From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
overlayfs <linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Subject: Re: overlayfs vs. fscrypt
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 09:13:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1552493632.3022.17.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190313155144.GC703@sol.localdomain>
On Wed, 2019-03-13 at 08:51 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:36:34AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Wed, 2019-03-13 at 11:16 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> > > So before we talk about how to make things work from a technical
> > > perspective, we should consider what the use case happens to be,
> > > and what are the security requirements. *Why* are we trying to
> > > use the combination of overlayfs and fscrypt, and what are the
> > > security properties we are trying to provide to someone who is
> > > relying on this combination?
> >
> > I can give one: encrypted containers:
> >
> > https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/issues/747
> >
> > The current proposal imagines that the key would be delivered to
> > the physical node and the physical node containerd would decrypt
> > all the layers before handing them off to to the kubelet. However,
> > one could imagine a slightly more secure use case where the layers
> > were constructed as an encrypted filesystem tar and so the key
> > would go into the kernel and the layers would be constructed with
> > encryption in place using fscrypt.
> >
> > Most of the desired security properties are in image at rest but
> > one can imagine that the running image wants some protection
> > against containment breaches by other tenants and using fscrypt
> > could provide that.
> >
>
> What do you mean by "containment breaches by other tenants"? Note
> that while the key is added, fscrypt doesn't prevent access to the
> encrypted files.
You mean it's not multiuser safe? Even if user a owns the key they add
user b can still see the decrypted contents?
> fscrypt is orthogonal to OS-level access control (UNIX mode bits,
> ACLs, SELinux, etc.), which can and should be used alongside
> fscrypt. fscrypt is a storage encryption mechanism, not an OS-level
> access control mechanism.
I was assuming in the multi-user case that if you don't own the keyring
you can't see the files. I suppose absent that it boils down to a
possible way to do the layering then as an fscrypt image rather than
tar then encrypt.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-13 16:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-13 12:31 overlayfs vs. fscrypt Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 12:36 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-03-13 12:47 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 12:58 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-03-13 13:00 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 13:24 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-03-13 13:32 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 14:26 ` Amir Goldstein
2019-03-13 15:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-03-13 15:30 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 15:36 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 15:51 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 16:13 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2019-03-13 16:24 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 16:44 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-03-13 17:45 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 18:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-03-13 19:17 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 19:57 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 20:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 20:25 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 21:04 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 22:13 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 22:29 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 22:58 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 16:06 ` Al Viro
2019-03-13 16:44 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 19:19 ` Al Viro
2019-03-13 19:43 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 15:30 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 20:33 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-13 22:26 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 22:42 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 7:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2019-03-14 17:15 ` [RFC] fscrypt_key_required mount option Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 17:15 ` [PATCH 1/4] fscrypt: Implement FS_CFLG_OWN_D_OPS Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 17:15 ` [PATCH 2/4] fscrypt: Export fscrypt_d_ops Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 17:15 ` [PATCH 3/4] ubifs: Simplify fscrypt_get_encryption_info() error handling Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 17:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Implement new mount option, fscrypt_key_required Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 17:49 ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-14 20:54 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 23:07 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-03-15 7:48 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-15 13:51 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-03-15 13:59 ` Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14 23:15 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-14 23:42 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-03-14 23:55 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-13 15:01 ` overlayfs vs. fscrypt Eric Biggers
2019-03-13 16:11 ` Al Viro
2019-03-13 16:33 ` Eric Biggers
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