From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, security@kernel.org
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@gmail.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 21:31:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1485379919.2998.159.camel@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <826ec4aab64ec304944098d15209f8c1ae65bb29.1485377903.git.luto@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1498 bytes --]
On Wed, 2017-01-25 at 13:06 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Currently, if you open("foo", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | ..., 02777) in a
> directory that is setgid and owned by a different gid than current's
> fsgid, you end up with an SGID executable that is owned by the
> directory's GID. This is a Bad Thing (tm). Exploiting this is
> nontrivial because most ways of creating a new file create an empty
> file and empty executables aren't particularly interesting, but this
> is nevertheless quite dangerous.
>
> Harden against this type of attack by detecting this particular
> corner case (unprivileged program creates SGID executable inode in
> SGID directory owned by a different GID) and clearing the new
> inode's SGID bit.
>
> > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> fs/inode.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
> index f7029c40cfbd..d7e4b80470dd 100644
> --- a/fs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/inode.c
> @@ -2007,11 +2007,28 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
> {
> inode->i_uid = current_fsuid();
> if (dir && dir->i_mode & S_ISGID) {
> + bool changing_gid = !gid_eq(inode->i_gid, dir->i_gid);
[...]
inode->i_gid hasn't been initialised yet. This should compare with
current_fsgid(), shouldn't it?
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
It is easier to write an incorrect program than to understand a correct
one.
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-25 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-25 21:06 [PATCH 0/2] setgid hardening Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 21:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 21:43 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-01-25 21:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 23:15 ` Frank Filz
2017-01-26 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-25 21:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 21:31 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2017-01-25 21:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 23:17 ` Frank Filz
2017-01-25 23:50 ` Willy Tarreau
2017-01-25 23:59 ` [PATCH 0/2] setgid hardening Willy Tarreau
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1485379919.2998.159.camel@decadent.org.uk \
--to=ben@decadent.org.uk \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=koct9i@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=security@kernel.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=w@1wt.eu \
--cc=yalin.wang2010@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).