From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752438Ab2BVHsa (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Feb 2012 02:48:30 -0500 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.89]:36656 "EHLO fmsmga101.fm.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751153Ab2BVHs2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Feb 2012 02:48:28 -0500 Authentication-Results: mr.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com designates 10.152.108.49 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Hugh Dickins Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH] tmpfs: security xattr setting on inode creation Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 09:48:14 +0200 Message-Id: <1329896894-7278-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.5.4 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Adds to generic xattr support introduced in Linux 3.0 by implementing initxattrs callback. This enables consulting of security attributes from LSM and EVM when inode originally created. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- mm/shmem.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 7a45ad0..72addf1 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -1480,6 +1480,59 @@ static int shmem_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) /* * File creation. Allocate an inode, and we're done.. */ + +static int shmem_xattr_alloc(size_t size, struct shmem_xattr **new_xattr) +{ + /* wrap around? */ + size_t len = sizeof(**new_xattr) + size; + if (len <= sizeof(**new_xattr)) + return -ENOMEM; + + *new_xattr = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*new_xattr == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + (*new_xattr)->size = size; + return 0; +} + +static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, + const struct xattr *xattr_array, + void *fs_info) +{ + const struct xattr *xattr; + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + struct shmem_xattr *new_xattr = NULL; + size_t len; + int err = 0; + + for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) { + err = shmem_xattr_alloc(xattr->value_len, &new_xattr); + if (err < 0) + break; + + len = strlen(xattr->name) + 1; + new_xattr->name = kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN + len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (new_xattr->name == NULL) { + kfree(new_xattr); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + memcpy(new_xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN); + memcpy(new_xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, + xattr->name, len); + memcpy(new_xattr->value, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + + spin_lock(&info->lock); + list_add(&new_xattr->list, &info->xattr_list); + spin_unlock(&info->lock); + } + + return err; +} + static int shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { @@ -1490,7 +1543,7 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) if (inode) { error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name, - NULL, NULL); + &shmem_initxattrs, NULL); if (error) { if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) { iput(inode); @@ -1630,7 +1683,7 @@ static int shmem_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *s return -ENOSPC; error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name, - NULL, NULL); + &shmem_initxattrs, NULL); if (error) { if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) { iput(inode); @@ -1731,26 +1784,19 @@ static int shmem_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return ret; } -static int shmem_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, +static int shmem_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); struct shmem_xattr *xattr; struct shmem_xattr *new_xattr = NULL; - size_t len; int err = 0; /* value == NULL means remove */ if (value) { - /* wrap around? */ - len = sizeof(*new_xattr) + size; - if (len <= sizeof(*new_xattr)) - return -ENOMEM; - - new_xattr = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new_xattr) - return -ENOMEM; + err = shmem_xattr_alloc(size, &new_xattr); + if (err < 0) + return err; new_xattr->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_xattr->name) { @@ -1758,7 +1804,6 @@ static int shmem_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return -ENOMEM; } - new_xattr->size = size; memcpy(new_xattr->value, value, size); } @@ -1858,7 +1903,7 @@ static int shmem_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (size == 0) value = ""; /* empty EA, do not remove */ - return shmem_xattr_set(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + return shmem_xattr_set(dentry->d_inode, name, value, size, flags); } @@ -1878,7 +1923,7 @@ static int shmem_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (err) return err; - return shmem_xattr_set(dentry, name, NULL, 0, XATTR_REPLACE); + return shmem_xattr_set(dentry->d_inode, name, NULL, 0, XATTR_REPLACE); } static bool xattr_is_trusted(const char *name) -- 1.7.5.4