LKML Archive on
 help / color / Atom feed
From: Mimi Zohar <>
To: Dave Young <>
Cc: Kairui Song <>,,,,,,,,,,,,
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 11:10:51 -0500
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

On Sun, 2019-01-13 at 09:39 +0800, Dave Young wrote:
> Hi,
> On 01/11/19 at 11:13am, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Fri, 2019-01-11 at 21:43 +0800, Dave Young wrote:
> > [snip]
> > 
> > > Personally I would like to see platform key separated from integrity.
> > > But for the kexec_file part I think it is good at least it works with
> > > this fix.
> > > 
> > > Acked-by: Dave Young <>
> > 
> > The original "platform" keyring patches that Nayna posted multiple
> > times were in the certs directory, but nobody commented/responded.  So
> > she reworked the patches, moving them to the integrity directory and
> > posted them (cc'ing the kexec mailing list).  It's a bit late to be
> > asking to move it, isn't it?
> Hmm, apologize for being late,  I did not get chance to have a look the
> old series.  Since we have the needs now, it should be still fine
> Maybe Kairui can check Nayna's old series, see if he can do something
> again?

Whether the platform keyring is defined in certs/ or in integrity/ the
keyring id needs to be accessible to the other, without making the
keyring id global.  Moving where the platform keyring is defined is
not the problem.

Commit a210fd32a46b ("kexec: add call to LSM hook in original
kexec_load syscall") introduced a new LSM hook.  Assuming
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, with commit b5ca117365d9 ("ima:
prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag") we can
now block the kexec_load syscall.  Without being able to block the
kexec_load syscall, verifying the kexec image signature via the
kexec_file_load syscall is kind of pointless.

Unless you're planning on writing an LSM to prevent the kexec_load
syscall, I assume you'll want to enable integrity anyway.


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-09 16:48 [RFC PATCH 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image Kairui Song
2019-01-09 16:48 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring Kairui Song
2019-01-09 19:21   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-09 16:48 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Kairui Song
2019-01-11 13:43   ` Dave Young
2019-01-11 16:13     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-13  1:39       ` Dave Young
2019-01-14  3:28         ` Kairui Song
2019-01-14 16:10         ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-01-15  2:42           ` Dave Young
2019-01-15  3:10             ` Kairui Song
2019-01-15 15:17             ` nayna

Reply instructions:

You may reply publically to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

LKML Archive on

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/0.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/1.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/2.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/3.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/4.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/5.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/6.git
	git clone --mirror lkml/git/7.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 lkml lkml/ \
	public-inbox-index lkml

Newsgroup available over NNTP:

AGPL code for this site: git clone public-inbox