From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
juerg.haefliger@hpe.com, deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
joao.m.martins@oracle.com, pradeep.vincent@oracle.com,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
jsteckli@os.inf.tu-dresden.de,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
chris.hyser@oracle.com, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>, Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Redoing eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) with isolated CPUs in mind (for KVM to isolate its guests per CPU)
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 15:22:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1534861342.14722.11.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ED24D811-C740-417F-A443-B7A249F4FF4C@oracle.com>
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On Tue, 2018-08-21 at 17:01 +0300, Liran Alon wrote:
>
> > On 21 Aug 2018, at 12:57, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> wrote:
> >
> > Another alternative... I'm told POWER8 does an interesting thing
> with
> > hyperthreading and gang scheduling for KVM. The host kernel doesn't
> > actually *see* the hyperthreads at all, and KVM just launches the
> full
> > set of siblings when it enters a guest, and gathers them again when
> any
> > of them exits. That's definitely worth investigating as an option
> for
> > x86, too.
>
> I actually think that such scheduling mechanism which prevents
> leaking cache entries to sibling hyperthreads should co-exist
> together with the KVM address space isolation to fully mitigate L1TF
> and other similar vulnerabilities. The address space isolation should
> prevent VMExit handlers code gadgets from loading arbitrary host
> memory to the cache. Once VMExit code path switches to full host
> address space, then we should also make sure that no other sibling
> hyprethread is running in the guest.
The KVM POWER8 solution (see arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c) does that.
The siblings are *never* running host kernel code; they're all torn
down when any of them exits the guest. And it's always the *same*
guest.
> Focusing on the scheduling mechanism, we must make sure that when a
> logical processor runs guest code, all siblings logical processors
> must run code which do not populate L1D cache with information
> unrelated to this VM. This includes forbidding one logical processor
> to run guest code while sibling is running a host task such as a NIC
> interrupt handler.
> Thus, when a vCPU thread exits the guest into the host and VMExit
> handler reaches code flow which could populate L1D cache with this
> information, we should force an exit from the guest of the siblings
> logical processors, such that they will be allowed to resume only on
> a core which we can promise that the L1D cache is free from
> information unrelated to this VM.
>
> At first, I have created a patch series which attempts to implement
> such mechanism in KVM. However, it became clear to me that this may
> need to be implemented in the scheduler itself. This is because:
> 1. It is difficult to handle all new scheduling contrains only in
> KVM.
> 2. This mechanism should be relevant for any Type-2 hypervisor which
> runs inside Linux besides KVM (Such as VMware Workstation or
> VirtualBox).
> 3. This mechanism could also be used to prevent future “core-cache-
> leaking” vulnerabilities to be exploited between processes of
> different security domains which run as siblings on the same core.
I'm not sure I agree. If KVM is handling "only let siblings run the
*same* guest" and the siblings aren't visible to the host at all,
that's quite simple. Any other hypervisor can also do it.
Now, the down-side of this is that the siblings aren't visible to the
host. They can't be used to run multiple threads of the same userspace
processes; only multiple threads of the same KVM guest. A truly generic
core scheduler would cope with userspace threads too.
BUT I strongly suspect there's a huge correlation between the set of
people who care enough about the KVM/L1TF issue to enable a costly
XFPO-like solution, and the set of people who mostly don't give a shit
about having sibling CPUs available to run the host's userspace anyway.
This is not the "I happen to run a Windows VM on my Linux desktop" use
case...
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-21 16:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-20 21:25 Redoing eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) with isolated CPUs in mind (for KVM to isolate its guests per CPU) Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-08-20 21:48 ` Linus Torvalds
[not found] ` <1534801939.10027.24.camel@amazon.co.uk>
2018-08-20 22:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-20 22:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-20 22:35 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-08-20 22:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-20 23:14 ` David Woodhouse
2018-08-20 23:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-20 23:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-21 9:57 ` David Woodhouse
2018-08-21 14:01 ` Liran Alon
2018-08-21 14:22 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-08-21 23:04 ` Liran Alon
2018-08-30 16:00 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-08-31 15:26 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-01 21:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-09-03 14:51 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-12 15:37 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-13 6:11 ` Juerg Haefliger
2018-09-17 10:01 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-17 10:19 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-17 13:27 ` Christoph Hellwig
2018-09-14 17:06 ` Khalid Aziz
2018-09-17 9:51 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-18 23:00 ` Khalid Aziz
2018-09-24 14:45 ` Stecklina, Julian
2018-10-15 8:07 ` Khalid Aziz
2018-10-24 11:00 ` Khalid Aziz
2018-10-24 15:00 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-03 15:26 ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-04 9:37 ` Julian Stecklina
[not found] ` <CACfEFw_h5uup-anKZwfBcWMJB7gHxb9NEPTRSUAY0+t11RiQbg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-09-03 15:36 ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-07 21:30 ` Khalid Aziz
2018-08-31 8:43 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-19 1:03 ` Balbir Singh
2018-09-19 15:43 ` Jonathan Adams
2018-09-23 2:33 ` Balbir Singh
2018-09-25 14:12 ` Stecklina, Julian
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