From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934144AbbHKGTf (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Aug 2015 02:19:35 -0400 Received: from mail-pa0-f54.google.com ([209.85.220.54]:34412 "EHLO mail-pa0-f54.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S934111AbbHKGTb (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Aug 2015 02:19:31 -0400 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" X-Google-Original-From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Matthew Garrett , Len Brown , Pavel Machek , Josh Boyer , Vojtech Pavlik , Matt Fleming , Jiri Kosina , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , "Lee, Chun-Yi" Subject: [PATCH v2 15/16] PM / hibernate: Bypass verification logic on legacy BIOS Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 14:16:35 +0800 Message-Id: <1439273796-25359-16-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.4.5 In-Reply-To: <1439273796-25359-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> References: <1439273796-25359-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Current hibernate signature verification solution relies on EFI stub and efi boot service variable on x86 architecture. So the verification logic was bypassed on legacy BIOS through checking EFI_BOOT flag. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Tested-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c | 3 +++ kernel/power/Kconfig | 3 ++- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 8 ++++++-- kernel/power/user.c | 6 +++++- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c index 8a50bf1..2125302 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ void create_hibernation_key_regen_flag(void) struct efivar_entry *entry = NULL; int err = 0; + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) + return; + if (!set_hibernation_key_regen_flag) return; diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig index 1a03777..c30598e 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ config HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION This option provides support for generating and verifying the signature of memory snapshot image by HMAC-SHA1. Current mechanism relies on UEFI secure boot environment, EFI stub generates HMAC - key for hibernate verification. + key for hibernate verification. So, the verification logic will be + bypassed on legacy BIOS. config HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION_FORCE bool "Require hibernate snapshot image to be validly signed" diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index 486dd73..22b80b7 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1469,8 +1470,11 @@ error_digest: forward_ret: if (ret) pr_warn("PM: Signature verifying failed: %d\n", ret); - /* forward check result when verifying pass or not enforce verifying */ - if (!ret || !sigenforce) { + if (ret == -ENODEV && !efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { + pr_warn("PM: Bypass verification on non-EFI machine\n"); + ret = 0; + } else if (!ret || !sigenforce) { + /* forward check result when verifying pass or not enforce verifying */ snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(ret); ret = 0; } diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c index a183abd..686d095 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.c +++ b/kernel/power/user.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -393,7 +394,10 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, break; case SNAPSHOT_REGENERATE_KEY: - set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = !!arg; + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) + error = -ENODEV; + else + set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = !!arg; break; default: -- 2.1.4