From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751833AbdBFLXw (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Feb 2017 06:23:52 -0500 Received: from mail-wm0-f42.google.com ([74.125.82.42]:37374 "EHLO mail-wm0-f42.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751770AbdBFLXu (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Feb 2017 06:23:50 -0500 From: Ard Biesheuvel To: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner , "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Josh Boyer , Ard Biesheuvel , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 11:22:44 +0000 Message-Id: <1486380166-31868-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1486380166-31868-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> References: <1486380166-31868-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Josh Boyer A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable secure boot mode if that variable is set. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer Signed-off-by: David Howells Cc: Matt Fleming Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c index 62d6904da800..766ac06dac84 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = { 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 }; +/* SHIM variables */ +static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; +static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = { + 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0 +}; + #define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \ @@ -33,7 +39,8 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = { */ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { - u8 secboot, setupmode; + u32 attr; + u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate; unsigned long size; efi_status_t status; @@ -52,6 +59,22 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + /* + * See if a user has put shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the + * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well + * honor that. + */ + size = sizeof(moksbstate); + status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid, + &attr, &size, &moksbstate); + + /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto secure_boot_enabled; + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + +secure_boot_enabled: pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; -- 2.7.4