From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>,
James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
dhowells@redhat.com, denkenz@gmail.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 17/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]
Date: Tue, 09 Oct 2018 17:48:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <153910373839.12141.5504385590194752512.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153910360263.12141.6032694262361399627.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
This commit adds TPM_LoadKey2 and TPM_FlushSpecific operations.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 94 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
index 8edca3c4c193..6a2d33014ecc 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
@@ -7,11 +7,105 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/trusted.h>
#include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h>
+#define TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC 186
+#define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65
+#define TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE 59
+#define TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE 18
+
+#define TPM_RT_KEY 0x00000001
+
+/*
+ * Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace
+ */
+static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+ uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
+ const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen,
+ uint32_t *newhandle)
+{
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t authhandle = 0;
+ unsigned char cont = 0;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ int ret;
+
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2);
+
+ /* session for loading the key */
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* generate odd nonce */
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+ ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce,
+ nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal,
+ keybloblen, keyblob, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* build the request buffer */
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE + keybloblen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2);
+ store32(tb, keyhandle);
+ storebytes(tb, keyblob, keybloblen);
+ store32(tb, authhandle);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, keyauth,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *newhandle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute the FlushSpecific TPM command
+ */
+static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle)
+{
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC);
+ store32(tb, handle);
+ store32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY);
+
+ return trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+}
+
/*
* Maximum buffer size for the BER/DER encoded public key. The public key
* is of the form SEQUENCE { INTEGER n, INTEGER e } where n is a maximum 2048
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-09 16:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-09 16:46 [PATCH 00/22] KEYS: Support TPM-wrapped key and crypto ops [ver #2] David Howells
2018-10-09 16:46 ` [PATCH 01/22] KEYS: Provide key type operations for asymmetric key " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:46 ` [PATCH 02/22] KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 03/22] KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 04/22] KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 05/22] KEYS: Provide software public key query function " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 06/22] KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 07/22] KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 08/22] KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:47 ` [PATCH 09/22] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 10/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 11/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 12/22] KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 13/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 14/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 15/22] KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` [PATCH 16/22] KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:48 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-10-09 16:49 ` [PATCH 18/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:49 ` [PATCH 19/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:49 ` [PATCH 20/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:49 ` [PATCH 21/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign " David Howells
2018-10-09 16:49 ` [PATCH 22/22] KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation " David Howells
2018-10-09 19:26 ` [PATCH 00/22] KEYS: Support TPM-wrapped key and crypto ops " James Morris
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