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From: Dan Rosenberg <>
To: Andrew Morton <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 00:22:44 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1292649765.10804.42.camel@dan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

On Fri, 2010-12-17 at 17:22 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 17 Dec 2010 20:12:39 -0500
> Dan Rosenberg <> wrote:
> > > 
> > > So what's next?  We need to convert 1,000,000 %p callsites to use %pK? 
> > > That'll be fun.  Please consider adding a new checkpatch rule which
> > > detects %p and asks people whether they should have used %pK.
> > 
> > The goal of this format specifier is specifically for pointers that are
> > exposed to unprivileged users.  I agree that hiding all kernel pointers
> > would be nice, but I don't expect the angry masses to ever agree to
> > that.  For now, I'll isolate specific cases, especially in /proc, that
> > are clear risks in terms of information leakage.  I'll also be skipping
> > over pointers written to the syslog, since I think hiding that
> > information is dmesg_restrict's job.
> Well...  some administrators may wish to hide the pointer values even
> for privileged callers.  That's a pretty trivial add-on for the code
> which you have, and means that those admins can also suppress the
> pointers for IRQ-time callers.  More /proc knobs :)

I can add a "2" setting that hides %pK pointers regardless of privilege
level, which I agree is a useful option.  But because it would be built
into the same format specifier, you still couldn't use %pK in interrupt
context (in case the sysctl wasn't set to 2).

> Then again, perhaps those admins would be OK if we simply disabled
> plain old %p everywhere.  In which case we're looking at a separate
> patch, I suggest.  

I would be happy to do this from a security perspective, but I'd imagine
there's a pretty high risk of things breaking by doing such a sweeping


  reply	other threads:[~2010-12-18  5:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-12-11  0:05 [PATCH v2] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-11  0:11 ` Kees Cook
2010-12-18  0:44 ` Andrew Morton
2010-12-18  1:12   ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-18  1:22     ` Andrew Morton
2010-12-18  5:22       ` Dan Rosenberg [this message]
2010-12-18  0:53 ` Andrew Morton

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