From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752613AbdKHUBV (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Nov 2017 15:01:21 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:56100 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752260AbdKHUBR (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Nov 2017 15:01:17 -0500 Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown From: Mimi Zohar To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" Cc: David Howells , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi , gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , "AKASHI, Takahiro" Date: Wed, 08 Nov 2017 15:01:09 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> References: <1509660086.3416.15.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <14219.1509660259@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1509660641.3416.24.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17110820-0008-0000-0000-000004A92067 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17110820-0009-0000-0000-00001E3BBF17 Message-Id: <1510171269.4484.26.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-11-08_03:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1707230000 definitions=main-1711080262 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > Or reflect that IMA-appraisal, if enabled, will enforce firmware being > > validly signed. > > But FWICT lockdown is a built-in kernel thingy, unless lockdown implies IMA > it would not be the place to refer to it. > > It seems the documentation was proposed to help users if an error was caught. > That error should cover only what is being addressed in code on the kernel. Enabling "lockdown" needs to take into account IMA-appraisal to prevent breaking systems with it enabled. An IMA builtin "secure_boot" policy was already upstreamed (commit 503ceaef8e2e "ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures").  An additional patch, automatically enables the "secure_boot" policy in "lockdown" mode. Refer to this discussion and patch: http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-October/003913.html http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-October/003910.html thanks, Mimi