From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/24] tomoyo: Implement security hooks for the new mount API [ver #7]
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 14:31:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <152414470395.23902.11628004819389905696.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <152414466005.23902.12967974041384198114.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Implement the security hook to check the creation of a new mountpoint for
Tomoyo.
As far as I can tell, Tomoyo doesn't make use of the mount data or parse
any mount options, so I haven't implemented any of the fs_context hooks for
it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
cc: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
---
security/tomoyo/common.h | 3 +++
security/tomoyo/mount.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 539bcdd30bb8..e637ce73f7f9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -971,6 +971,9 @@ int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
const u8 index);
int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev);
+int tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data_page);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 7dc7f59b7dde..e2e1cb203775 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "common.h"
@@ -236,3 +237,44 @@ int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
return error;
}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_permission_fc - Check permission to create a new mount.
+ * @fc: Context describing the object to be mounted.
+ * @mountpoint: The target object to mount on.
+ * @mnt: The MNT_* flags to be set on the mountpoint.
+ *
+ * Check the permission to create a mount of the object described in @fc. Note
+ * that the source object may be a newly created superblock or may be an
+ * existing one picked from the filesystem (bind mount).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+ unsigned int ms_flags = 0;
+ int error;
+ int idx;
+
+ if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT) ==
+ TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Convert MNT_* flags to MS_* equivalents. */
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ms_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) ms_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ms_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOATIME) ms_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NODIRATIME) ms_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_RELATIME) ms_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) ms_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+
+ idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+ error = tomoyo_mount_acl(&r, fc->source, mountpoint, fc->fs_type->name,
+ ms_flags);
+ tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 213b8c593668..31fd6bd4f657 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -391,6 +391,20 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, path, NULL);
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mountpoint().
+ * @fc: Context describing the object to be mounted.
+ * @mountpoint: The target object to mount on.
+ * @mnt_flags: Mountpoint specific options (as MNT_* flags).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ return tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(fc, mountpoint, mnt_flags);
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mount().
*
@@ -519,6 +533,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mountpoint, tomoyo_sb_mountpoint),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot),
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-19 13:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-19 13:31 [PATCH 00/24] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #7] David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 01/24] vfs: Undo an overly zealous MS_RDONLY -> SB_RDONLY conversion " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 02/24] VFS: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 03/24] VFS: Introduce the structs and doc for a filesystem context " David Howells
2018-04-23 3:36 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-01 14:29 ` David Howells
2018-05-01 15:31 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for " David Howells
2018-04-19 20:32 ` Paul Moore
2018-04-20 15:35 ` David Howells
2018-04-23 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-24 15:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-25 14:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 05/24] apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-05-04 0:10 ` John Johansen
2018-05-11 12:20 ` David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 07/24] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 08/24] VFS: Require specification of size of mount data for internal mounts " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 09/24] VFS: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 10/24] VFS: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 11/24] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 12/24] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs " David Howells
2018-06-19 3:34 ` [12/24] " Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 6:13 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 7:27 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 8:57 ` David Howells
2018-06-28 5:50 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 13/24] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 14/24] cpuset: Use " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 15/24] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 16/24] hugetlbfs: Convert to " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 17/24] VFS: Remove kern_mount_data() " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 18/24] VFS: Implement fsopen() to prepare for a mount " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 19/24] VFS: Implement fsmount() to effect a pre-configured " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 20/24] afs: Fix server record deletion " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 21/24] net: Export get_proc_net() " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 22/24] afs: Add fs_context support " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 23/24] afs: Implement namespacing " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 24/24] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount " David Howells
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