From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31B28C43381 for ; Fri, 8 Jan 2021 09:53:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE132235FA for ; Fri, 8 Jan 2021 09:53:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728322AbhAHJxB (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Jan 2021 04:53:01 -0500 Received: from so254-31.mailgun.net ([198.61.254.31]:32575 "EHLO so254-31.mailgun.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728299AbhAHJxA (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Jan 2021 04:53:00 -0500 DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; v=1; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mg.codeaurora.org; q=dns/txt; s=smtp; t=1610099554; h=Message-Id: Date: Subject: Cc: To: From: Sender; bh=TwVrvVK1OzG/lArxagrlCuTmDgJ2ODUQJRFSPWgtUOk=; b=j2UcN/8uNh1hpG8UJPAXxbUEOF3mdXUqcamkhx3eEngMo9dA4inqyaXFabAGURPYMhRMKOIW uB2g1DYGFznqz3PyMH7g1kqSms998DtwTFTwGqsBm31vOyD5qT7QaPa45f0YgT5rMipfHlVK pjAlTAV/Th/atfXB8m01pJ1Vs+o= X-Mailgun-Sending-Ip: 198.61.254.31 X-Mailgun-Sid: WyI0MWYwYSIsICJsaW51eC1rZXJuZWxAdmdlci5rZXJuZWwub3JnIiwgImJlOWU0YSJd Received: from smtp.codeaurora.org (ec2-35-166-182-171.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [35.166.182.171]) by smtp-out-n08.prod.us-east-1.postgun.com with SMTP id 5ff82b43d092322d9e7779eb (version=TLS1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256); Fri, 08 Jan 2021 09:52:03 GMT Sender: pnagar=codeaurora.org@mg.codeaurora.org Received: by smtp.codeaurora.org (Postfix, from userid 1001) id A2CC0C43468; Fri, 8 Jan 2021 09:52:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pnagar-linux.qualcomm.com (unknown [202.46.22.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: pnagar) by smtp.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C6A8EC433C6; Fri, 8 Jan 2021 09:51:56 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 smtp.codeaurora.org C6A8EC433C6 Authentication-Results: aws-us-west-2-caf-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=codeaurora.org Authentication-Results: aws-us-west-2-caf-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=pnagar@codeaurora.org From: Preeti Nagar To: arnd@arndb.de, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: psodagud@codeaurora.org, nmardana@codeaurora.org, dsule@codeaurora.org, pnagar@codeaurora.org, Joe Perches , Miguel Ojeda , Nick Desaulniers , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v2] selinux: security: Move selinux_state to a separate page Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 15:19:47 +0530 Message-Id: <1610099389-28329-1-git-send-email-pnagar@codeaurora.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The changes introduce a new security feature, RunTime Integrity Check (RTIC), designed to protect Linux Kernel at runtime. The motivation behind these changes is: 1. The system protection offered by SE for Android relies on the assumption of kernel integrity. If the kernel itself is compromised (by a perhaps as yet unknown future vulnerability), SE for Android security mechanisms could potentially be disabled and rendered ineffective. 2. Qualcomm Snapdragon devices use Secure Boot, which adds cryptographic checks to each stage of the boot-up process, to assert the authenticity of all secure software images that the device executes. However, due to various vulnerabilities in SW modules, the integrity of the system can be compromised at any time after device boot-up, leading to un-authorized SW executing. The feature's idea is to move some sensitive kernel structures to a separate page and monitor further any unauthorized changes to these, from higher Exception Levels using stage 2 MMU. Moving these to a different page will help avoid getting page faults from un-related data. Using this mechanism, some sensitive variables of the kernel which are initialized after init or are updated rarely can also be protected from simple overwrites and attacks trying to modify these. Currently, the change moves selinux_state structure to a separate page. In future we plan to move more security-related kernel assets to this page to enhance protection. We want to seek your suggestions and comments on the idea and the changes in the patch. Signed-off-by: Preeti Nagar --- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/linux/init.h | 4 ++++ security/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h index b2b3d81..158dbc2 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h @@ -770,6 +770,15 @@ *(.scommon) \ } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_RTIC +#define RTIC_BSS \ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \ + KEEP(*(.bss.rtic)) \ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); +#else +#define RTIC_BSS +#endif + /* * Allow archectures to redefine BSS_FIRST_SECTIONS to add extra * sections to the front of bss. @@ -782,6 +791,7 @@ . = ALIGN(bss_align); \ .bss : AT(ADDR(.bss) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \ BSS_FIRST_SECTIONS \ + RTIC_BSS \ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \ *(.bss..page_aligned) \ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \ diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h index 7b53cb3..617adcf 100644 --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -300,6 +300,10 @@ void __init parse_early_options(char *cmdline); /* Data marked not to be saved by software suspend */ #define __nosavedata __section(".data..nosave") +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_RTIC +#define __rticdata __section(".bss.rtic") +#endif + #ifdef MODULE #define __exit_p(x) x #else diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 7561f6f..66b61b9 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -291,5 +291,15 @@ config LSM source "security/Kconfig.hardening" +config SECURITY_RTIC + bool "RunTime Integrity Check feature" + help + RTIC(RunTime Integrity Check) feature is to protect Linux kernel + at runtime. This relocates some of the security sensitive kernel + structures to a separate page aligned special section. + + This is to enable monitoring and protection of these kernel assets + from a higher exception level(EL) against any unauthorized changes. + endmenu diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6b1826f..7add17c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -104,7 +104,11 @@ #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_RTIC +struct selinux_state selinux_state __rticdata; +#else struct selinux_state selinux_state; +#endif /* SECMARK reference count */ static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); -- 2.7.4