* [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:45 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for David Howells
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " Ard Biesheuvel
` (5 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: David Howells, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Provide the ability to perform mixed-mode runtime service calls for x86 in
the same way that commit 0a637ee61247bd4bed9b2a07568ef7a1cfc76187
("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services") provides the
ability to invoke arbitrary boot services.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +++---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 6d3aeabbce68..f99978db6b6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c) \
\
table = (typeof(table))sys_table; \
\
+ c->runtime_services = table->runtime; \
c->boot_services = table->boottime; \
c->text_output = table->con_out; \
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
index fd0b6a272dd5..d85b9625e836 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
call make_boot_params
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
2:
call efi_main
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ relocated:
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
.data
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.long efi_call_phys
.long 0
.byte 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 4d85e600db78..d2ae1f821e0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/*
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
- addq %rbp, efi64_config+32(%rip)
+ addq %rbp, efi64_config+40(%rip)
movq %rax, %rdi
call make_boot_params
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ handover_entry:
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
movq efi_config(%rip), %rax
- addq %rbp, 32(%rax)
+ addq %rbp, 40(%rax)
2:
movq efi_config(%rip), %rdi
call efi_main
@@ -456,14 +456,14 @@ efi_config:
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
.global efi32_config
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi64_thunk
.byte 0
#endif
.global efi64_config
efi64_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi_call
.byte 1
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index e99675b9c861..2f77bcefe6b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static inline efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(
struct efi_config {
u64 image_handle;
u64 table;
+ u64 runtime_services;
u64 boot_services;
u64 text_output;
efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...);
@@ -226,6 +227,10 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) \
__efi_early()->call((unsigned long)f, __VA_ARGS__);
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) \
+ __efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f, \
+ __efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__)
+
extern bool efi_reboot_required(void);
#else
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* [tip:efi/core] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 9:45 ` tip-bot for David Howells
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for David Howells @ 2017-02-07 9:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: ard.biesheuvel, lukas, linux-kernel, peterz, matt, mingo, tglx,
hpa, dhowells, torvalds
Commit-ID: a2cd2f3f29f26782b7484b32e2af172e29313717
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/a2cd2f3f29f26782b7484b32e2af172e29313717
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:40 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:09 +0100
x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
Provide the ability to perform mixed-mode runtime service calls for x86 in
the same way the following commit provided the ability to invoke for boot
services:
0a637ee61247bd ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services")
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +++---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 6d3aeab..f99978d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c) \
\
table = (typeof(table))sys_table; \
\
+ c->runtime_services = table->runtime; \
c->boot_services = table->boottime; \
c->text_output = table->con_out; \
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
index fd0b6a2..d85b962 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
call make_boot_params
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
2:
call efi_main
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ relocated:
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
.data
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.long efi_call_phys
.long 0
.byte 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 4d85e60..d2ae1f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/*
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
- addq %rbp, efi64_config+32(%rip)
+ addq %rbp, efi64_config+40(%rip)
movq %rax, %rdi
call make_boot_params
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ handover_entry:
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
movq efi_config(%rip), %rax
- addq %rbp, 32(%rax)
+ addq %rbp, 40(%rax)
2:
movq efi_config(%rip), %rdi
call efi_main
@@ -456,14 +456,14 @@ efi_config:
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
.global efi32_config
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi64_thunk
.byte 0
#endif
.global efi64_config
efi64_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi_call
.byte 1
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index e99675b..2f77bce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static inline efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(
struct efi_config {
u64 image_handle;
u64 table;
+ u64 runtime_services;
u64 boot_services;
u64 text_output;
efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...);
@@ -226,6 +227,10 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) \
__efi_early()->call((unsigned long)f, __VA_ARGS__);
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) \
+ __efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f, \
+ __efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__)
+
extern bool efi_reboot_required(void);
#else
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:46 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for David Howells
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions Ard Biesheuvel
` (4 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: David Howells, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
efi_call_runtime() is provided for x86 to be able abstract mixed mode
support. Provide this for ARM also so that common code work in mixed mode
also.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (false)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b6b1633017f..e7445281e534 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (true)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* [tip:efi/core] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 9:46 ` tip-bot for David Howells
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for David Howells @ 2017-02-07 9:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: lukas, torvalds, peterz, mingo, hpa, dhowells, tglx,
ard.biesheuvel, linux-kernel, matt
Commit-ID: 6d0ca4a47bf8cb313a5180eabb791c33467f4452
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/6d0ca4a47bf8cb313a5180eabb791c33467f4452
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:41 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:09 +0100
arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
efi_call_runtime() is provided for x86 to be able abstract mixed mode
support. Provide this for ARM also so that common code work in mixed mode
also.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-3-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b06f53..e4e6a9d6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (false)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b6b163..e744528 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (true)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: " Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
` (2 more replies)
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status Ard Biesheuvel
` (3 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 3 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: David Howells, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi, Josh Boyer
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add the definitions for shim and image security database, both of which
are used widely in various Linux distros.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 8c6e007a5408..52c87de3e50d 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
#define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4, 0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
#define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
+
/*
* This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
* structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-02-07 8:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:23 ` David Howells
2017-02-07 9:46 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for Josh Boyer
2 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2017-02-07 7:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: matt, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin, David Howells,
linux-kernel, linux-efi, Josh Boyer
* Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> Add the definitions for shim and image security database, both of which
> are used widely in various Linux distros.
>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
That's not a valid SOB chain: the SOB of the author of the patch (David Howells)
must come first.
I changed it to:
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Please holler if that's not OK.
Thanks,
Ingo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
2017-02-07 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
@ 2017-02-07 8:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-07 8:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar
Cc: Matt Fleming, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin, David Howells,
linux-kernel, linux-efi, Josh Boyer
On 7 February 2017 at 07:52, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> * Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
>> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>>
>> Add the definitions for shim and image security database, both of which
>> are used widely in various Linux distros.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>
> That's not a valid SOB chain: the SOB of the author of the patch (David Howells)
> must come first.
>
> I changed it to:
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>
> Please holler if that's not OK.
>
Ah yes, thanks for spotting that.
OK with me
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
@ 2017-02-07 9:23 ` David Howells
2017-02-07 9:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-02-07 9:46 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for Josh Boyer
2 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2017-02-07 9:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar
Cc: dhowells, Ard Biesheuvel, matt, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin,
linux-kernel, linux-efi, Josh Boyer
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
> That's not a valid SOB chain: the SOB of the author of the patch (David Howells)
> must come first.
>
> I changed it to:
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>
> Please holler if that's not OK.
Actually, it should be authored by Josh Boyer. Somehow the authorship got
lost.
David
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
2017-02-07 9:23 ` David Howells
@ 2017-02-07 9:42 ` Ingo Molnar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2017-02-07 9:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, matt, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin,
linux-kernel, linux-efi, Josh Boyer
* David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > That's not a valid SOB chain: the SOB of the author of the patch (David Howells)
> > must come first.
> >
> > I changed it to:
> >
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> > Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> >
> > Please holler if that's not OK.
>
> Actually, it should be authored by Josh Boyer. Somehow the authorship got
> lost.
Ok, I have fixed it accordingly.
Thanks,
Ingo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [tip:efi/core] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-02-07 9:23 ` David Howells
@ 2017-02-07 9:46 ` tip-bot for Josh Boyer
2 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for Josh Boyer @ 2017-02-07 9:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: jwboyer, matt, torvalds, linux-kernel, tglx, peterz, dhowells,
hpa, ard.biesheuvel, mingo
Commit-ID: e58910cdc9f43cda2e52fcdf2fddbdc74e80b2f7
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/e58910cdc9f43cda2e52fcdf2fddbdc74e80b2f7
Author: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:42 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:10 +0100
efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
Add the definitions for shim and image security database, both of which
are used widely in various Linux distros.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-4-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 85e9fda..d00538a 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
#define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4, 0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
#define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
+
/*
* This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
* structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:47 ` [tip:efi/core] efi: Get and store " tip-bot for David Howells
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode Ard Biesheuvel
` (2 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: David Howells, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a)
generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot
loader or kexec. This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new
kernel.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 7 ++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 63 +++----------------------------
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++
8 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index f99978db6b6f..801c7a158e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -988,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
else
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
+ /*
+ * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
+ * otherwise we ask the BIOS.
+ */
+ if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index c62e015b126c..de827d6ac8c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
+ OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 33e0e2f1a730..f7425960f6a5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index 6fca48c9e054..d4056c6be1ec 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
- static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
- static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
- u8 val;
- unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
- efi_status_t status;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 0)
- return 0;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 1)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- return 0;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- return -EIO;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- return -EACCES;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
-
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
@@ -157,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
- int secure_boot = 0;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -227,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
- if (secure_boot > 0)
- pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-
- if (secure_boot < 0) {
- pr_efi_err(sys_table,
- "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- }
/*
- * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
- * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
+ * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
+ * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
+ * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
- if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
+ if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
+ strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..62d6904da800
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ * Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ u8 secboot, setupmode;
+ unsigned long size;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ size = sizeof(secboot);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &secboot);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+ pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+out_efi_err:
+ pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 52c87de3e50d..729ee6a2579b 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1480,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
+
/*
* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* [tip:efi/core] efi: Get and store the secure boot status
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 9:47 ` tip-bot for David Howells
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for David Howells @ 2017-02-07 9:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: peterz, lukas, tglx, matt, dhowells, hpa, mingo, linux-kernel,
ard.biesheuvel, torvalds
Commit-ID: de8cb458625c164bb3f93c4e415e479afce8fa9d
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/de8cb458625c164bb3f93c4e415e479afce8fa9d
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:43 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:10 +0100
efi: Get and store the secure boot status
Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the ARM stub and (a)
generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot
loader or kexec. This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new
kernel.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
[ Small readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 7 ++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 63 +++----------------------------
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++
8 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 95a4d34..b8527c6 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index f99978d..801c7a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -988,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
else
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
+ /*
+ * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
+ * otherwise we ask the BIOS.
+ */
+ if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b10bf31..5138dac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index c62e015..de827d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
+ OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 33e0e2f..f742596 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index 6fca48c..d4056c6 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
- static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
- static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
- u8 val;
- unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
- efi_status_t status;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 0)
- return 0;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 1)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- return 0;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- return -EIO;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- return -EACCES;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
-
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
@@ -157,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
- int secure_boot = 0;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -227,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
- if (secure_boot > 0)
- pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-
- if (secure_boot < 0) {
- pr_efi_err(sys_table,
- "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- }
/*
- * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
- * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
+ * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
+ * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
+ * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
- if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
+ if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
+ strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b20b8b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ * Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ u8 secboot, setupmode;
+ unsigned long size;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ size = sizeof(secboot);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &secboot);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+ pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+out_efi_err:
+ pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index d00538a..94d34e0 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1480,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
+
/*
* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:48 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for Josh Boyer
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific Ard Biesheuvel
6 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: Josh Boyer, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi, David Howells
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
secure boot mode if that variable is set.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
index 62d6904da800..766ac06dac84 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
};
+/* SHIM variables */
+static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = {
+ 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0
+};
+
#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
@@ -33,7 +39,8 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
*/
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
- u8 secboot, setupmode;
+ u32 attr;
+ u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
unsigned long size;
efi_status_t status;
@@ -52,6 +59,22 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+ * honor that.
+ */
+ size = sizeof(moksbstate);
+ status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
+ &attr, &size, &moksbstate);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto secure_boot_enabled;
+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+secure_boot_enabled:
pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* [tip:efi/core] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 9:48 ` tip-bot for Josh Boyer
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for Josh Boyer @ 2017-02-07 9:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: peterz, jwboyer, tglx, linux-kernel, dhowells, torvalds, hpa,
ard.biesheuvel, matt, mingo
Commit-ID: f3cf6f7434debcc65f397228c689641b07c1be35
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/f3cf6f7434debcc65f397228c689641b07c1be35
Author: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:44 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:10 +0100
efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
secure boot mode if that variable is set.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
index b20b8b4..6def402 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
};
+/* SHIM variables */
+static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = {
+ 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0
+};
+
#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
@@ -31,7 +37,8 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
*/
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
- u8 secboot, setupmode;
+ u32 attr;
+ u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
unsigned long size;
efi_status_t status;
@@ -50,6 +57,22 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+ * honor that.
+ */
+ size = sizeof(moksbstate);
+ status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
+ &attr, &size, &moksbstate);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto secure_boot_enabled;
+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+secure_boot_enabled:
pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:48 ` [tip:efi/core] " tip-bot for David Howells
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific Ard Biesheuvel
6 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: David Howells, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Print the secure boot status in the x86 setup_arch() but otherwise do
nothing more for now. More functionality will be added later, but this at
least allows for testing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
[ardb: use efi_enabled() instead of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 4cfba947d774..69780edf0dde 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1176,6 +1176,20 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* [tip:efi/core] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 9:48 ` tip-bot for David Howells
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for David Howells @ 2017-02-07 9:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: tglx, torvalds, hpa, linux-kernel, ard.biesheuvel, matt,
dhowells, mingo, peterz
Commit-ID: 9661b332041dab63ba2e5222b40a9f916c1368a9
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/9661b332041dab63ba2e5222b40a9f916c1368a9
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:45 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:10 +0100
efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
Print the secure boot status in the x86 setup_arch() function, but otherwise do
nothing more for now. More functionality will be added later, but this at
least allows for testing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Use efi_enabled() instead of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI). ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-7-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 4cfba94..69780ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1176,6 +1176,20 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 7/7] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
2017-02-06 11:22 [GIT PULL 0/7] EFI updates for v4.11 part 2 Ard Biesheuvel
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-06 11:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-07 9:49 ` [tip:efi/core] efi/libstub: " tip-bot for Ard Biesheuvel
6 siblings, 1 reply; 19+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-06 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matt, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, H . Peter Anvin
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, linux-efi
The ARM decompressor is finicky when it comes to uninitialized variables
with local linkage, the reason being that it may relocate .text and .bss
independently when executing from ROM. This is only possible if all
references into .bss from .text are absolute, and this happens to be the
case for references emitted under -fpic to symbols with external linkage,
and so all .bss references must involve symbols with external linkage.
When building the ARM stub using clang, the initialized local variable
__chunk_size is optimized into a zero-initialized flag that indicates
whether chunking is in effect or not. This flag is therefore emitted into
.bss, which triggers the ARM decompressor's diagnostics, resulting in a
failed build.
Under UEFI, we never execute the decompressor from ROM, so the diagnostic
makes little sense here. But we can easily work around the issue by making
__chunk_size global instead.
However, given that the file I/O chunking that is controlled by the
__chunk_size variable is intended to work around known bugs on various
x86 implementations of UEFI, we can simply make the chunking an x86
specific feature. This is an improvement by itself, and also removes the
need to parse the efi= options in the stub entirely.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
index 6ee9164251a9..2a07b867bec7 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
@@ -414,6 +414,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char *cmdline)
char *str;
/*
+ * Currently, the only efi= option we look for is 'nochunk', which
+ * is intended to work around known issues on certain x86 UEFI
+ * versions. So ignore for now on other architectures.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86))
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ /*
* If no EFI parameters were specified on the cmdline we've got
* nothing to do.
*/
@@ -586,7 +594,9 @@ efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
size = files[j].size;
while (size) {
unsigned long chunksize;
- if (size > __chunk_size)
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86) &&
+ size > __chunk_size)
chunksize = __chunk_size;
else
chunksize = size;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread* [tip:efi/core] efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
2017-02-06 11:22 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-02-07 9:49 ` tip-bot for Ard Biesheuvel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 19+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-02-07 9:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: mingo, linux-kernel, tglx, matt, torvalds, hpa, peterz,
ard.biesheuvel, arnd
Commit-ID: b3879a4d3a31ef14265a52e8d941cf4b0f6627ae
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/b3879a4d3a31ef14265a52e8d941cf4b0f6627ae
Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
AuthorDate: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:46 +0000
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 10:42:11 +0100
efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
The ARM decompressor is finicky when it comes to uninitialized variables
with local linkage, the reason being that it may relocate .text and .bss
independently when executing from ROM. This is only possible if all
references into .bss from .text are absolute, and this happens to be the
case for references emitted under -fpic to symbols with external linkage,
and so all .bss references must involve symbols with external linkage.
When building the ARM stub using clang, the initialized local variable
__chunk_size is optimized into a zero-initialized flag that indicates
whether chunking is in effect or not. This flag is therefore emitted into
.bss, which triggers the ARM decompressor's diagnostics, resulting in a
failed build.
Under UEFI, we never execute the decompressor from ROM, so the diagnostic
makes little sense here. But we can easily work around the issue by making
__chunk_size global instead.
However, given that the file I/O chunking that is controlled by the
__chunk_size variable is intended to work around known bugs on various
x86 implementations of UEFI, we can simply make the chunking an x86
specific feature. This is an improvement by itself, and also removes the
need to parse the efi= options in the stub entirely.
Tested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-8-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
[ Small readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
index 6ee9164..919822b 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
@@ -414,6 +414,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char *cmdline)
char *str;
/*
+ * Currently, the only efi= option we look for is 'nochunk', which
+ * is intended to work around known issues on certain x86 UEFI
+ * versions. So ignore for now on other architectures.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86))
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ /*
* If no EFI parameters were specified on the cmdline we've got
* nothing to do.
*/
@@ -586,7 +594,8 @@ efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
size = files[j].size;
while (size) {
unsigned long chunksize;
- if (size > __chunk_size)
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86) && size > __chunk_size)
chunksize = __chunk_size;
else
chunksize = size;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 19+ messages in thread