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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/11] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware
Date: Tue,  4 Sep 2012 11:55:15 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1346774117-2277-10-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1346774117-2277-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com>

The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
down.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c          |  3 +++
 include/linux/cred.h             |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
 				(below)
+1EB/001	ALL	kbd_status	Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001	ALL	secure_boot	Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns
 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
 				(array of struct e820entry)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index b3e0227..3789356 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -724,6 +724,36 @@ fail:
 	return status;
 }
 
+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
+{
+	u8 sb, setup;
+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+
+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
+				&setup);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (setup == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
  * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
@@ -1018,6 +1048,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
 	if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
 		goto fail;
 
+	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table);
+
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
 	status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
index 2ad874c..c7338e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ struct boot_params {
 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
-	__u8  _pad6[5];					/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  _pad6[4];					/* 0x1ed */
 	struct setup_header hdr;    /* setup header */	/* 0x1f1 */
 	__u8  _pad7[0x290-0x1f1-sizeof(struct setup_header)];
 	__u32 edd_mbr_sig_buffer[EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX];	/* 0x290 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f4b9b80..239bf2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -947,6 +947,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	io_delay_init();
 
+	if (boot_params.secure_boot)
+		secureboot_enable();
+
 	/*
 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
 	 */
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
 extern void __init cred_init(void);
 
+extern void secureboot_enable(void);
+
 /*
  * check for validity of credentials
  */
-- 
1.7.11.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-09-04 15:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-04 15:55 [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 01/11] Secure boot: Add new capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:00   ` Pavel Machek
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:16   ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:16     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:12   ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:13     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:13   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 20:22     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:13       ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 21:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 22:12           ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 23:25             ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05  4:33               ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05  5:16                 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05  7:00                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05  7:03                     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:39         ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 21:40           ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 15:43             ` Roland Eggner
2012-09-05 15:46               ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-05 21:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:49       ` Eric Paris
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 08/11] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:30   ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 16:38     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:44       ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 20:37         ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 20:37           ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:50             ` Josh Boyer
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 11/11] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:08 ` [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:12   ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:07     ` Pavel Machek

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