From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY,USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6422ECE58D for ; Mon, 7 Oct 2019 08:52:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBB412084B for ; Mon, 7 Oct 2019 08:52:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727416AbfJGIwK (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2019 04:52:10 -0400 Received: from mailgw01.mediatek.com ([210.61.82.183]:7137 "EHLO mailgw01.mediatek.com" rhost-flags-OK-FAIL-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727258AbfJGIwJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2019 04:52:09 -0400 X-UUID: 6eaafef2995a4a6aa98d7ddc6c762b60-20191007 X-UUID: 6eaafef2995a4a6aa98d7ddc6c762b60-20191007 Received: from mtkcas08.mediatek.inc [(172.21.101.126)] by mailgw01.mediatek.com (envelope-from ) (Cellopoint E-mail Firewall v4.1.10 Build 0809 with TLS) with ESMTP id 684474058; Mon, 07 Oct 2019 16:51:59 +0800 Received: from mtkcas08.mediatek.inc (172.21.101.126) by mtkmbs07n1.mediatek.inc (172.21.101.16) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1395.4; Mon, 7 Oct 2019 16:51:56 +0800 Received: from [172.21.84.99] (172.21.84.99) by mtkcas08.mediatek.inc (172.21.101.73) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 15.0.1395.4 via Frontend Transport; Mon, 7 Oct 2019 16:51:56 +0800 Message-ID: <1570438317.4686.44.camel@mtksdccf07> Subject: Re: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y From: Walter Wu To: Dmitry Vyukov CC: Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Matthias Brugger , LKML , kasan-dev , Linux-MM , Linux ARM , , wsd_upstream Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 16:51:57 +0800 In-Reply-To: References: <20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> <1569594142.9045.24.camel@mtksdccf07> <1569818173.17361.19.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570018513.19702.36.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570069078.19702.57.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570095525.19702.59.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570110681.19702.64.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570164140.19702.97.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570176131.19702.105.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570182257.19702.109.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570190718.19702.125.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570418576.4686.30.camel@mtksdccf07> <1570436289.4686.40.camel@mtksdccf07> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.2.3-0ubuntu6 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MTK: N Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2019-10-07 at 10:24 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 10:18 AM Walter Wu wrote: > > The patchsets help to produce KASAN report when size is negative numbers > > in memory operation function. It is helpful for programmer to solve the > > undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and > > suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1. > > > > [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 > > [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/ > > > > Walter Wu (2): > > kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function > > kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove > > > > lib/test_kasan.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ > > mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++----- > > mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 +++++ > > mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > > mm/kasan/tags.c | 5 +++++ > > mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > > 6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > commit 5b3b68660b3d420fd2bd792f2d9fd3ccb8877ef7 > > Author: Walter-zh Wu > > Date: Fri Oct 4 18:38:31 2019 +0800 > > > > kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function > > > > It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative numbers to > > memset()/memcpy()/memmove() > > , so need to be detected by KASAN. > > > > If size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons to be defined > > as out-of-bounds bug type. > > 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a > > large > > size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this > > can > > qualify as out-of-bounds. > > 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate reports > > by > > some systems, e.g. syzbot. > > > > KASAN report: > > > > BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 > > Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task > > cat/72 > > > > CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted > > 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 > > Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) > > Call trace: > > dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 > > show_stack+0x14/0x20 > > dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 > > print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 > > __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 > > kasan_report+0xc/0x18 > > check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 > > memmove+0x34/0x88 > > kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 > > > > [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 > > > > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu > > Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov > > Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov > > > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c > > index 6814d6d6a023..6ef0abd27f06 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c > > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); > > #undef memset > > void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > > { > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_); > > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > > + return NULL; > > > > return __memset(addr, c, len); > > } > > @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > > #undef memmove > > void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > > { > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || > > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > > + return NULL; > > > > return __memmove(dest, src, len); > > } > > @@ -119,8 +121,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t > > len) > > #undef memcpy > > void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > > { > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || > > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > > + return NULL; > > > > return __memcpy(dest, src, len); > > } > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c > > index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c > > @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool > > check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr, > > if (unlikely(size == 0)) > > return true; > > > > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { > > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > > + return false; > > + } > > + > > if (unlikely((void *)addr < > > kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) { > > kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > > index 36c645939bc9..ed0eb94cb811 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > > @@ -107,6 +107,18 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct > > kasan_access_info *info) > > > > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > > { > > + /* > > + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons > > + * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. > > + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as > > + * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > > + * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate > > reports > > + * by some systems, e.g. syzbot. > > + */ > > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) > > + return "out-of-bounds"; > > "out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. It won't > prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the frequent one. /* * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as * a "large" size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate reports * by some systems, e.g. syzbot. "out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. * It won't prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the frequent one. */ We directly add it into the comment. > > > if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr)) > > return get_shadow_bug_type(info); > > return get_wild_bug_type(info); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c > > index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c > > @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t > > size, bool write, > > if (unlikely(size == 0)) > > return true; > > > > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { > > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > > + return false; > > + } > > + > > tag = get_tag((const void *)addr); > > > > /* > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > > index 969ae08f59d7..012fbe3a793f 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > > @@ -36,6 +36,18 @@ > > > > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > > { > > + /* > > + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons > > + * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. > > + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as > > + * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > > + * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate > > reports > > + * by some systems, e.g. syzbot. > > + */ > > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) > > + return "out-of-bounds"; > > + > > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY > > struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; > > struct kmem_cache *cache; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > commit fb5cf7bd16e939d1feef229af0211a8616c9ea03 > > Author: Walter-zh Wu > > Date: Fri Oct 4 18:32:03 2019 +0800 > > > > kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove > > > > Test size is negative vaule in memmove in order to verify > > if it correctly get KASAN report. > > > > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu > > > > diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c > > index 49cc4d570a40..06942cf585cc 100644 > > --- a/lib/test_kasan.c > > +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c > > @@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ static noinline void __init > > kmalloc_oob_in_memset(void) > > kfree(ptr); > > } > > > > +static noinline void __init kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(void) > > +{ > > + char *ptr; > > + size_t size = 64; > > + > > + pr_info("invalid size in memmove\n"); > > + ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!ptr) { > > + pr_err("Allocation failed\n"); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64); > > + memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, -2); > > + kfree(ptr); > > +} > > + > > static noinline void __init kmalloc_uaf(void) > > { > > char *ptr; > > @@ -773,6 +790,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void) > > kmalloc_oob_memset_4(); > > kmalloc_oob_memset_8(); > > kmalloc_oob_memset_16(); > > + kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(); > > kmalloc_uaf(); > > kmalloc_uaf_memset(); > > kmalloc_uaf2(); > > > > > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/1570436289.4686.40.camel%40mtksdccf07.