From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933760AbbA1EQL (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Jan 2015 23:16:11 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.136]:37635 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1760859AbbA1EQI (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Jan 2015 23:16:08 -0500 From: lizf@kernel.org To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Willy Tarreau , "Don A. Bailey" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Zefan Li Subject: [PATCH 3.4 030/177] lzo: check for length overrun in variable length encoding. Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2015 12:07:07 +0800 Message-Id: <1422418236-12852-60-git-send-email-lizf@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1422418050-12581-1-git-send-email-lizf@kernel.org> References: <1422418050-12581-1-git-send-email-lizf@kernel.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Willy Tarreau 3.4.106-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ commit 72cf90124e87d975d0b2114d930808c58b4c05e4 upstream. This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding 255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number. The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8 and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting two less 255 steps. This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1% (measured on x86_64). The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels. Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers Cc: "Don A. Bailey" Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Zefan Li --- lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c index 569985d..a1c387f 100644 --- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c @@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ #define NEED_OP(x) if (!HAVE_OP(x)) goto output_overrun #define TEST_LB(m_pos) if ((m_pos) < out) goto lookbehind_overrun +/* This MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base + * count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when + * multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier + * depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8 + * and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than + * or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting + * two less 255 steps. See Documentation/lzo.txt for more information. + */ +#define MAX_255_COUNT ((((size_t)~0) / 255) - 2) + int lzo1x_decompress_safe(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len) { @@ -55,12 +65,19 @@ int lzo1x_decompress_safe(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, if (t < 16) { if (likely(state == 0)) { if (unlikely(t == 0)) { + size_t offset; + const unsigned char *ip_last = ip; + while (unlikely(*ip == 0)) { - t += 255; ip++; NEED_IP(1); } - t += 15 + *ip++; + offset = ip - ip_last; + if (unlikely(offset > MAX_255_COUNT)) + return LZO_E_ERROR; + + offset = (offset << 8) - offset; + t += offset + 15 + *ip++; } t += 3; copy_literal_run: @@ -116,12 +133,19 @@ copy_literal_run: } else if (t >= 32) { t = (t & 31) + (3 - 1); if (unlikely(t == 2)) { + size_t offset; + const unsigned char *ip_last = ip; + while (unlikely(*ip == 0)) { - t += 255; ip++; NEED_IP(1); } - t += 31 + *ip++; + offset = ip - ip_last; + if (unlikely(offset > MAX_255_COUNT)) + return LZO_E_ERROR; + + offset = (offset << 8) - offset; + t += offset + 31 + *ip++; NEED_IP(2); } m_pos = op - 1; @@ -134,12 +158,19 @@ copy_literal_run: m_pos -= (t & 8) << 11; t = (t & 7) + (3 - 1); if (unlikely(t == 2)) { + size_t offset; + const unsigned char *ip_last = ip; + while (unlikely(*ip == 0)) { - t += 255; ip++; NEED_IP(1); } - t += 7 + *ip++; + offset = ip - ip_last; + if (unlikely(offset > MAX_255_COUNT)) + return LZO_E_ERROR; + + offset = (offset << 8) - offset; + t += offset + 7 + *ip++; NEED_IP(2); } next = get_unaligned_le16(ip); -- 1.9.1