tfm_alg_name(cc->tfm); + + switch(cc->tfm->crt_u.cipher.cit_mode) { + case CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC: + mode = "cbc"; + break; + case CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB: + mode = "ecb"; + break; + default: + BUG(); + } + + snprintf(result, maxlen, "%s-%s ", cipher, mode); + offset = strlen(result); + + if (cc->key_size > 0) { + if ((maxlen - offset) < ((cc->key_size << 1) + 1)) + return -ENOMEM; + + crypt_encode_key(result + offset, cc->key, cc->key_size); + offset += cc->key_size << 1; + } else { + if (offset >= maxlen) + return -ENOMEM; + result[offset++] = '-'; + } + + snprintf(result + offset, maxlen - offset, " " SECTOR_FORMAT + " %s " SECTOR_FORMAT, cc->iv_offset, + bdevname(cc->dev->bdev, b), cc->start); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct target_type crypt_target = { + .name = "crypt", + .module = THIS_MODULE, + .ctr = crypt_ctr, + .dtr = crypt_dtr, + .map = crypt_map, + .status = crypt_status, +}; + +int __init dm_crypt_init(void) +{ + int r; + + _io_cache = kmem_cache_create("dm-crypt io", sizeof(struct crypt_io), + 0, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (!_io_cache) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = dm_daemon_start(&_kcryptd, "kcryptd", kcryptd); + if (r) { + kmem_cache_destroy(_io_cache); + DMERR("couldn't create kcryptd: %d", r); + } + + r = dm_register_target(&crypt_target); + if (r < 0) { + dm_daemon_stop(&_kcryptd); + kmem_cache_destroy(_io_cache); + DMERR("crypt: register failed %d", r); + } + + return r; +} + +void dm_crypt_exit(void) +{ + int r = dm_unregister_target(&crypt_target); + + if (r < 0) + DMERR("crypt: unregister failed %d", r); + + dm_daemon_stop(&_kcryptd); + kmem_cache_destroy(_io_cache); +} + +/* + * module hooks + */ +module_init(dm_crypt_init) +module_exit(dm_crypt_exit) + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Christophe Saout "); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DM_NAME " target for transparent encryption / decryption"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm-daemon.c linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm-daemon.c --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm-daemon.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm-daemon.c 2003-07-31 19:32:37.118879440 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2003 Sistina Software + * + * This file is released under the LGPL. + */ + +#include "dm.h" +#include "dm-daemon.h" + +#include +#include + +static int daemon(void *arg) +{ + struct dm_daemon *dd = (struct dm_daemon *) arg; + DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wq, current); + + daemonize("%s", dd->name); + + atomic_set(&dd->please_die, 0); + + add_wait_queue(&dd->job_queue, &wq); + + down(&dd->run_lock); + up(&dd->start_lock); + + /* + * dd->fn() could do anything, very likely it will + * suspend. So we can't set the state to + * TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE before calling it. In order to + * prevent a race with a waking thread we do this little + * dance with the dd->woken variable. + */ + while (1) { + if (atomic_read(&dd->please_die)) + goto out; + + do { + set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + + atomic_set(&dd->woken, 0); + dd->fn(); + + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + } while (atomic_read(&dd->woken)); + + schedule(); + } + + out: + remove_wait_queue(&dd->job_queue, &wq); + up(&dd->run_lock); + return 0; +} + +int dm_daemon_start(struct dm_daemon *dd, const char *name, void (*fn)(void)) +{ + pid_t pid = 0; + + /* + * Initialise the dm_daemon. + */ + dd->fn = fn; + strncpy(dd->name, name, sizeof(dd->name) - 1); + sema_init(&dd->start_lock, 1); + sema_init(&dd->run_lock, 1); + init_waitqueue_head(&dd->job_queue); + + /* + * Start the new thread. + */ + down(&dd->start_lock); + pid = kernel_thread(daemon, dd, CLONE_KERNEL); + if (pid <= 0) { + DMERR("Failed to start %s thread", name); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + /* + * wait for the daemon to up this mutex. + */ + down(&dd->start_lock); + up(&dd->start_lock); + + return 0; +} + +void dm_daemon_stop(struct dm_daemon *dd) +{ + atomic_set(&dd->please_die, 1); + dm_daemon_wake(dd); + down(&dd->run_lock); + up(&dd->run_lock); +} + +void dm_daemon_wake(struct dm_daemon *dd) +{ + atomic_set(&dd->woken, 1); + wake_up_interruptible(&dd->job_queue); +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dm_daemon_start); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dm_daemon_stop); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dm_daemon_wake); diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm-daemon.h linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm-daemon.h --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm-daemon.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm-daemon.h 2003-07-31 19:32:37.119879288 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2003 Sistina Software + * + * This file is released under the LGPL. + */ + +#ifndef DM_DAEMON_H +#define DM_DAEMON_H + +#include +#include + +struct dm_daemon { + void (*fn)(void); + char name[16]; + atomic_t please_die; + struct semaphore start_lock; + struct semaphore run_lock; + + atomic_t woken; + wait_queue_head_t job_queue; +}; + +int dm_daemon_start(struct dm_daemon *dd, const char *name, void (*fn)(void)); +void dm_daemon_stop(struct dm_daemon *dd); +void dm_daemon_wake(struct dm_daemon *dd); +int dm_daemon_running(struct dm_daemon *dd); + +#endif diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm.h linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm.h --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/dm.h 2003-07-31 19:34:25.277436840 +0200 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/dm.h 2003-07-31 19:32:37.119879288 +0200 @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void dm_interface_exit(void); /* - * Targets for linear and striped mappings + * Targets for the mappings */ int dm_linear_init(void); void dm_linear_exit(void); @@ -167,4 +167,9 @@ int dm_stripe_init(void); void dm_stripe_exit(void); +#ifdef DM_TARGET_CRYPT +int dm_crypt_init(void); +void dm_crypt_exit(void); +#endif + #endif diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/Kconfig linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/Kconfig 2003-07-31 19:34:25.278436688 +0200 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/Kconfig 2003-07-31 19:32:37.119879288 +0200 @@ -152,5 +152,15 @@ Recent tools use a new version of the ioctl interface, only select this option if you intend using such tools. +config BLK_DM_CRYPT + tristate "dm-crypt target" + depends on BLK_DEV_DM && EXPERIMENTAL + select CRYPTO + ---help--- + This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that + transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate + the required ciphers in the cryptoapi configuration in order to + be able to use it. + endmenu diff -Nur linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/Makefile linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/Makefile --- linux-2.6.0-test2.orig/drivers/md/Makefile 2003-07-31 19:34:25.278436688 +0200 +++ linux-2.6.0-test2/drivers/md/Makefile 2003-07-31 19:32:37.120879136 +0200 @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # dm-mod-objs := dm.o dm-table.o dm-target.o dm-linear.o dm-stripe.o \ - dm-ioctl.o + dm-ioctl.o dm-daemon.o # Note: link order is important. All raid personalities # and xor.o must come before md.o, as they each initialise @@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MD_MULTIPATH) += multipath.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_MD) += md.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DM) += dm-mod.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DM_CRYPT) += dm-crypt.o --=-yqgi1avuk8oj6KOJzEum--