From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932836AbXK2SjT (ORCPT ); Thu, 29 Nov 2007 13:39:19 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1759497AbXK2SjH (ORCPT ); Thu, 29 Nov 2007 13:39:07 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([66.187.233.31]:54479 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755055AbXK2SjG (ORCPT ); Thu, 29 Nov 2007 13:39:06 -0500 Subject: Re: Out of tree module using LSM From: Jon Masters To: Justin Banks Cc: Ray Lee , Greg KH , Jan Engelhardt , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Christoph Hellwig , Al Viro , Casey Schaufler , "Tvrtko A. Ursulin" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20071129181957.GA5575@bleen.corp.bb> References: <20071129003840.GA22530@kroah.com> <20071129010753.GA19106@kroah.com> <1196354172.6473.52.camel@perihelion> <20071129164746.GB9664@kroah.com> <20071129170326.GA10024@kroah.com> <2c0942db0711290935l56d28b70v2b35dfb1663e4d2b@mail.gmail.com> <20071129174528.GA14431@kroah.com> <2c0942db0711291003h45177f3cr5496cf30bdb01996@mail.gmail.com> <20071129181957.GA5575@bleen.corp.bb> Content-Type: text/plain Organization: Red Hat, Inc. Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2007 13:38:28 -0500 Message-Id: <1196361508.6473.88.camel@perihelion> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.12.0 (2.12.0-3.fc8) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2007-11-29 at 11:19 -0700, Justin Banks wrote: > Ray Lee wrote > > On Nov 29, 2007 9:45 AM, Greg KH wrote: > > > > Perhaps if you looked at this outside of a file-server scenario, the > > > > problem would be clearer? Anti-malware companies want to check > > > > anything written to disk on a system, either at write time or blocking > > > > the open/mmap. That means proactively protecting email programs with > > > > known vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched, web browsers > > > > writing and reading their caches, an Apache instance running WebDAV, > > > > the list goes on. And these are on desktop systems, with no attached > > > > file/network server. > > > > > > Ok, if they want to check on every open/mmap then just hook in glibc to > > > do this. Especially as they want to run userspace code at this point in > > > time. > > > > Doesn't help statically linked binaries, or anything else that bypases glibc. > > Or NFS servers for that matter, either. Right. I threw all of these examples out there and was given the impression that a one-size fits all "solution" is needed. And to be honest, I can understand that desire. I don't want to fall into any "snake oil" traps, because I know the reality is that there are holes in any solution. The only way to /really/ be sure of file integrity is to mark every user-visible pagecache page read only, trap on every single write, and re-scan the entirety of the file at that point. And even more silliness. A compromise is therefore called for. I will go shut up and go talk to these guys and see if I can hook up a public discussion around a set of requirements. Preferably some code too, but at least a requirements doc. Thanks, Jon.