From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
tglx@linutronix.de, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, x86@kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 00/12] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:22 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515707194-20531-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
This is a mitigation for the 'variant 2' attack described in
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
Using GCC patches available from the hjl/indirect/gcc-7-branch/master
branch of https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commits/hjl and by manually
patching assembler code, all vulnerable indirect branches (that occur
after userspace first runs) are eliminated from the kernel.
They are replaced with a 'retpoline' call sequence which deliberately
prevents speculation.
Fedora 27 packages of the updated compiler are available at
https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=24065739
v1: Initial post.
v2: Add CONFIG_RETPOLINE to build kernel without it.
Change warning messages.
Hide modpost warning message
v3: Update to the latest CET-capable retpoline version
Reinstate ALTERNATIVE support
v4: Finish reconciling Andi's and my patch sets, bug fixes.
Exclude objtool support for now
Add 'noretpoline' boot option
Add AMD retpoline alternative
v5: Silence MODVERSIONS warnings
Use pause;jmp loop instead of lfence;jmp
Switch to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE positive feature logic
Emit thunks inline from assembler macros
Merge AMD support into initial patch
v6: Update to latest GCC patches with no dots in symbols
Fix MODVERSIONS properly(ish)
Fix typo breaking 32-bit, introduced in V5
Never set X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD yet, pending confirmation
v7: Further bikeshedding on macro names
Stuff RSB on kernel entry
Implement 'spectre_v2=' command line option for IBRS/IBPB too
Revert to precisely the asm sequences from the Google paper
v8: Re-enable (I won't say "fix") objtool support
Use numeric labels for GCC compatibility
Add support for RSB-stuffing on vmexit
I don't know... other bloody bikeshedding. Can I sleep now?
Andi Kleen (1):
x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
David Woodhouse (10):
objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
Josh Poimboeuf (1):
objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 28 ++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 ++
arch/x86/Makefile | 10 ++
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 5 +-
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 5 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 25 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 18 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S | 8 +-
arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 7 +-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 48 ++++++
tools/objtool/check.c | 69 +++++++-
tools/objtool/check.h | 2 +-
25 files changed, 616 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-11 21:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-11 21:46 David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:22 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:22 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-18 19:09 ` [v8,02/12] " Guenter Roeck
2018-01-18 19:33 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-18 19:41 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-22 19:34 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 20:25 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-22 20:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-28 21:06 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-29 1:26 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-29 17:15 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-29 17:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-22 19:27 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:23 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] " Tom Lendacky
2018-01-12 10:28 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-14 15:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-14 15:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-14 15:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:23 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 22:40 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] " Borislav Petkov
2018-01-23 22:53 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 23:05 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 22:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-23 23:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-24 0:32 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-24 9:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-23 23:06 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-23 23:21 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:24 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-23 23:45 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-24 4:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-24 9:56 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-24 13:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-24 14:03 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-24 14:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:24 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:24 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:25 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:25 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:25 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:26 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:26 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:27 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:51 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] " Andi Kleen
2018-01-12 11:11 ` [PATCH v8.1 " David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 11:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-12 11:21 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-12 11:37 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-14 14:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-14 15:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-14 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:20 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 12:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 15:10 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 16:03 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:56 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 17:00 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 17:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 17:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 18:41 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-25 17:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 17:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 17:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 18:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 18:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 19:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 19:10 ` Borislav Petkov
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