From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1947133Ab3BHVHc (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Feb 2013 16:07:32 -0500 Received: from tx2ehsobe004.messaging.microsoft.com ([65.55.88.14]:9625 "EHLO tx2outboundpool.messaging.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1947070Ab3BHVHa (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Feb 2013 16:07:30 -0500 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:157.56.236.101;KIP:(null);UIP:(null);IPV:NLI;H:BY2PRD0510HT005.namprd05.prod.outlook.com;RD:none;EFVD:NLI X-SpamScore: -2 X-BigFish: PS-2(zz98dI936eIzz1f42h1ee6h1de0h1202h1e76h1d1ah1d2ahzzz2fh2a8h668h839h93fhd24he5bhf0ah1288h12a5h12a9h12bdh137ah13b6h1441h1504h1537h153bh162dh1631h1758h18e1h1946h19b5h1155h) From: Matthew Garrett To: Kees Cook CC: "H. Peter Anvin" , LKML , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "x86@kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , linux-security-module Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot Thread-Topic: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot Thread-Index: AQHOBjA7mQsIMlqU/k+EElzc7Yz1iZhwVXgAgAAAbACAAAawAIAACLcAgAABPICAAAKrAIAAAdKAgAAHwICAAAFnAA== Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 21:07:21 +0000 Message-ID: <1360357636.18083.19.camel@x230.lan> References: <20130208191213.GA25081@www.outflux.net> <00780235-deac-4f80-b936-867834e05661@email.android.com> <5115553A.5000708@zytor.com> <1360355671.18083.18.camel@x230.lan> In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.255.84.4] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-ID: <03989305AE685A42AB6353079D5CF946@namprd05.prod.outlook.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginatorOrg: nebula.com Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by mail.home.local id r18L7WoS006076 On Fri, 2013-02-08 at 13:02 -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > I don't find it unreasonable to drop all caps and lose access to > sensitive things. :) That's sort of the point, really. I think a cap > is the best match. It seems like it should either be a cap or a > namespace flag, but the latter seems messy. Yeah, I think it's an expected outcome, but it means that if (say) qemu drops privileges, qemu can no longer access PCI resources - even on non-secure boot systems. That breaks existing userspace. {.n++%ݶw{.n+{G{ayʇڙ,jfhz_(階ݢj"mG?&~iOzv^m ?I