From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 14:47:10 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1493750832-11981-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1493750832-11981-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The builtin "ima_appraise_tcb" policy should require file signatures for
at least a few of the hooks (eg. kernel modules, firmware, and the kexec
kernel image), but changing it would break the existing userspace/kernel
ABI.
This patch defines a new builtin policy named "secure_boot", which
can be specified on the "ima_policy=" boot command line, independently
or in conjunction with the "ima_appraise_tcb" policy, by specifing
ima_policy="appraise_tcb | secure_boot". The new appraisal rules
requiring file signatures will be added prior to the "ima_appraise_tcb"
rules.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
- Reference secure boot in the new builtin policy name. (Thiago Bauermann)
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 06b95e28e5e2..4e15b6a67d2c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@
ima_policy= [IMA]
The builtin policies to load during IMA setup.
- Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb"
+ Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot"
The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files
mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1489,6 +1489,10 @@
all files owned by root. (This is the equivalent
of ima_appraise_tcb.)
+ The "secure_boot" policy appraises the integrity
+ of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules,
+ firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures.
+
ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead.
Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0ddc41389a9c..3653c86c70df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -153,6 +153,17 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
#endif
};
+static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+};
+
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
@@ -171,6 +182,7 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
{
char *p;
@@ -182,6 +194,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
+ ima_use_secure_boot = 1;
}
return 1;
@@ -410,12 +424,14 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
*/
void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
- int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
+ int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
+ secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
+ ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -434,6 +450,14 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
+ * any other appraise rules.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
+ list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
&ima_default_rules);
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-02 18:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-02 18:47 [PATCH 0/4] ima: builtin policy requiring file signatures Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 18:47 ` [PATCH 1/4] ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 18:47 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-05-02 18:47 ` [PATCH 3/4] ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 18:47 ` [PATCH 4/4] ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled() Mimi Zohar
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