Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions

[Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>]

Hi Paul,

On Mon, 2018-06-04 at 20:21 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Stefan Berger
> <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> > the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines
> > AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >
> > Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
> > audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
> > the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
> 
> Aaand now I see you included the current->audit_context pointer I
> mentioned in my comments for 3/4 ;)
> 
> So basically this should be fine, although I should point out that you
> do not need to define a new message type to associate records
> together.  The fact that we don't associate all connected records is
> basically a bug.
> 
> Anyway, patches 3/4 and 4/4 look good to me.  Considering this is
> likely going in during the *next* merge window, I would ask that you
> convert from "current->audit_context" to "audit_context()" as soon as
> this merge window closes.
> 
> Thanks!

Thanks, Paul.  I'd like to start queueing patches for the next open
window now, instead of scrambling later.  Can I add your Ack now, and
remember to make this change when rebasing?

Mimi

> 
> > type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
> >   func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
> > type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
> >   func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
> > type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
> >   success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
> >   items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
> >   fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
> >   exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
> >   subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > ---
> >  include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 1 +
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++--
> >  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > index 65d9293f1fb8..cb358551376b 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
> >  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR        1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> >  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE       1805 /* policy rule */
> >  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR   1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */
> > +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */
> >
> >  #define AUDIT_KERNEL           2000    /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index bc99713dfe57..f7230db217a7 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -652,8 +652,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> >         bool uid_token;
> >         int result = 0;
> >
> > -       ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
> > -                                      AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> > +       ab = integrity_audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
> > +                                      AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
> >
> >         entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> >         entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> > --
> > 2.13.6
> >
>