From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 32/44] Enable LSM hooks to distinguish operations on file descriptors from operations on pathnames
Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2007 09:49:40 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1183470580.12218.253.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200706282015.51430.agruen@suse.de>
On Thu, 2007-06-28 at 20:15 +0200, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> On Thursday 28 June 2007 18:12, James Morris wrote:
> > Are you trying to cater for the case where you're holding an open fd for a
> > file which has been deleted, and thus has no pathname?
>
> Yes, see the AA_CHECK_FD flag in security/apparmor/main.c:aa_perm_dentry(). We
> want to distinguish between the following two cases:
>
> - process performs an operation on an open file descriptor,
>
> - process performs an operation on a pathname, and between the dentry
> lookup and the LSM permission check, the file gets deleted.
>
> In the former case, we obviously want to continue giving the process access to
> his fd (the classical pattern: open temporary file; delete it so that it will
> self-recycle, continue using the open file descriptor).
>
> In the latter case, The file still existed at the time of the lookup but not
> anymore at the time of the permission check. The file obviously doesn't have
> a filename anymore, so we cannot check permissions. If we granted access in
> that case, processes could bypass their profile permissions in that race
> window. We close the race by returning -ENOENT in that case, the same result
> as if the file had already been deleted before the lookup.
So you don't actually need/use the struct file pointer; you just need a
flag indicating whether or not access was by open file descriptor or by
pathname?
And what does this mean for a process that has "changed hats"? Which
might not be authorized to access the file anymore, even via an already
opened descriptor.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-07-03 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-06-26 23:07 [AppArmor 00/44] AppArmor security module overview jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:07 ` [AppArmor 01/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-30 9:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2007-07-03 22:28 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-26 23:07 ` [AppArmor 02/44] Pass struct path down to remove_suid and children jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:07 ` [AppArmor 03/44] Add a vfsmount parameter to notify_change() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 04/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 05/44] Add struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_mkdir() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 06/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_mkdir LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 07/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_mknod() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 08/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_mknod LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 09/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_symlink() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 10/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_symlink LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 11/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_readlink " jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 12/44] Add struct vfsmount parameters to vfs_link() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 13/44] Pass the struct vfsmounts to the inode_link LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 14/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_rmdir() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 15/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rmdir LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 16/44] Call lsm hook before unhashing dentry in vfs_rmdir() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 17/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_unlink() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 18/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_unlink LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 19/44] Add struct vfsmount parameters to vfs_rename() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 20/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rename LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 21/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_setxattr() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 22/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setxattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 23/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_getxattr() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 25/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_listxattr() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 26/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_listxattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 27/44] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_removexattr() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 28/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_removexattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 29/44] Fix __d_path() for lazy unmounts and make it unambiguous jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 30/44] Make d_path() consistent across mount operations jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 32/44] Enable LSM hooks to distinguish operations on file descriptors from operations on pathnames jjohansen
2007-06-28 16:12 ` James Morris
2007-06-28 18:15 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-07-03 13:49 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2007-07-03 20:01 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 33/44] Pass struct file down the inode_*xattr security LSM hooks jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 34/44] Factor out sysctl pathname code jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 35/44] Allow permission functions to tell between parent and leaf checks jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 36/44] Export audit subsystem for use by modules jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 37/44] AppArmor: Main Part jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 38/44] AppArmor: Module and LSM hooks jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 39/44] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 40/44] AppArmor: all the rest jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 41/44] Add AppArmor LSM to security/Makefile jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 42/44] Switch to vfs_permission() in do_path_lookup() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 43/44] Switch to vfs_permission() in sys_fchdir() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:08 ` [AppArmor 44/44] Fix file_permission() jjohansen
2007-06-26 23:52 ` [AppArmor 00/44] AppArmor security module overview Andrew Morton
2007-06-27 2:24 ` John Johansen
2007-06-27 2:47 ` Andrew Morton
2007-06-27 6:43 ` John Johansen
2007-06-27 15:11 ` Adrian Bunk
2007-06-27 21:06 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-27 21:29 ` Sean
2007-06-27 22:46 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-27 23:05 ` David Miller
2007-06-28 0:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-28 0:34 ` David Miller
2007-06-28 10:23 ` Alan Cox
2007-06-28 13:50 ` Bill O'Donnell
2007-06-28 11:27 ` Tilman Schmidt
2007-06-28 12:48 ` Adrian Bunk
2007-06-27 22:41 ` Andreas Dilger
2007-07-02 16:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-07-02 19:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-07-02 20:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2007-07-02 21:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-07-03 16:33 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-29 18:06 ` Pavel Machek
2007-07-03 6:20 ` Dave Jones
2007-06-27 10:58 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-06-27 13:37 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-27 0:32 ` [AppArmor 24/44] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_getxattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-06-27 0:32 ` [AppArmor 31/44] Add d_namespace_path() to compute namespace relative pathnames jjohansen
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