From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1030254AbWJCTy4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Oct 2006 15:54:56 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1030237AbWJCTyz (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Oct 2006 15:54:55 -0400 Received: from pentafluge.infradead.org ([213.146.154.40]:47003 "EHLO pentafluge.infradead.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1030254AbWJCTyy (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Oct 2006 15:54:54 -0400 Subject: Re: [patch] remove MNT_NOEXEC check for PROT_EXEC mmaps From: Arjan van de Ven To: Stas Sergeev Cc: Ulrich Drepper , Linux kernel , Alan Cox , Hugh Dickins , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu In-Reply-To: <4522BCBF.2050508@aknet.ru> References: <45150CD7.4010708@aknet.ru> <451555CB.5010006@aknet.ru> <1159037913.24572.62.camel@localhost.localdomain> <45162BE5.2020100@aknet.ru> <1159106032.11049.12.camel@localhost.localdomain> <45169C0C.5010001@aknet.ru> <4516A8E3.4020100@redhat.com> <4516B2C8.4050202@aknet.ru> <4516B721.5070801@redhat.com> <45198395.4050008@aknet.ru> <1159396436.3086.51.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <451E3C0C.10105@aknet.ru> <1159887682.2891.537.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <45229A99.6060703@aknet.ru> <45229C8E.6080503@redhat.com> <4522A691.7070700@aknet.ru> <4522B7CD.4040206@redhat.com> <4522BCBF.2050508@aknet.ru> Content-Type: text/plain Organization: Intel International BV Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2006 21:54:25 +0200 Message-Id: <1159905265.2891.551.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.2.3 (2.2.3-2.fc4) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by pentafluge.infradead.org See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2006-10-03 at 23:40 +0400, Stas Sergeev wrote: > Hello. > > Ulrich Drepper wrote: > > You really don't get it, do you. > Yes, sorry. :) > > > The way ld.so works can be implemented > > in many other forms with other programs. > Having "noexec" (in its older form) on *every* user-writable > mount makes it harder for an attacker to run his own loaders, > so implementing it in other forms was useless in the past. > > > With some time and energy you > > likely can write a perl or python script to do it. > This is solvable the same way too - "chmod 'o-x' perl" and chmod o-x bash .... at which point.. game over. (and yes you can do in bash pretty much what you can do in perl. heck you can prove that.. shell is turning complete ;)