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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oupton@google.com
Subject: [FYI PATCH 3/3] KVM: nVMX: Check IO instruction VM-exit conditions
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 19:56:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1582570596-45387-4-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1582570596-45387-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>

From: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>

Consult the 'unconditional IO exiting' and 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution
controls when checking instruction interception. If the 'use IO bitmaps'
VM-execution control is 1, check the instruction access against the IO
bitmaps to determine if the instruction causes a VM-exit.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index f979832c394d..e920d7834d73 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -5353,7 +5353,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 {
 	unsigned long exit_qualification;
-	unsigned int port;
+	unsigned short port;
 	int size;
 
 	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 5801a86f9c24..63aaf44edd1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7145,6 +7145,39 @@ static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	to_vmx(vcpu)->req_immediate_exit = true;
 }
 
+static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct x86_instruction_info *info)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	unsigned short port;
+	bool intercept;
+	int size;
+
+	if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
+	    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
+		port = info->src_val;
+		size = info->dst_bytes;
+	} else {
+		port = info->dst_val;
+		size = info->src_bytes;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution control is 0, IO instruction
+	 * VM-exits depend on the 'unconditional IO exiting' VM-execution
+	 * control.
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, IO instruction VM-exits are controlled by the IO bitmaps.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+		intercept = nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
+					   CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
+	else
+		intercept = nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+
+	return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
 static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			       struct x86_instruction_info *info,
 			       enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
@@ -7152,18 +7185,30 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
 
+	switch (info->intercept) {
 	/*
 	 * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
 	 * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
 	 */
-	if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_rdtscp &&
-	    !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
-		ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
-		ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
-		return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
-	}
+	case x86_intercept_rdtscp:
+		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
+			ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
+			ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
+			return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case x86_intercept_in:
+	case x86_intercept_ins:
+	case x86_intercept_out:
+	case x86_intercept_outs:
+		return vmx_check_intercept_io(vcpu, info);
 
 	/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 }
 
-- 
1.8.3.1


      parent reply	other threads:[~2020-02-24 18:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-24 18:56 [FYI PATCH 0/3] CVE-2020-2732 Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-24 18:56 ` [FYI PATCH 1/3] KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-29 18:00   ` Jan Kiszka
2020-02-29 18:33     ` Oliver Upton
2020-02-29 19:00       ` Jim Mattson
2020-02-29 19:21         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-02-29 20:17           ` Jim Mattson
2020-02-29 20:36             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-02-24 18:56 ` [FYI PATCH 2/3] KVM: nVMX: Refactor IO bitmap checks into helper function Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-24 18:56 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]

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