From: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
To: Tetsuo Handa <from-linux-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Subject: Re: Is CAP_SYS_ADMIN checked by every program !?
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2005 08:52:46 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1104760366.16598.40.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200412301640.FCB13564.FtFPMSMGJtSOLVOYN@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
On Thu, 2004-12-30 at 02:40, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> I'm developing a kernel patch that provides simple and handy
> MAC(mandatory access control) functionality, much easier than SELinux.
> And now I'm porting the patch from 2.4 to 2.6,
> though the patch can't support LSM, for it refers 'struct vfsmount'.
>
> At first, I doubted that some kernel function (do_execve(), memory management
> functions, or any kernel functions that are always called by every process) is
> doing this CAP_SYS_ADMIN checking. But may be this CAP_SYS_ADMIN checking is
> caused by the Fedora Core 3's libc, not by the kernel.
> I don't have 2.6 kernel environment other than Fedora Core 3.
>
> But anyway, I have to give up checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN .
Just override the vm_enough_memory security hook with your own function,
as we do in SELinux, to avoid auditing the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check there.
Note that this issue has also come up again on the linux-security-module
mailing list recently, and might be addressed through a change to the
cap_vm_enough_memory hook function.
--
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-01-03 13:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2004-12-29 4:47 Is CAP_SYS_ADMIN checked by every program !? Tetsuo Handa
2004-12-30 3:52 ` Walter Liu
2004-12-30 4:45 ` Bernd Eckenfels
2004-12-30 5:35 ` Kyle Moffett
2004-12-30 5:46 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2004-12-30 6:13 ` Bernd Eckenfels
2004-12-30 7:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2004-12-30 8:24 ` Bernd Eckenfels
2005-01-03 13:52 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2004-12-30 13:37 ` Tetsuo Handa
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