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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
        Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>, Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Subject: [PATCH 3.10 109/143] proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
Date: Sun,  5 Jun 2016 12:20:12 +0200
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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>

commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 upstream.

If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 7b5d453..e5160b7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -844,7 +844,8 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	int ret = 0;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
 
-	if (!mm)
+	/* Ensure the process spawned far enough to have an environment. */
+	if (!mm || !mm->env_end)
 		return 0;
 
 	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
-- 
2.8.0.rc2.1.gbe9624a