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From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>, Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 14:16:24 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1439273796-25359-5-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1439273796-25359-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>

This patch adds the codes for generating random number array as the
HMAC key that will used by later EFI stub codes.

The original codes in efi_random copied from aslr and add the codes
to accept input entropy and EFI debugging. In later patch will add
the codes to get random number by EFI protocol. The separate codes
can avoid impacting aslr function.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile     |  1 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_random.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c       |  4 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h       |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_random.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 0a291cd..377245b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/aslr.o
 
 $(obj)/eboot.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -mno-red-zone
 
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION) += $(obj)/efi_random.o
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(obj)/eboot.o $(obj)/efi_stub_$(BITS).o \
 	$(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_random.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a69352e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/archrandom.h>
+
+#define EDX_TSC		(1 << 4)
+#define ECX_RDRAND	(1 << 30)
+
+static unsigned int cpuid_0x1_ecx, cpuid_0x1_edx;
+
+static void cpuid_ecx_edx(void)
+{
+	unsigned int eax, ebx;
+
+	cpuid(0x1, &eax, &ebx, &cpuid_0x1_ecx, &cpuid_0x1_edx);
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_random_long(unsigned long entropy,
+				     struct boot_params *boot_params,
+				     efi_system_table_t *sys_table)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	const unsigned long mix_const = 0x5d6008cbf3848dd3UL;
+#else
+	const unsigned long mix_const = 0x3f39e593UL;
+#endif
+	unsigned long raw, random;
+	bool use_i8254 = true;
+
+	if (entropy)
+		random = entropy;
+	else
+		random = get_random_boot(boot_params);
+
+	if (cpuid_0x1_ecx & ECX_RDRAND) {
+		if (rdrand_long(&raw)) {
+			random ^= raw;
+			use_i8254 = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cpuid_0x1_edx & EDX_TSC) {
+		rdtscll(raw);
+
+		random ^= raw;
+		use_i8254 = false;
+	}
+
+	if (use_i8254)
+		random ^= read_i8254();
+
+	/* Circular multiply for better bit diffusion */
+	asm("mul %3"
+	    : "=a" (random), "=d" (raw)
+	    : "a" (random), "rm" (mix_const));
+	random += raw;
+
+	return random;
+}
+
+void efi_get_random_key(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
+			struct boot_params *params, u8 key[], unsigned int size)
+{
+	unsigned long entropy = 0;
+	unsigned int bfill = size;
+
+	if (key == NULL || !size)
+		return;
+
+	cpuid_ecx_edx();
+
+	memset(key, 0, size);
+	while (bfill > 0) {
+		unsigned int copy_len = 0;
+		entropy = get_random_long(entropy, params, sys_table);
+		copy_len = (bfill < sizeof(entropy)) ? bfill : sizeof(entropy);
+		memcpy((void *)(key + size - bfill), &entropy, copy_len);
+		bfill -= copy_len;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index 70acd7e..c8e2237 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *decompress_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
 	return output;
 }
 
-#if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+#if CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION || CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
 #define I8254_PORT_CONTROL	0x43
 #define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0	0x40
 #define I8254_CMD_READBACK	0xC0
@@ -489,4 +489,4 @@ unsigned long get_random_boot(struct boot_params *boot_params)
 
 	return hash;
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION || CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 60e4893..3508a6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int cmdline_find_option(const char *option, char *buffer, int bufsize);
 int cmdline_find_option_bool(const char *option);
 #endif
 
-#if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+#if CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION || CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
 extern u16 read_i8254(void);
 extern unsigned long get_random_boot(struct boot_params *boot_params);
 #endif
-- 
2.1.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-08-11  6:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-11  6:16 [PATCH v2 00/16] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] PM / hibernate: define HMAC algorithm and digest size of hibernation Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI services pointer table Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-19 16:35   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/boot: Public getting random boot function Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` Lee, Chun-Yi [this message]
2015-08-20 14:12   ` [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  4:06     ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number generator protocol Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 14:47   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  4:51     ` joeyli
2015-08-20 20:26   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  6:17     ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 20:40   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  9:04     ` joeyli
2015-09-09 12:15       ` Matt Fleming
2015-09-13  2:47         ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] efi: Make efi_status_to_err() public Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-20 15:07   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  9:06     ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-15 17:07   ` Pavel Machek
2015-08-16  5:28     ` joeyli
2015-08-16 21:23     ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-17  6:54       ` Nigel Cunningham
2015-08-21 12:40   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27  9:28     ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and erase footprints Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-13  2:45   ` Chen, Yu C
2015-08-13  3:25     ` joeyli
2015-08-13 14:33   ` joeyli
2015-08-21 13:27   ` Matt Fleming
2015-08-27 10:21     ` joeyli
2015-09-09 12:24       ` Matt Fleming
2015-09-13  2:58         ` joeyli
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] PM / hibernate: Generate and verify signature of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] PM / hibernate: Avoid including hibernation key to hibernate image Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] PM / hibernate: Forward signature verifying result and key to image kernel Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] PM / hibernate: Add configuration to enforce signature verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] PM / hibernate: Allow user trigger hibernation key re-generating Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] PM / hibernate: Bypass verification logic on legacy BIOS Lee, Chun-Yi
2015-08-11  6:16 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] PM / hibernate: Document signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi

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