linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 08/23] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 14:48:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149692969796.11452.2915277493345705577.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149692963884.11452.7673998701432248814.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'.  When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer.  Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp().  [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c |   31 +++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index d14f1a47a130..0f7b95de3b5f 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
  */
 static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
 {
-	if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else
-		goto out;
+	int prefix_len;
+
+	if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
-out:
-	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /*

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-08 13:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-08 13:47 [PATCH 00/23] KEYS: Fixes David Howells
2017-06-08 13:47 ` [PATCH 01/23] security/keys: add CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT to Kconfig David Howells
2017-06-08 13:47 ` [PATCH 02/23] security: use READ_ONCE instead of deprecated ACCESS_ONCE David Howells
2017-06-08 13:47 ` [PATCH 03/23] KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero David Howells
2017-06-08 13:47 ` [PATCH 04/23] X.509: Fix error code in x509_cert_parse() David Howells
2017-06-08 13:47 ` [PATCH 05/23] KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in get_derived_key() David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 06/23] KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() fails David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 07/23] KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 09/23] KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculations David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 10/23] KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 11/23] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 12/23] KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update() David Howells
2017-06-08 13:48 ` [PATCH 13/23] KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 14/23] KEYS: user_defined: sanitize " David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 15/23] KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 16/23] KEYS: trusted: " David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 17/23] KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeing David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 18/23] KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hash David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 19/23] KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDF David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 20/23] KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly aligned David Howells
2017-06-08 13:49 ` [PATCH 21/23] KEYS: DH: add __user annotations to keyctl_kdf_params David Howells
2017-06-08 13:50 ` [PATCH 22/23] crypto : asymmetric_keys : verify_pefile:zero memory content before freeing David Howells
2017-06-08 13:50 ` [PATCH 23/23] KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP API David Howells
2017-06-08 14:33 ` [PATCH 00/23] KEYS: Fixes James Morris
2017-06-08 14:49 ` David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=149692969796.11452.2915277493345705577.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
    --to=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@google.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).