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From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, chang.seok.bae@intel.com,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 03/17] x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 13:06:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1568318818-4091-4-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1568318818-4091-1-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

This is temporary.  It will allow the next few patches to be tested
incrementally.

Setting unsafe_fsgsbase is a root hole.  Don't do it.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
---

Changes from v7: none
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 1c67acd..2ff72af 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2875,6 +2875,9 @@
 	no5lvl		[X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
 			kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
 
+	unsafe_fsgsbase	[X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions.  This will be
+			replaced with a nofsgsbase flag.
+
 	no_console_suspend
 			[HW] Never suspend the console
 			Disable suspending of consoles during suspend and
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 9ae7d1b..9f57fb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -438,6 +438,22 @@ static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
+ * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally.
+ *
+ * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
+ * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
+ */
+static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
+
+static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+{
+	unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+
+/*
  * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
  */
 static bool pku_disabled;
@@ -1455,6 +1471,14 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_smap(c);
 	setup_umip(c);
 
+	/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+		if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
+			cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+		else
+			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
 	 * Now we do "generic changes."
-- 
2.7.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-09-12 20:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-12 20:06 [PATCH v8 00/17] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base write Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` Chang S. Bae [this message]
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE in switch_to() if available Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] x86/entry/64: Clean up paranoid exit Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] x86/entry/64: Document GSBASE handling in the paranoid path Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Chang S. Bae
2019-09-12 20:06 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode Chang S. Bae
2019-09-27 21:25   ` Randy Dunlap
2019-09-27 21:50     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-09-13  4:10 ` [PATCH v8 00/17] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-16  9:21   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-09-18 21:02   ` Bae, Chang Seok

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