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From: "tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	x86 <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks
Date: Sat, 04 Jul 2020 17:49:10 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <159388495037.4006.7851835406474127743.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <881de09e786ab93ce56ee4a2437ba2c308afe7a9.1593795633.git.luto@kernel.org>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     3c73b81a9164d0c1b6379d6672d2772a9e95168e
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/3c73b81a9164d0c1b6379d6672d2772a9e95168e
Author:        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
AuthorDate:    Fri, 03 Jul 2020 10:02:54 -07:00
Committer:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Sat, 04 Jul 2020 19:47:25 +02:00

x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks

Chasing down a Xen bug caused me to realize that the new entry sanity
checks are still fairly weak.  Add some more checks.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/881de09e786ab93ce56ee4a2437ba2c308afe7a9.1593795633.git.luto@kernel.org

---
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c | 11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index f392a8b..e83b3f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -49,6 +49,23 @@
 static void check_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) {
+		/*
+		 * Make sure that the entry code gave us a sensible EFLAGS
+		 * register.  Native because we want to check the actual CPU
+		 * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
+		 */
+		unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF |
+				      X86_EFLAGS_NT));
+
+		/* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs));
+
+		/*
+		 * All entries from user mode (except #DF) should be on the
+		 * normal thread stack and should have user pt_regs in the
+		 * correct location.
+		 */
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(!on_thread_stack());
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
 	}
@@ -577,6 +594,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(ni_syscall)
 bool noinstr idtentry_enter_cond_rcu(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
+		check_user_regs(regs);
 		enter_from_user_mode();
 		return false;
 	}
@@ -710,6 +728,7 @@ void noinstr idtentry_exit_cond_rcu(struct pt_regs *regs, bool rcu_exit)
  */
 void noinstr idtentry_enter_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	check_user_regs(regs);
 	enter_from_user_mode();
 }
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c
index 970e5e1..a108b80 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c
@@ -81,5 +81,16 @@ int main(void)
 	printf("[RUN]\tSet NT|AC|TF and issue a syscall\n");
 	do_it(X86_EFLAGS_NT | X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_TF);
 
+	/*
+	 * Now try DF.  This is evil and it's plausible that we will crash
+	 * glibc, but glibc would have to do something rather surprising
+	 * for this to happen.
+	 */
+	printf("[RUN]\tSet DF and issue a syscall\n");
+	do_it(X86_EFLAGS_DF);
+
+	printf("[RUN]\tSet TF|DF and issue a syscall\n");
+	do_it(X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_DF);
+
 	return nerrs == 0 ? 0 : 1;
 }

  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-04 17:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-03 17:02 [PATCH entry v2 0/6] x86/entry: Fixes and cleanups Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 17:02 ` [PATCH entry v2 1/6] x86/entry/compat: Clear RAX high bits on Xen PV SYSENTER Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-04 17:49   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 17:02 ` [PATCH entry v2 2/6] x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-04 17:49   ` tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-08-20 10:23     ` [tip: x86/urgent] " peterz
2020-08-22 21:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 17:02 ` [PATCH entry v2 3/6] x86/entry/xen: Route #DB correctly on Xen PV Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-04 17:49   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-06  8:41   ` [PATCH entry v2 3/6] " Michal Kubecek
2020-07-06  8:57     ` Jürgen Groß
2020-07-06  9:32       ` Michal Kubecek
2020-07-03 17:02 ` [PATCH entry v2 4/6] x86/entry/32: Fix #MC and #DB wiring on x86_32 Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-04 17:49   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 17:02 ` [PATCH entry v2 5/6] x86/ldt: Disable 16-bit segments on Xen PV Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 19:00   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-07-04 17:49   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 17:02 ` [PATCH entry v2 6/6] x86/entry: Rename idtentry_enter/exit_cond_rcu() to idtentry_enter/exit() Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-07  8:23   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 17:31 ` [PATCH entry v2 0/6] x86/entry: Fixes and cleanups Peter Zijlstra

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