From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B556DC47404 for ; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 01:14:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 820B420867 for ; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 01:14:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729500AbfJHBOv (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2019 21:14:51 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:3620 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728983AbfJHBOv (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2019 21:14:51 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x981Brnd010334 for ; Mon, 7 Oct 2019 21:14:50 -0400 Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vgfrjsewp-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 07 Oct 2019 21:14:49 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 8 Oct 2019 02:14:44 +0100 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x981ECxP36372934 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 8 Oct 2019 01:14:13 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83ED411C054; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 01:14:42 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECC7B11C04C; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 01:14:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.231.8]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 01:14:39 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v7 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 21:14:19 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19100801-0008-0000-0000-0000031EF96D X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19100801-0009-0000-0000-00004A3E0C47 Message-Id: <1570497267-13672-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-07_05:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910080011 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patchset extends the previous version of the patchset[1] by adding the support for checking against the binary blacklisted hashes. IMA subsystem supports custom, built-in, arch-specific policies to define the files to be measured and appraised. These policies are honored based on the priority where arch-specific policies is the highest and custom is the lowest. PowerNV systems uses the linux based bootloader and kexec the Host OS. It rely on IMA for signature verification of the kernel before doing the kexec. This patchset adds support for powerpc arch specific ima policies that are defined based on system's OS secureboot and trustedboot state. The OS secureboot and trustedboot state are determined via device-tree properties. The verification needs to be done only for the binaries which are not blacklisted. The kernel currently checks against the blacklisted keys. However that results in blacklisting all the binaries that are signed by that key. In order to prevent single binary from loading, it is required to support checking against blacklisting of the binary hash. This patchset adds the support in IMA to check against blacklisted hashes for the files signed by appended signature. [1] http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/cover/1149262/ Changelog: v7: * Removes patch related to dt-bindings as per input from Rob Herring. * fixes Patch 1/8 to use new device-tree updates as per Oliver feedback to device-tree documentation in skiboot mailing list. (https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/skiboot/2019-September/015329.html) * Includes feedbacks from Mimi, Thiago * moves function get_powerpc_fw_sb_node() from Patch 1 to Patch 3 * fixes Patch 2/8 to use CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE. * updates Patch description in Patch 5/8 * adds a new patch to add wrapper is_binary_blacklisted() * removes the patch that deprecated permit_directio v6: * includes feedbacks from Michael Ellerman on the patchset v5 * removed email ids from comments * add the doc for the device-tree * renames the secboot.c to secure_boot.c and secboot.h to secure_boot.h * other code specific fixes * split the patches to differentiate between secureboot and trustedboot state of the system * adds the patches to support the blacklisting of the binary hash. v5: * secureboot state is now read via device tree entry rather than OPAL secure variables * ima arch policies are updated to use policy based template for measurement rules v4: * Fixed the build issue as reported by Satheesh Rajendran. v3: * OPAL APIs in Patch 1 are updated to provide generic interface based on key/keylen. This patchset updates kernel OPAL APIs to be compatible with generic interface. * Patch 2 is cleaned up to use new OPAL APIs. * Since OPAL can support different types of backend which can vary in the variable interpretation, the Patch 2 is updated to add a check for the backend version * OPAL API now expects consumer to first check the supported backend version before calling other secvar OPAL APIs. This check is now added in patch 2. * IMA policies in Patch 3 is updated to specify appended signature and per policy template. * The patches now are free of any EFIisms. v2: * Removed Patch 1: powerpc/include: Override unneeded early ioremap functions * Updated Subject line and patch description of the Patch 1 of this series * Removed dependency of OPAL_SECVAR on EFI, CPU_BIG_ENDIAN and UCS2_STRING * Changed OPAL APIs from static to non-static. Added opal-secvar.h for the same * Removed EFI hooks from opal_secvar.c * Removed opal_secvar_get_next(), opal_secvar_enqueue() and opal_query_variable_info() function * get_powerpc_sb_mode() in secboot.c now directly calls OPAL Runtime API rather than via EFI hooks. * Fixed log messages in get_powerpc_sb_mode() function. * Added dependency for PPC_SECURE_BOOT on configs PPC64 and OPAL_SECVAR * Replaced obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) with obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) in arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile *** BLURB HERE *** Nayna Jain (8): powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system powerpc: add support to initialize ima policy rules powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 12 ++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 35 ++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ certs/blacklist.c | 9 +++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 6 ++ include/linux/ima.h | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 12 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 39 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 41 +++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 10 +++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 14 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c -- 2.20.1