From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
"Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>,
Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2019 08:48:58 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1571575738.5342.7.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1571508377-23603-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
On Sat, 2019-10-19 at 14:06 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be
> booted, trusted boot takes a measurement of the kernel image prior to
> boot that can be subsequently compared against good known values via
> attestation services.
>
Instead of "takes a measurement", either "stores a measurement" or
"calculates the file hash of the kernel image and stores the
measurement prior to boot, that".
> This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state
> is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the IMA
> arch-specific policies.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 6 ++++++
> arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h
> index 07d0fe0ca81f..a2ff556916c6 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c
> index 99bba7915629..9753470ab08a 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,17 @@
> #include <linux/of.h>
> #include <asm/secure_boot.h>
>
> +static struct device_node *get_ppc_fw_sb_node(void)
> +{
> + static const struct of_device_id ids[] = {
> + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v1", },
> + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v2", },
> + {},
> + };
> +
scripts/checkpatch.pl is complaining that secureboot-v1, secureboot-v2
are not documented in the device tree bindings.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-20 12:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-19 18:06 [PATCH v8 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Nayna Jain
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-22 23:37 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Nayna Jain
2019-10-20 0:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-20 12:48 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-10-22 23:38 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy Nayna Jain
2019-10-20 0:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Nayna Jain
2019-10-20 1:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Nayna Jain
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Nayna Jain
2019-10-20 0:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-20 16:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-20 16:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Nayna Jain
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